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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the influence of executive ideological orientation on state 
foreign policy behavior. I advance an analytical model which asserts that foreign policy 
decisionmakers act in a manner consistent with the ideological principles presented in 
their political platforms, party manifestos, and their voters' expectations. Thus, I assert 
that within developed democracies, the further right a government is, the higher the 
propensity to behave more aggressively. Oppositely, the further left a government is, the 
more likely it is to behave more cooperatively.  
 I empirically analyze this theoretical argument by developing three models where 
the foreign policy behavior is measured uniquely in each separate model. I estimate 
executive ideology by using two proxies: one which estimates the overall ideology of the 
executive while the other captures only the foreign policy dimension of executive 
ideology. To test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model, I create a new 
dataset of responses to international crises. Foreign policy behavior is operationalized as 
an ordinal variable which takes into account a complex range of actions that governments 
take in the international arena, such as providing aid, mediation, non intervention, 
condemnation, sanctions, and the use of force. I employ Logit and Orderd Logit statistical 
analyses on a large-N cross national model. My dissertation focuses on all 22 OECD 
countries, during the period 1977 to 2001.  
 The empirical findings partially support my theoretical argument, contingent upon 
the proxy used for executive ideology and the way state behavior is estimated. I find 
consistent support to my argument if executive ideology is estimated with the proxy 
which contains only the party manifestos' foreign policy variables. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived 
as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine 
distinctions of the statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in 
the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and 
absolute evil (Morgenthau 1967, 165). 
 
 If society "forgets" what a university is, the powers and practices of 
professor and student cease to exist; if the United States and Soviet 
Union decide that they are no longer enemies, "the cold war is over." 
It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize 
our actions (Wendt 1992, 397). 
 
 Ideologies are important because they constitute the framework in 
which policymakers deal with specific issues and in which the attentive 
public understands those issues (Hunt 1987, 16). 
 
 
The post-Cold War security environment 
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent developments associated with it, such as the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the changing balance of power in the international 
system, the emergence of a new range of security challenges, and consequently, the push 
for a new set of responses to those challenges, marks a new stage in relationships among 
states. A number of events, among which, the first Gulf War, the war in the former 
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Yugoslavia, the ethnic conflicts in Africa, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and 
the subsequent military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, have contributed to the 
creation of a new international security environment, characterized by uncertainty, 
turbulence, and rapid change. The result is that the  nature of the international system is 
changing and states are trying to adapt to these new conditions. In Henry Kissinger's 
words (2007),  
"the international system is in a state of upheaval, but there are different kinds of 
upheaval in different parts of the world. One characteristic is that the nation and 
the state, as we have known it, are in the process of transformation in most parts 
of the world. So some of what were thought of as universal principles of 
international relations are changing".  
 As the danger of nuclear confrontation between the two former enemies, the 
United States and Soviet Union, decreased significantly, the concept of balance of power 
decreased in relevance when it came to explaining international politics. In the present 
world, the main enemies of the developed countries are no longer states. The present 
unconventional dangers in the world, such as terrorism, can not be fought entirely with 
conventional militaries and nuclear weapons have lost much of their effectiveness and 
deterring power in the face of an enemy without precise coordinates. Under these new 
circumstances, the balance of power no longer provides the same leverage in explaining 
phenomena in world politics. 
 A new range of international security challenges emerged in the aftermath of the 
Cold War. First, states' vulnerability, particularly that of the Western democracies, is on 
the rise due to an increasing wave of extremism and Islamic religious fundamentalism 
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(Tibi 1998, Neumann 2006). In strict connection with this Islamic religious 
fundamentalism, transnational terrorism poses a serious threat to the governments and 
societies of the West and is here to stay for a long time (Hoffmann 1998, Gunaratna 
2004). The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is another international security 
threat which, if not contained, may have a serious impact on global stability (Betts 1998, 
Talbott 1999). The fluctuating tensions between the two nuclear powers, India and 
Pakistan, the will of Iran to develop its nuclear program, and North Korea's ambitions to 
acquire more nuclear weapons and improve its arsenal, demonstrate the gravity of this 
threat. As dangerous as the previous challenges, nationalism and the outbreak of ethnic 
conflicts as a result of long ethnic tensions, poverty, and undemocratic rule, may have 
serious regional consequences (Lake and Rothchild 1996, Harff and Gurr 2004). The long 
war in the former Yugoslavia, the atrocities committed in Sudan, Rwanda, and Somalia, 
had a strong ethnic component and required outside interventions in order to end.  
 How do states react to these recent developments? Are military capabilities still 
the answer when dealing with these new threats? After half a century dominated by a 
conventional and nuclear arms race between East and West and with the Cold War's 
ideologically based polarization gone, most states changed their approaches on how to 
tackle the different security challenges they confront. The complexity and volatility of the 
new security environment reduced states' ability to resolve disputes and deal with crises 
just by using the military force (Nye Jr. 2002, 5-12). For instance, given the impressive 
economic and financial interdependence between China and the United States, a trade 
dispute between the two countries can not be settled by resorting to arms. Moreover. 
because wars are costly tools of foreign policy and many times they lead to significant 
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casualties and high political costs, governments are reluctant to use military force. As 
Haass asserts (1994, 22-23), "despite some predictions to the contrary, the passing of the 
Cold War has made intervention decisions more commonplace and complex... Military 
intervention in any form is expensive... There is the danger, too, that an intervention that 
fares poorly, particularly one that becomes a "quagmire," could sour Americans on their 
world role and trigger a renewed bout of isolationism at home, thereby leaving them 
unable to use force when they really should or need to".  
 Thus, wars between and among states became a rare phenomenon, but 
governments may resort to a wide range of foreign policy tools. They may engage in the 
world affairs by using various instruments, among which we can identify foreign aid, 
mediation, peacekeeping missions, sanctions, the threat of the use of force, and so on. 
When getting involved, they can choose to act either alone, with other countries under the 
auspices of international institutions, or along with allies, old or new.  
 
Analyzing the determinants of state behavior 
In this study, I address the determinants of state strategic behavior with a main focus on 
the political ideology of governments. Specifically, I analyze the way in which the 
ideological orientation of the foreign policy decisionmakers influence the way in which 
they engage their states in world affairs. Thus, I examine, primarily, if left wing 
governments differ from right wing ones in their propensity to act more hawkishly or 
dovishly in international arena. In order to do this, I propose a theoretical model and 
empirical test of the conditions, at both domestic and international level, which determine 
governments' ideological predispositions toward accommodationist or aggressive 
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behavior. I contend that political ideology of the executive, economic interdependence, 
and power status, are significant determinants of strategic behavior. 
 Research on state behavior (Mearsheimer 2001, Keohane 1984, Kissinger 1974, 
Organski 1968) has been mostly directed at material factors while ideational factors have 
been largely ignored. For a long while, state capabilities (Morgenthau 1967) and the 
distribution of power in the international system (Waltz 1979) have been prominent in 
discussions of international interactions. Then, as a reaction to this research agenda, it 
was the thesis that economics matter, namely, the nature of economic relationships 
between states shapes their behavior (Rosecrance 1986). This focus on material factors is 
partly explained by the fact that the material structure of the international system is more 
accessible to researchers and more amenable to measurement, not that ideational factors 
have no significant impact on foreign policy decisions.  
 More recently, IR scholars have come to challenge the preeminence of 
materialism,  asserting the relevance of ideational determinants of state behavior (Wendt 
1992, Hudson 1997). How is possible that similarly powerful states more often than not 
choose to react differently to the same international constraints? Their answer was that 
domestic politics plays an important role and that foreign policy decisions must be 
examined in such a way to take into consideration the socio-cultural and political 
environment in which decisionmakers operate. Among these ideational factors, it was 
conceived that decisionmakers' political ideologies, perceptions, and images play an 
essential role, and also, a nation's culture and the national identity may shape  foreign 
policy (George 1979, Herman 1993, Rosen 1996).  
 Fundamental questions in international relations cannot not be entirely answered 
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without understanding the role played by foreign policy decionmakers' political 
ideologies. Ideologies are important because they explain and evaluate social conditions 
and provide a program for social action (Ball and Dagger 2004, 4). They simplify a vast 
and complex reality and limit the freedom of choice when action is required. Ideologies 
explain cause and effect and evaluate the social environment with approval and disproval. 
In the foreign policy domain, "ideological conviction ... is inherently revolutionary and 
aggressive because it transforms relations between states from a difference of interests, 
which it is right to seek to conciliate, into a conflict between philosophies in which to 
compromise is unrighteous" (Kissinger 1964, cited in Freeman 1994, p.173). Therefore, 
under similar circumstances, different political ideologies may demand their subscribers, 
foreign policy decisionmakers included, to act in different ways.  
 The post World War II period shows mixed results when it comes to explaining 
states' strategic behavior from the perspective of decisionmakers' ideology. There are 
instances when political parties' positions on some international politics issues are clearly 
defined by their location on the ideological left-right spectrum. For example, with regard 
to Iran's nuclear program, there were significant differences among different political 
groups in the European Parliament, when they were negotiating, in 2008, the further steps 
after the sanctions' failure imposed on Iran. Since UEN's (the Union for the Europe of the 
Nations) position did not exclude a military intervention against Iran, the Greens and 
GUE (European United Left) supported a negotiated solutions, while PPE (European 
People's Party) and PSE (Party of European Socialists) were pushing for further sanctions 
(Zanon 2009, 7). The same ideological demarcation lines are visible among Indian 
political parties on their stances regarding the territorial dispute over Kashmir and the 
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relationship with Pakistan (Kumar 2007). In contrast, in other instances, political 
ideology may not play such an important role. For example, before the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq, the overwhelming majority of Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. Congress 
voted in favor of President Bush's decision to go to war. Then, ideology did not matter. 
 Regarding the impact of ideology on state behavior, the mixed evidence in the 
practice of international politics is accompanied by a lack of a unified approach in the 
International Relations literature. First, realists see international interactions as an 
expression of state capabilities and the distribution of these military capabilities more 
generally throughout the international system. They dismiss the role of ideology in 
foreign policymaking. Others, however, insist that political ideology does matter and 
helps explain variation in state foreign policy actions (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and 
Budge 1994, McCormick, Wittkopf, and Danna 1997, Therien 2002).  
 In this study, I plan to build on the ongoing analytical debate between materialists 
and ideationalists and identify the impact that political ideology has on foreign policy 
decisionmaking. I will address this relationship empirically by developing a statistical 
model which will test the correlation between partisanship and state strategic behavior. 
State behavior will be analyzed in a larger context than in the extant literature, which 
mostly focuses on the use or non use of force. In this dissertation, state behavior will 
cover a large variety of policy options that leaders have available, among which, 
providing foreign aid, mediation, and imposing sanctions.  
 
Outline of the dissertation 
My dissertation proceeds in five chapters following this introduction. In chapter II, I will 
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review the literature on foreign policy decisionmaking by broadly discussing the impact 
of material versus ideational forces on foreign policy behavior. On the material forces, I 
will focus on the role played by power and economic relationships and then discuss the 
evidence relating them to foreign policy behavior. On ideational forces, I will discuss the 
possible ways in which culture, norms, ideas and beliefs, can shape strategic behavior.  
 Chapter III explores the previous scholarship which addresses my research 
question. As underlined above, there are two opposing groups of International Relations 
scholars that tackle this issue. First, I will look at the literature which dismisses the role 
of political ideologies. Then, I will examine, both normatively and empirically, the 
literature which supports the thesis according to which decisionmakers' political ideology 
represents a causal factor of state behavior. I advance and then test two hypotheses. The 
first hypothesis sustains that the ideology of the government is not a causal factor of 
foreign policy behavior. Second, I hypothesize that ideology matters: more liberal 
governments are more likely to act cooperatively, and vice versa, more conservative 
governments show higher propensity toward more aggressive behavior.  
 In chapter IV, I will develop the empirical research design, needed to test the 
hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. Here, I will explain the case selection 
procedure and the way in which each variable is measured. I will use International Crises 
Behavior dataset in order to identify the crises during 1990-2000 and then I will estimate 
the OECD countries' behavior by analyzing their involvement in each of those crises, as it 
is presented Keesing's Record of World Events. To test the hypotheses, I introduce a new 
categorical measure for state behavior, which captures the different ways in which a state 
can act in response to an international crisis. 
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 In chapter V, I will test the hypotheses enunciated in chapter III by using the 
research design presented in chapter IV. I will introduce three empirical models where 
the foreign policy behavior is measured uniquely in each separate model. To examine 
these three models, I employ Logit and Orderd Logit statistical analyses on a large-N 
cross national model. Two different measures of executive ideology will be used: one 
which estimates the overall ideology of the executive, while the other captures only the 
foreign policy dimension of executive ideology. A number of domestic and systemic 
structure level variables will additionally be used in order to explain the changes in 
foreign policy behavior. 
In chapter VI, I will conclude with an outline of what my study found out and 
propose suggestions on how this research can be developed in the future.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
MATERIAL FACTORS VERSUS IDEATIONAL FACTORS IN  
FOREIGN POLICY DECISON-MAKING 
 
 
 
You have seen the war in Indochina described variously as an outgrowth of 
French colonialism and its French refusal to treat indigenous populations 
decently. You find it again described as a war between the communists and the 
other elements in southeast Asia. But ... you don't know, really, why we are so 
concerned with the far-off southeast corner of Asia... If Indochina goes... the tin 
and tungsten that we so greatly value from that area would cease coming 
(Eisenhower 1954). 
 
Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to 
be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some 
defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling 
their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the 
power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual 
encroachment of ideas (Keynes 1936). 
  
People act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meaning 
that the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do 
toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not (Wendt 1992, 
396-7). 
 
  
 The present international relations literature presents a clash between two camps 
of scholars, who dispute the origins of state strategic behavior: the materialist and the 
idealists. The mainstream international relations is dominated by those who argue that it 
is material forces which mainly determine foreign policy decisionmaking. Thus, a first 
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important weakness of the extant research is that the ideational forces are, to a large 
extent, ignored (Hudson 1997, Hopf 1998). A second major weakness is that the vast 
majority of studies fail to explore the full range of decisions states take. More precisely, 
they investigate the causes of war (Maoz and Abdolahi 1989, Levy 1993, Cashman 1993, 
Geller and Singer 1998, Van Evera 1999) which is just one of the multiple choices that 
states have when they engage in the international affairs.  
 As the two most relevant material determinants of state behavior, power and 
economic relationships have occupied the center stage of the international relations 
scholarship. Either because they were the most visible and significant attributes during 
the Cold War or because they are more amenable to quantification in comparison with 
their nonmaterial counterparts, power and economic relationships overshadow other 
causal factors of foreign policy such as culture, identity, norms, and ideology. However, 
that should not be the case. As stated by Ruggie (1998), “the building blocks of 
international reality are ideational as well as material” (p.879). Moreover, because "both 
actors' identities and interests are constituted by ideational structures... ideational factors 
do more than constrain behavior"; they constitute the rules of the game which define 
roles, identities, interests and criteria of legitimacy and justification" (Jackson 2003, 22-
23). In this context, for a better understanding of state actions, there is a need to expand 
the range of possible causal factors and include ideational ones. 
 Regarding the second limitation in the international relations scholarship, as we 
see in the practice of international relations, wars are rare events in international relations 
and states can do more than just wage wars. Among others, they can help other states via 
foreign aid (Therien and Noel 2000), they can mediate conflicts (Bercovitch 1989, 
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Wallensteen 2002), contribute in peacekeeping operations, condemn states who violate 
the rights of other states, or impose sanctions on states which do not comply with 
international law (Drezner 1999; Lektzian and Sprecher 2007). That is why reducing state 
behavior to the simple use of force does not offer leverage in explaining global politics. 
 In the present dissertation, I intend to address these two important limitations in 
the international relations literature by doing the following. First, I will examine 
analytically and empirically the causal influences of political ideology on foreign policy 
decisionmaking. Currently, scholarship in international relations does not properly 
address this relationship. Most studies analyze policy preferences by estimating 
programmatic positions of political actors, via elite surveys or content analysis to party 
policy documents or speeches of politicians, rather than actually examining the 
executives' foreign policy decisions (Debus 2009). Besides, little systematic attention has 
been paid to the empirical relationship between ideology and foreign policy (Schultz 
2005, Schultz and Hall 2002). Second, this study will examine the way in which states 
interact with other states in a more comprehensive manner than the rigid and limited use 
of force/non use of force; one which will take into consideration a much wider range of 
state actions, from the most accommodationist to the most aggressive. The current status 
of international relations shows a predisposition toward the study of war. Most studies 
analyze the determinants of military conflicts at the expense of other possible types of 
state behavior, such as providing foreign aid, mediation, or imposing sanctions.  
 In the rest of this chapter I will discuss how material and ideational forces are 
evaluated in the present literature. On the material factors, I will refer to the empirical 
evidence that relates foreign policy behavior with two basic measures, power and 
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economic relationships.  
 
State behavior and its material determinants 
Many political scientists believe that political behavior is strictly determined by the 
physical world alone. Applied to the field of international relations, this approach 
delineates a line of inquiry which puts material matters at the core of international 
politics. In other words, the origins of state behavior in the international arena are best 
explained by material factors. It is not that ideational factors are totally irrelevant 
(Mearsheimer 2001, 58), but there is a logic in the hierarchy among various levels of 
causal factors. Material factors come first, then institutional factors and then the social 
environment (Searle 1995, 34-35). In the relationship material factors state behavior, the 
nature of the relationship is causal. That is, from a temporal perspective, material factors 
precede state behavior and are independent of it (Wendt 2000, 25).  
 Examining the present international relations literature, it would be fair to say that 
most contemporary theoretical work is focused on material explanations of state 
behavior, centered either at the individual, state, or the international system level. 
Alexander Wendt (2000, 23), clearly captures the essence of materialism, when he writes: 
"Materialists believe the most fundamental fact about society is the nature and 
organization of the material forces. At least five material factors recur in 
materialist discourse: (1) human nature; (2) natural resources; (3) geography; (4) 
forces of production; and (5) forces of destruction. These can matter in various 
ways: by permitting the manipulation of the world, by empowering some actors 
over others, by disposing people toward aggression, by creating threats, and so 
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on".  
The two theoretical traditions in international politics that are most materialist in their 
ontology are realism and neoliberal institutionalism. Both theories place social issues and 
moral standards subordinate to the power concerns of states and international actors.  
 Material forces determine state foreign behavior at the individual, state, and 
system levels. At the individual level, most materialists assume that human beings have a 
selfish nature, are aggressive and power-seeking, and fear of death dictates their behavior 
(Hobbes 1996, Machiavelli 1988). At the core of the materialist argument is the 
assumption that people always act on material self-interest, as opposed to idealists' 
argument, according to which people's actions are best explained by norms and values. In 
order to create and maintain stability in society and peaceful coexistence among its 
members, there is a need for power and authority. But why is human nature important in 
the big picture of state strategic behavior? According to Carr (1939) and Morgenthau 
(1967), human nature is a fundamental determinant of the national interest. It is human 
nature which is the source of a state's quest for power. According to this view, the 
expansionist policies of states represent just an extension of the egoistic nature of rulers. 
 When it comes to the notion of security, it is the need for physical security which 
is paramount. Other types of needs are also important, but less important than physical 
security. Recognition from society, socialization, and self-esteem, are less visible than the 
physical security, but more ideational in character (Giddens 1984, Turner 1988, Honneth 
1996). However, people need, first and foremost, basic things for survival, like food and 
water, and protection from threats. Consequently, according to materialists, the 
characteristics of human nature and people's basic needs require a focus on material 
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determinants when explaining human behavior.  
 At the state level, the main argument of the materialist school of thought is that 
material objects (e.g. territory, mountains, weapons, oil) have a direct impact on state 
behavior, which is not altered by the perceptions and ideas decisionmakers associate with 
those objects. Materialists assert that material power drives state behavior (Morgenthau 
1967, Gilpin 1981). Materialists tend to assume preferences, arguing that the states’ 
primary goal is to maintain their own security. In order to pursue their interests, states 
attempt to accumulate resources, and thus, relations among states are a matter of their 
relative levels of power. 
 Scholars like Joshua Goldstein and Robert Keohane (1993) insist both states' 
material interests and ideas about the political world belong to two distinct spaces. Even 
though ideas may play a role in affecting strategic behavior, the primary cause of state 
behavior has a material foundation. In the case of states' primary interests, many IR 
scholars and practitioners acknowledge that the content of those interests (such as wealth, 
power, and survival), are unchanging and have a material essence. Under these 
circumstances, they assert, it is reasonable to believe that the attributes which prefigure 
those interests, the material resources of states, are also material in character. Therefore, 
"states are either constructed by material forces or can be treated as if their construction is 
irrelevant to their interests and behavior" (Hurd 2008, 302). 
 As in the case of individuals, states also want to survive. In the materialist view, 
states' ability to survive is strictly determined by their material resources such as military 
and economic capabilities. In this way, international politics becomes the stage where 
states interact with each other, with the objective of enlarging their resources and 
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capabilities, for the purpose of maximizing their chances for survival. Above all, the 
struggle over territory is "one of the enduring features of international politics" (Huth 
1996, 5). As asserted by Holsti (1991), during the period 1648-1989, territory was at the 
core of interstate wars. An overwhelming majority of wars entailed territory-related 
issues (Vasquez 1993, 1995).  
 On the quest for strategic raw materials, President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1954), 
referring to the "domino theory principle", emphasized the importance of Indochina's 
supply of tin, rubber, and tungsten, to U.S. strategic interests. More recently, China's 
present foreign policy shift toward the Third World shows an increasing interest for new 
sources of strategic raw materials (Eisenman, Heginbotham, and Mitchell 2007). Also, 
the access to new energy sources constitutes an important factor which determines the 
strategic behavior of states. The first Gulf War and the 2003 U.S. military invasion of 
Iraq are just two examples when the United States acted in such a way to secure its access 
to the oil resources in the Persian Gulf. Finally, the location of a country and its 
geography impact its behavior. For a long while, U.S. isolationism was the expression of 
its location on the globe. The two oceans made it difficult for the United States to interact 
with other countries, as opposed to European states, which have frequently been 
decimated by wars. The geographic location of a country, then, determines in part how 
accessible that country is to foreign invasion.  
 The preeminence of material factors is valid also at the international system level. 
When studying social phenomena and the constitution of the world in which states 
interact, materialists suggest that ideas do not constitute social reality, they just mirror the 
material world and help validate the material causes (Krasner 1993). Following the logic 
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of anarchy, in a world characterized by the lack of a supra-state authority, states are self-
help actors, and from here, their tendency to perceive reality in terms of who has the 
material power to determine others' behavior (Waltz 1979). On this note, John 
Mearsheimer (1995, 91) says that "the distribution of material capabilities among states is 
the key factor for understanding world politics". More precisely, “states are differently 
placed by their power, and differences in placement help to explain both the behavior and 
their fates. In any political system, the distribution of the unit’s capabilities is a key to 
explanation” (Waltz 1979, 75). Therefore, the character of the international system - if it 
is unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar - determines state interactions.  
 Among the first neorealists to explain state behavior in terms of material polarity 
of the international system, Morton Kaplan (1957) and Robert Gilpin (1981) did not go 
farther to discuss how the relationship between poles affect the stability of the 
international system. The only thing which matters in neorealism is the number of major 
powers or poles, whereas perceptions that poles have about each other are not relevant. 
However, in reality, it makes a significant difference to how the relations among states 
evolve in the world arena, if the poles are friends or enemies. That is, on the role of 
system level factors on strategic behavior of states, neorealists stop short of bringing the 
idealist social theory in the international relations debate.  
 Keohane (1984) adds a new element in the discussion on the role of material 
factors at the international system level. Mostly realist in orientation, he argues that 
international institutions are global actors and considers them helpful in facilitating 
cooperation among states by providing information and reducing transaction costs:  
"Institutions... could provide information, monitor compliance, increase iterations, 
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facilitate issue linkages, define cheating, and offer salient solutions... chiefly by 
providing information to actors (not by enforcing rules in a centralized manner), 
institutions could enable states to achieve their own objectives more efficiently" 
(Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998, 662). 
 Addressing the role of material forces at the individual level and their impact on 
the behavior of states may be a difficult empirical task. For example, it is hard to make a 
plausible theoretical argument and then demonstrate the causal relationship between a 
president or prime minister's wealth and his or her foreign policy decision. Are richer 
foreign policy decisionmakers more likely than the less prosperous ones, to adopt more 
aggressive foreign policies? There is not much theoretic foundation for making such a 
case. Instead, international relations scholarship focuses more on the role of ideational 
factors rather than material factors at the individual level when explaining foreign 
policies. Among these ideational factors, leaders' perceptions and misperceptions, 
personalities, systematic set of beliefs, and psychological makeup (Keller 2005; Hermann 
and Hagan 1998; Jervis 1976) may predispose them toward certain kinds of foreign 
policies. 
 That leaves us with the alternative of concentrating on the material forces at the 
state and systemic levels. At these two levels, it is power and economic interdependence 
which constitute the most common material determinants of state strategic behavior. In a 
material world, according to realists, "power is central to international politics because it 
means bigness, and bigness means influence, and influence means affecting other 
nations... because power often equals the ability to be violent and impose one's will on 
others, then power is important" (Sullivan 1990, 76). The second material factor, 
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economic interdependence, is also important and represents one of the most debated 
research programs in the international relations field. In the view of Keohane and Nye 
(2000), interdependence among states generates sensitivities and vulnerabilities and may 
lead either to international conflict (Barbieri 1996) or peace (Russett and Oneal 2001).  
 In the following two sections of this chapter, I will analyze from a normative 
perspective power and economic interdependence and their role in shaping the foreign 
behavior of states. Also, I will discuss the evidence which points to the causal 
relationship between the two material factors and behavior.  
 
Power and strategic behavior of states 
Power is considered the central concept in the study of international politics. Most 
international interactions involve power relations, but power itself may have different 
forms. As maybe the most contested term in International Relations, power is a 
multifaceted concept and thus, difficult to define. However, no matter how 
comprehensive this concept, power comes to be perceived as the ability of state A to 
cause state B to act in a certain way that B otherwise would not have act (Dahl 1957).
 One of the debates in the literature centers on how power is defined and 
understood. There are two approaches to this issue. First, power is viewed as an attribute 
of states, it is a possession or property of states. According to this view, military power, 
economic well being, country's size and population, geography, natural and human 
resources, the morale of the society, the quality of the political leaders, and so on, 
constitute power. Here, a state's power is assessed independent of the other states in the 
international system. This approach identifies power as potential, as if all dimensions of 
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power can be summed up and used against a potential enemy. One problem with this 
approach is that some power resources are useless in certain situations. For example, it is 
very unlikely that the United States will use its nuclear weapons against China or 
conventional weapons against a democratic country with which U.S. may have a trade 
dispute (Baldwin 2002, 178-179). Second, power can be thought of in terms of relational 
power. This approach conceives of power in a causal way, where power becomes a 
relationship. That is, behavior of actor A is partially determined by the power of actors B, 
C, and D, while actors may be persons, states, institutions, and so on, and behavior has a 
broad meaning, which includes, among others,  beliefs, attitudes, and predispositions to 
act (Baldwin 2002, 178).  
 How important is power in determining strategic behavior of states? Realists 
Morgenthau (1967, 4), a classic realist, maintains that "the main signpost that helps 
political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the 
concept of interest defined in terms of power". The realm of international politics 
becomes a confrontational arena where states seek power both as an end in itself as well 
as a means to all their other ends. In the hierarchy among different types of power, 
realists insist that it is military power which is most important. In Art's words (2009, 7), 
"Militarily powerful states have greater clout in world politics than militarily 
weak ones. Militarily strong states are less subject to the influence of other states 
than militarily weak ones. Militarily powerful states can better offer protection to 
other states, or more seriously threaten them, in order to influence their behavior 
than can militarily weak ones". 
Further, as argued by Mearsheimer (1994/1995, 11-12), power is relative or relational: 
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"states in the international system aim to maximize their relative power position over 
other states". They choose to acquire more power because this is the surest way to 
guarantee survival. However, within the large group of realists, there is the group of so 
called "defensive" realists who argue that the costs of expansion might outweigh the 
benefits of such a behavior (van Evera 1999, Snyder 1991).  
 How do realists see the causal relationship between power and behavior? The 
general intuitive argument is that large, powerful states, are inclined to have a broader 
range of interests and more international commitments than small, less powerful states. In 
this way, major powers become more likely to get involved in world affairs. Besides, 
major powers have higher stakes in changing the international status quo or maintaining 
it, when challengers emerge. No less important, they simply may act as guarantors of the 
world order and, when in alliances, powerful countries are responsible for the protection 
of allies and from here, the necessity to act (Cashman and Robinson 2007, 10). The 
simple fact that powerful states act more often than less powerful states increases the 
odds that they may behave more aggressively than other states in the international 
system.  
 An alternate explanation is that not all countries can afford or have the ability to 
react or adapt to changing conditions in the international system. The existence of a 
certain interstate conflict (Sullivan 1976), the emergence of a troubling regional or 
international actor, or the intensification of domestic ethnic animosities in a failing state 
are instances which may require the intervention of third parties. As was the case in many 
regional or international crises, countries' involvement in conflict or the third party 
intervention require the use or the threat of using force. In this situation, national military 
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capabilities play a major role that automatically limits the number of actors which may 
get involved directly or indirectly in a conflict. Thus, power and capabilities act as filters, 
constraining the range of potential states which intervene in world affairs.  
 Liberals, neoliberal institutionalists, and constructivists distance themselves from 
the realist idea that power explains everything, trying to demonstrate that power-related 
variables are not the main variables responsible for changes in foreign policy outcomes. 
Liberals claim that the importance of power is no longer primarily military in nature, but 
rather economic in orientation today (Doyle 1997). Moreover, state behavior is not a 
matter of capabilities but a function of preferences. According to Moravcsik (1997, 522),  
"The capability-based power to threaten central to realism enters the equation in 
specific circumstances and only through linkage to threats and side-payments. 
Even where capability-based threats and promises are employed, preference-
based determinants of the tolerance for bearing bargaining costs, including 
differential temporal discount rates, risk-acceptance, and willingness to accept 
punishment, remain central". 
As an alternative to the power considerations, liberals propose that state behavior is better 
understood if taking into consideration, in addition to power, the presence of democratic 
regimes, particular arrangements of domestic interests, international institutions, or 
economic interdependence. Thus, the relationship between states and the domestic and 
transnational social context shape state preferences. As empirical evidence, the conflicts 
in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Chechnya come to support the liberal view on the 
relationship between power and state behavior. The overwhelming military advantage of 
the United States over Vietnam and the Soviet Union's over Afghanistan proved not to be 
 23 
decisive factors in front of the strong will and determination of the Vietnamese and 
Afghan populations. Power by itself, then is insufficient in explaining the outcomes of 
these conflicts. 
 Neoliberal institutionalists, while arguing that power is essential in understanding 
international politics, consider that international institutions, viewed as “persistent and 
connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain 
activity, and shape expectations” (Keohane 1989, 163), are able to promote cooperation 
among states (Keohane 1984, 9). According to North (1981, 1990) and Keohane (1984), 
institutions provide information and stabilize expectations which lead to less uncertainty 
and reduce transaction costs. Moreover, international institutions matter because “they 
could … monitor compliance, increase iterations, facilitate issue linkages, define 
cheating, and offer salient solutions” (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998, 662). A 
central concept to neoliberal institutionalism, which determines state behavior, is 
complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Viewed as interconnectedness 
among different societies, and formally defined as the “flows of money, goods, people, 
and messages across international boundaries” (Keohane and Nye 2000, 6-7) 
interdependence creates sensitivity and vulnerability, leads to cooperation and restricts 
autonomy simultaneously (Keohane and Nye 1977, 9-11).  
 For constructivism, power is not an attribute of particular actors, but is viewed as 
a "social process of constituting what actors are as social beings, that is, their social 
identities and capacities" (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 42). As expressed by Wendt (1995, 
73), "power and interest do not have effects, apart from the shared knowledge that 
constitutes them as such". Similarly, threats and opportunities, friends and foes, are also 
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understood as being a product of the same social structures of shared knowledge. That is 
why, all British nuclear weapons are less dangerous to the United States than the few 
weapons possessed by North Korea. But how does power shape behavior in constructivist 
theory? Constructivists argue that power concerns discourse, through which meaning is 
produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed. In this context, the notion of 
discourse "refers to how “microfields” or the quotidian (read "ordinary") define the 
impossible, the improbable, the natural, the normal, what counts as a problem, ... they 
define the social fields of action that are imaginable and possible” (Barnett and Duvall 
2005, 55).  
 
Does power matter? Empirical evidence.  
As we have seen in the previous discussion, power seems to be the most complex and 
multifaceted concept in international relations. In order to understand the empirical effect 
of power on state behavior, we need to study the relationship between power-related 
variables at the state, dyadic, and system level and the strategic behavior of states. The 
three power-related variables that I will look at are power status, capability balance, and 
system's polarity. 
 The research with a focus on the relationship between power status and state 
behavior show that more powerful states tend to behave more aggressively than less 
powerful countries (Geller and Singer 1998; Geller 1988; Small and Singer 1982, 1970). 
In their studies of wars during 1815-1965 and 1816-1980, Singer and Small (1967, 1982) 
demonstrate that powerful states are much more likely to engage in wars than are weak 
states. In terms of all battle deaths, 90% belong to eleven powerful states, among them, 
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Britain, France, the United States, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. At the opposite end, 
during the same period, 77 of the 144 less powerful states did not get involved in any 
military conflict. On a same note, Wright (1964) finds a positive relationship between 
national capabilities and the likelihood to behave aggressively. Similarly, Bremer (1980) 
concludes that countries with high CINC (composite index of national capability) scores 
tend to initiate and be involved in more wars than states with lower CINC scores. More 
recent studies also support the major powers' belligerency thesis. Geller and Singer 
(1998, 565-568) find that states with greater power capabilities are more likely than states 
with lesser capabilities to participate in and initiate wars, since Geller (1988) states that 
the powerful countries are more likely to get involved in severe military conflicts and less 
likely to fight moderate wars than are less powerful countries. 
 At the dyadic level, quantitative empirical research shows mixed evidence. In a 
study which covers the period 1816-1974, Bueno de Mesquita (1978) reports that in at 
least 65% of the cases war initiators are stronger than their targets and finds that 
capability balance is statistically significant in determining initiation of wars. 
Correspondingly, Siverson and Tennefoss (1984) demonstrate that, during the period 
1815-1965, just a few disputes among relatively equally powerful countries escalate to 
military conflict while conflicts initiated by strong states against weak states are much 
more likely to lead to war. Also, there is empirical evidence which supports the thesis 
that equality of power leads to war. In a study which analyzes border disputes during 
1945-1974, Mandel (1980) concludes that violent border disputes are more likely to take 
place when the fighting neighbors show parity of power. Consistent with these results, in 
a study which covers all COW dyads for the period 1816-1965, Bremer (1992) finds that 
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military conflict is more likely to occur in dyads where the difference between the two 
countries' capabilities are small or medium than between countries with large capability 
differences.  
 Finally, the importance of the international system's polarity was the focus of 
many international relations empirical studies. In a study which analyzes international 
wars from 1495 to 1980, Mansfield (1988) finds that the average annual number of wars 
initiated during times of unipolarity was higher than in times of bipolarity or 
multipolarity. Conversely, examining COW conflicts during the same time interval like 
Mansfield, Thompson (1986) suggests military conflicts were less likely to occur when 
the system was unipolar, whereas bipolar and multipolar international systems are similar 
in terms of war-proneness. The same mixed results were obtained when examining the 
bipolar and multipolar systems. According to Brecher et al. (1990), during the period 
1929-1985, the bipolar system is more stable than multipolar one, if examining the major 
powers' involvement in ICB international crises. This study also concludes that war 
magnitude (total nation-months of war) is higher during bipolarity (1945-1962) than 
during multipolarity (1929-1939). However, opposite results show that for the temporal 
span of 1815-1965, major power war magnitude was higher for multipolar power systems 
than for bipolar ones (Wayman 1984).  
 
Economic interdependence and strategic behavior of states 
 The second material determinant of state behavior, economic interdependence is widely 
used, mainly by scholars who subscribe to the international relations liberal tradition, to 
explain state behavior. Developed by neoliberal institutionalists, the concepts of 
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interdependence and complex interdependence function as bigger tents for the more 
specific notion of economic interdependence. The first, interdependence, is a broad term 
which refers to "situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among 
actors in different countries" (Keohane and Nye 2000, 8). More comprehensive than the 
first one, complex interdependence refers to a "situation among a number of countries in 
which multiple channels of contact connect societies (that is, states do not monopolize 
these contacts; there is no hierarchy of issues; and military force is not used by 
governments towards one another" (Keohane and Nye 1987, 731). The large number of 
state and private economic actors and the high stakes of economics in world politics bring 
economic interdependence closer to the second concept of the two, complex 
interdependence.  
 In studies on conflict, the notion of economic interdependence involves two 
different aspects. The first aspect, sensitivity interdependence, implies that a group of 
countries are interdependent if economic conditions in one country are influenced by 
those found in others. An example which fits this type of interdependence is the 
European Union, where rising inflation or unemployment in one country affects the 
economic conditions in another. Secondly, vulnerability interdependence, assumes that it 
would be too costly for a country to completely break up the trade with other countries, 
as it may be noticed in the case of Western countries' high demand of oil and their 
reliance on the OPEC countries' oil resources (Mansfield and Pollins 2003, 11). In a more 
general sense, "states are economically interdependent when they are engaged in trade 
and investment relations which would be costly to break" (Ripsman and Blanchard 1996, 
9).  
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 The most common view in the scholarship on the conceptual links between 
economic interdependence and state behavior is that international markets and large 
economic exchanges hinder interstate conflict (Doyle 1997, chapter 8; Polachek 1992, 
1980; Rosecrance 1986; Morse 1970; Mitrany 1964; Haas 1964). As stated by Blainey 
(1973, 18),"the long peace that followed the Battle of Waterloo was increasingly 
explained as a result of the international flow of commodities and ideas". Similarly, in 
Robert Art's words (1980, 16-17), a "nation whose economic interests are deeply 
entangled with another's cannot use force ... interests intertwined render force unusable".  
 This liberal argument can be explained in different ways. First, increasing trade 
and economic ties more generally facilitate contact and encourage a better 
communication, which ultimately improves the political climate and reduces the 
likelihood of war (Stein 1993, Doyle 1997). More profoundly, via trade, citizens from a 
country are exposed to the ideas and learn from perspectives of other countries. That 
leads to the creation of "security communities", wherein shared values are created and a 
sense of identity emerges (Deutsch et al, 1957). Second, economic interdependence 
strengthens the pacific benefits of democratic institutions and norms (Russett and Oneal 
2001, 129). In this way, material incentives contribute to solidifying law and morality 
within domestic societies. Third, governments' main responsibility is to acquire the 
resources needed to promote their national security and economic growth. As trade and 
foreign investment increase, states' revenues increase and thus, the need for territorial 
expansion and conquest is significantly reduced (Rosecrance 1986). Fourth, even though 
benefits of trade are asymmetrical, trading partners have an interest in the economic well-
being of the other. Due to this precise reason, they will avoid military conflict, because 
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otherwise they can not sell their goods and invest in the other country , and also obtain 
imports from it (Russett and Oneal 2001, 129). Finally, a vibrant international trade 
environment generates domestically a wealthy business community and a solid middle 
class who are interested in maintaining the status quo. When the economic relations are 
disrupted, political relations between states become strained and the gains from trade 
become questionable. Under these new circumstances, the domestic actors urge foreign 
policy decision makers to avoid military conflict. These public officials, who count on 
the political support of the business and middle class, respond to their demands and thus, 
the political tensions between the trading partners deescalate (Mansfield and Pollins 
2003, 3).  
 Second, an opposing view to the liberals' is expressed by those who emphasize 
that trade and economic ties do not necessarily promote peace, but even may create 
rivalry and finally, lead to conflict (Rosecrance 1986, Gilpin 1981, dos Santos 1970). 
Three lines of reasoning are present here. First, from the practice of trade among  
countries, it can be noticed the benefits from trade are not distributed symmetrically 
among the trading partners. As an example, the annual average trade deficit between the 
United States and China in the last five years is over a quarter of a trillion dollars (U.S. 
Census Bureau). The distribution of these gains influences the power relations among 
states. According to Gilpin (1981) and Levy (1989), the shifting power relations among 
major powers can lead to instability and military conflict. Further, in line with economic 
theories of imperialism, the growth of imperialism, the increasing need on the part of the 
great powers for access to new territories and foreign markets, leads to conflict among 
the great powers (Hobson 1965, Lenin 1939). Thus, international politics is just an 
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expression of how the governments of the wealthy nations defend and promote the 
interests of their economic monopolies and powerful corporations. Finally, according to 
dependistas, trade and investment produce dependency, exploitation, and military 
conflict, rather than interdependence (dos Santos 1970, Rubinson 1976). The trade 
between states of significantly unequal size and the subsequent domination by the more 
powerful country can increase popular resentment in the less developed one. This 
situation can enable nationalists or revolutionary to seize power, who may then 
implement retaliatory measures such as seizing assets owned by the nationals of the great 
power. Consequently, that may lead to rising tensions between the two states and possible 
retaliatory measures from the more powerful country.  
 The third conceptual avenue which links interdependence and state behavior 
reveals that trade is irrelevant to international conflict. According to realist theorists, 
economic issues are a matter of low politics and their influences are secondary to other 
considerations such as the distribution of political-military capabilities (Buzan 1984, 
Gilpin 1987). Power relations overshadow any possible effect of economic 
interdependence. However, protecting the national interest may imply the use of 
economic instruments (Morgenthau 1967). In this situation, trade does not have a 
beneficial effect toward the use of more accomodationist tools in foreign policy, but it is 
just a means for securing and increasing power. As evidence that economic ties have little 
systematic impact on state relations, it is pointed out that economic relations among the 
major powers before World War I were substantial, whereas prior to World War II, the 
same economic relations were less extensive (Mansfield and Pollins 2003, 4).  
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Does economic interdependence matter? Empirical evidence. 
Empirical research on the causal relationship between economic interdependence and 
state behavior is extensive (Polachek 1980, Barbieri 1996, Oneal and Russett 1997, 
1999a; Russett and Oneal 2001). There is substantial empirical evidence (Russett and 
Oneal 2001; Bennett and Stam 2000; Oneal and Russett 1999, 1997a; Russett, Oneal, and 
Davis 1998; Mansfield 1994) which supports the liberal view, according to which 
interdependence inhibits conflict. Even conceptualized as openness and measured as the 
percentage of global output (Mansfield 1994), viewed as sensitivity and quantified as the 
ratio of trade flows between states to the national income of each partner (Hegre 2000), 
the connection with the global economy makes states less likely to go to war. Also, if 
analyzed as foreign investment, interdependence has the same beneficial effect, 
increasing the incentives for peace (Russett and Oneal 2001, 141).  In a study from 1980, 
Polachek hypothesizes that potential welfare losses as a result of diminishing trade, deter 
conflict. Testing a model using a ten-year thirty-country cross section merged from four 
separate data source, he finds that countries with the greatest levels of economic trade 
engage in the least amount in hostility. Indeed, a doubling of trade on average leads to a 
twenty percent decrease of hostility. The same negative relationship between 
interdependence and behavior is obtained by Oneal and Russett (1997, 1999a). Using 
pooled-regression analyses of politically relevant dyads for the Cold War era, Oneal and 
Russett (1997) conclude that higher levels of economically important trade, as indicated 
by the bilateral trade-to-GDP ratio, are associated with lower incidences of militarized 
interstate disputes and war.  
 In contrast with the above considerations, other authors (Barbieri 1998, 1996, 
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1995) report that bilateral trade increases the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes 
(MIDs). Barbieri (1996), for instance, shows that higher levels of commerce increased 
hostilities in the period 1875-1930, when controlling for the potentially confounding 
influences of contiguity, regime type (joint democracy), relative capabilities, and alliance 
commitments. She contends that economic relations determine the likelihood that dyads 
engage in militarized disputes but they do not influence the occurrence of wars. Most 
probable, trade leads to peace when trading partners are mutually dependent. However, 
the higher the degree of interdependence, the higher the likelihood of dyadic disputes. 
Extreme interdependence, whether symmetrical or asymmetrical, has the greatest 
prospective for increasing the chance of conflict.  
 Finally, there are studies that found that the effect of trade on state behavior is 
conditioned by the presence of trading institutions and outside those institutions, trade 
does not affect significantly the security relations among the trading states (Mansfield 
and Pevehouse 2000). Besides, a state's domestic regime is also important when studying 
the impact of interdependence on foreign policy decisionmaking. As expected, 
authoritarian leaders are normally not affected by to the costs of trade disruption 
associated with military disputes. Therefore, "trade acts as a powerful constrain on 
conflict within democratic dyads... [since]... for autocratic states, however, economic 
interdependence may actually increase the incidence of military conflict" (Gelpi and 
Grieco 2003, 54). 
 
State behavior and the role of ideas 
The post-war scholarship was mainly dominated by materialists, those who argue that it 
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is the material factors, such as military capabilities and economic relations, which shape 
the way states interact with each other, and that state interests are strictly determined by 
power, security, and wealth. However, their supremacy did not remain unchallenged. 
Multiple lines of inquiry and theorizing go beyond the material factors and focus on the 
ideational factors and their role in foreign policy making (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 
1954; Katzenstein 1996; Hudson 1997, Wendt 1992 and 2000, Hopf 2002). Although 
material factors are important, leaving ideational factors out of the equation, it would be 
difficult to explain the contested nature of international relations. Questions such as why 
the nuclear weapons of Britain and France are less dangerous to the United States than 
those of North Korea and possibly Iran do not receive a definite answer if going only 
with the materialist approach.  
 The fundamental principle in the idealist line of inquiry is that world politics is 
socially constructed, that is, "people act towards objects, including other actors, on the 
basis of the meanings that the objects have for them" (Wendt 1992, 396-397). This line of 
theorizing focuses on the primary role of ideas in foreign policy decision processes. 
Idealists "tend to emphasize the constitutive role of ideas, the ways in which ideas give 
other factors the explanatory role that they have by investing them with meaning and 
content" (Fearon and Wendt 2002, 60). In general, ideas refer to belief systems, 
perceptions, identity, ideology, discourse, and culture. To Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 
6-7), more specifically, ideas represent particular beliefs, shared by large numbers of 
people, ranging from "general moral principles to agreement on a specific application of 
scientific knowledge".  
 The two main international relations theories which provide the normative 
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foundation for debating the role of ideas in state behavior are constructivism (Wendt 
1995, Hopf 1998, Finnemore and Sikkink 2001) and liberalism (Moravcsik 1997, Ruggie 
1982). In constructivism, the relationship ideas-behavior is constitutive since ideas are 
endogenous to interaction; there is no temporal disjunction between the two, they exist 
simultaneously (Wendt 2000, 25). In liberalism, societal ideas, interests, and institutions 
condition state behavior by shaping state preferences (Moravcsik 1997). One variant of 
liberal theory, ideational liberalism, contends that ideas about national, political, and 
socioeconomic public goods provision explain variations in state foreign policy 
preferences. Conflict and cooperation in world politics are largely determined by "the 
underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups (inside and outside 
the state apparatus) who constantly pressure the central decision makers to pursue 
policies consistent with their preferences" (Moravcsik 1997, 514). 
 Regarding the importance of the material factors, the advocates of ideas' 
preeminence in foreign policymaking maintain that, in this socially constructed world, 
material factors matter, but the way they matter depends on ideas. In a departure from the 
realist perspective, according to which power and interest are material in character, 
idealists argue that the meaning of power and content of interests are largely a function of 
actors' ideas. Put differently, power and interest produce the causes they do because of 
the ideas that make them up. According to Wendt (2000, 115), "...only a small part of 
what constitutes interests is actually material. The material force constituting interests is 
human nature. The rest is ideational: schemas and deliberations that are in turn 
constituted by shared ideas and culture".  
 At its turn, power also becomes a matter of ideas. That is why Britain's nuclear 
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arsenal constitute an element of power in Iran's view, as opposed to the United States, a 
traditional ally of the first, which considers Britain's weapons as friendly, and thus, not a 
constitutive element in power relations between the two states. Further, the nature of state 
interactions between two democracies is not a result of the power relations. Similarly, 
"material polarity of the international system matters but how it matters depends on 
whether the poles are friends or enemies, which is a function of shared ideas" (Wendt 
2000, 24). Even the nature of security challenges is shaped by the way states perceive 
those challenges. In Stephen Walt' view (1987) states' actions are determined by their will 
to balance threats rather than power, threats being socially constructed. "... if the United 
States and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer enemies, "the cold war is over." It 
is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions (Wendt 
1992, 397).  
 
The ways ideas influence policy outcomes 
As enunciated above, in constructivism, the structure of the international system has three 
components: material conditions, interests, and ideas. In this context, the relationship 
between ideas and strategic behavior is straightforward. As stated by Wendt (2000, 139), 
"without ideas there are no interests, without interests there are no meaningful material 
conditions, without material conditions there is no reality at all". Thus, ideas constitute 
the material base of social reality, while power and interests determine foreign policy 
outcomes. Essential to this theoretical approach, power and interests do not have an 
independent existence, unless they are given a meaning by actors' ideas and beliefs.  
 In the neoliberal institutionalist view, ideas help to order the social environment. 
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In this way, ideas may influence agendas and thus, they influence outcomes. Besides, 
ideas function as a selection process by reducing the number of plausible alternatives to a 
situation. There are three conceptual paths which link ideas with policy outcomes. In 
their attempt to explain political outcomes, Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 3) state: "our 
argument is that ideas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody 
provide road maps that increase actors' clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, 
when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, 
and when they become embedded in political institutions". 
  
Ideas as road map 
The first pathway builds on the assumption that policy preferences for certain outcomes 
are gained, not prearranged. World views and principled beliefs condition people's views 
about the outside world, the nature of human beings, the major moral principles which 
guide our lives, what is right and wrong, and so on. Therefore, in order to decipher the 
causes which determine certain policy preferences, we need to understand what range of 
ideas are at hand and how policymakers select among different ideas. In this capacity, 
ideas help constitute goals and identify alternative strategies used to attain those goals. 
Furthermore, in conditions of uncertainty or incomplete information, the role of ideas and 
causal beliefs is reinforced when policymakers choose among different courses of action 
to reach the desired goals (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 13). In the domain of foreign 
policy, ideas determine social reality and shape the way in which foreign policy actors 
perceive the security environment, the urgency of threats, and the means which will be 
used in order to face those threats (Alagappa 1998, 612).  
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 Two examples come to support this view. First, after the World War II, many East 
European countries adopted the economic model of development of the Soviet Union the 
reason being that they were afraid of Soviet punishment. In the case of China, however, 
the power-based explanation does not work as well. China adopted the Stalinist model 
simply because of the power of Soviet ideas, not the power of Soviet tanks and artillery 
(Halpern 1993). Second, the timing and extent of decolonization in the 1950 was largely 
determined by the European states' new ideas about self-determination rather than 
changes in interests and power (Jackson 1993).  
 
Ideas as focal points and glue 
According to this view, ideas play a coordinating role among a certain number of 
participants. Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 12) state that "ideas affect strategic 
interactions, helping or hindering joint efforts to attain more efficient outcomes - 
outcomes that are at least as good as the status quo for all participants. Here ideas 
contribute to outcomes in the absence of a unique equilibrium". Consequently, ideas can 
function as focal points, "as solutions to problems associated with incomplete 
contracting, or as the means to counteract problems of collective action" (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993, 18). Shared cultural, religious, or ethnic beliefs of actors or 
decisionmakers can serve as a foundation for establishing alternative strategies in order to 
attain their goals.  
 An example which reflects this functional role of ideas is a study on constructing 
the European Community's internal market (Garrett and Weingast 1993). Due to the 
divergent interests of different countries and firms, the study's argument is that a 
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cooperative agreement in Europe was not possible to emerge without countries agreeing 
upon a common set of actions leading up to organizing market exchanges in the EC. 
What determined the agreement was the existence of a set of core ideas, such as the 
preeminence of EC laws over domestic laws and the principle of mutual recognition.  
 
Institutionalization 
The third pathway conceives that the use of ideas over time create changes in the present 
rules and norms, which constitute institutions. Once ideas become institutionalized, they 
restrain the decisionmakers' freedom to consider all possible paths of action in order to 
attain their goals. That is, "ideas embedded in institutions specify policy in the absence of 
innovation" (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 13). Here, political institutions may be viewed 
as governmental agencies, laws, norms, and operating procedures. In this sense, ideas 
have a long-lasting effect on policymaking, which may go from decades to generations. 
More precisely, disposing of an obsolete statute does not imply that the ideational 
foundation of that statute vanished; it still influences policymaking (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993, 20-21). Legal or military doctrines, and political ideologies, are types of 
institutionalized ideas which reflect this line of theorizing.  
 In a study focused on Germany and Japan, Katzenstein (1993) argues that these 
two countries' present politics are influenced by a complex range of ideas, with their roots 
in institutions which emerged in the past. In the case of Germany, its stance on 
international issues which is expressed by a belief in international community and non 
involvement in military aggressions, is a result of post World War II changes in social 
norms and the adoption of a new set of ideas on the relationship with the rest of the 
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world. Similarly, because of Japan's political norms and beliefs, there is a Hobbessian 
view of international politics. This is why Japanese policy makers reveal an unilateralist 
approach in international affairs and accept the economic and security vulnerabilities in 
the international system. 
 
Conclusion 
 Substantial research has been dedicated to understanding the determinants of state 
behavior. Most studies on states' strategic behavior focused their attention on the material 
aspects of the relations among states. In contrast, the ideational determinants of foreign 
policy have been generally ignored. As one of the few ideational variables which have 
been mentioned in the international relations scholarship, partisanship, or political 
ideology of the decisionmakers, has received little theoretical and empirical attention.  
 The present literature on state behavior is characterized by two major weaknesses 
that this study will partially try to address. First, there is a normative and empirical 
predisposition toward the study of material factors while the explanatory role of 
ideational factors tends to be normatively minimized, and empirically almost ignored. 
Second, extant research fails to explore the full range of decisions states take. Indeed, 
most studies ignore most of the foreign policy of states, focusing on violent conflict.  
 The international relations research agenda is largely dominated by the study of 
material factors. Power relations, military capabilities, economic relationships, land and 
natural resources, geography and location, contiguity, have often been used to explain 
state interactions. Ideational factors, such as culture, identity, religion, and so on, became 
second hand objects of study, or factors of last resort (Fearon and Wendt 2002, 58). In 
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addition to this, there is no comprehensive empirical effort to test the causal effect 
ideational factors have in foreign policy decision-making. Understandably, it is much 
easier to count nuclear warheads and calculate the national GDP per capita than 
empirically assessing identity and culture. In reality, only a combination of material and 
ideational approaches can explain the full range of security concerns and the behavior of 
governments. With ideational factors left out, it would be difficult to explain the 
contested nature of international relations. Specifically, this study will address, from a 
normative and an empirical standpoint, the role played by government ideology in 
foreign policy decision making. I will test statistically if left wing governments or right 
governments are more likely to behave more aggressively in international politics.  
 The second major limitation of the present international relations scholarship is 
the narrow way in which state behavior is treated and analyzed. Most studies (Keohane 
1984; James and Oneal 1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Russett and Oneal 2001; 
Meernik 2004) trim down the wide range of state behavior to the use or non use of force 
in international politics. Only a limited number of studies assess other types of state 
behavior, such as mediation (Bercovitch 1989; Princen 1995; Bercovitch and Houston 
1995) and sanctions (Nossal 1989; Drezner 1999; Lektzian and Sprecher 2007). Since 
wars are rare events in international relations, I consider a new approach toward state's 
foreign behavior is appropriate to be empirically studied. This study will examine the 
way in which states interact with other states in a more comprehensive manner. Thus, in 
this dissertation state behavior will be expressed by a categorical indicator which goes 
from the most accommodationist to the most aggressive instances of behavior. Among 
these, condemnation, mediation, and the use of sanctions, are just a few. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
GOVERNMENT'S IDEOLOGY AND DECISION-MAKING  
IN FOREIGN POLICY  
 
 
 
The westward expansion of the Russian frontier and of the Russian sphere of 
influence, though always a Russian aim, was accomplished when, as, and because 
the Red Army defeated the German army and advanced to the center of Europe. It 
was the mighty power of the Red Army, not the ideology of Karl Marx, which 
enabled the Russian government to expand its frontiers. It is the pressure of that 
army far beyond the new frontiers which makes the will of the Kremlin irresistible 
within the Russian sphere of influence (Lippman 1987, 874). 
 
In contrast, the Sunni Arab guerrillas in Iraq lack a unifying ideology. They are 
either Baathists (discredited in most of the country) or Salafis (a hard line Sunni 
ideology with no appeal to Shiites in the south or to most Kurds in the north), or 
Arab nationalists. Arab nationalism is rejected by the Kurds and is increasingly 
seen by Shiites as having a subtle Sunni bias (Cole 2005). 
 
In the Europe-centered nineteenth-century system, interstate conflict was for 
limited power, prestige, and profits, with exceptions - notably, Napoleonic 
France. The coming of Fascism, Nazism and Communism, however, sundered the 
value consensus of the international system... Ideology and power become 
intertwined, each strengthening the intensity of the other; the result was to 
aggravate the tendency of actors to seek unlimited power, now possible because 
of the technological revolution (Brecher 1969, 55).  
 
 
The study of countries' foreign policies is at the core of international relations 
scholarship. Realists and neoliberal institutionalists argue that state behavior in 
international arena is strictly determined by material factors, such as military capabilities, 
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raw materials, and geography. Oppositely, liberals and constructivists emphasize the 
primary role of ideas in foreign policy decision processes, arguing that world politics is 
socially constructed. This scholarly debate is largely dominated by those whose research 
agenda focuses on the material factors, while ideational factors are for the most part 
disregarded. Further, among all types of state behavior, the study of the use of force 
dominates international politics scholarship. Thus, most state interactions are essentially 
ignored. 
 Post World War II international relations scholarship has become progressively 
open to explore the role of domestic-political conditions in determining the relationship 
between states. Factors such as government type - democratic versus nondemocratic -, the 
president's job approval, domestic economic conditions, the nature of the electoral 
system, presidential versus parliamentary government, the number of "veto points" in the 
political system, and the degree of consensus surrounding foreign policy, have been often 
used to explain foreign policy decisionmaking. However, the ideological orientation of 
decisionmakers, an ideational variable in nature, has yet to be fully explored. 
 The present international relations literature lacks an in-depth analytical debate on 
the relationship between a government ideology and a country's foreign policy. More 
importantly, there is little empirical evidence that shows whether or not government 
ideology influences foreign policy decisionmaking. In other words, it is not clear yet if 
right wing governments are more likely to adopt more aggressive foreign policies than 
left wing governments or vice versa.  
 A comprehensive examination of the relationship between executives' political 
ideology and governments' foreign policy decisions requires an understanding of the 
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concept of ideology in more general terms, its tenets and evolution. In the first part of this 
chapter, I will examine analytically the concept of ideology. Here, I will present some 
views on ideology and its characteristics. Then, I continue with a discussion about the 
relevance of political ideology, as a general concept, in political science. Next, I will 
review the analytical debate which focuses on the relationship between ideology and 
foreign policy. Here, I examine two sets of arguments. First, there is a group of 
international relations scholars who argue that the decisionmakers' ideology is not an 
important factor in both international and domestic politics. According to these scholars, 
power-related factors, both national and systemic, are solely responsible for changes in 
states' foreign policies (Kennan 1957, Morgenthau 1967) or ideology is just a pretext 
used by  politicians who propose ideologically-motivated policies in order to win 
elections (Downs 1957). Second, there are a significant number of scholars who argue 
that ideology is an important determinant in foreign policymaking (Foster and Palmer 
2006; Schultz 2005; Therien 2000; Holsti and Rosenau 1988, 1990; Klingemann et al. 
1994). This second analytical argument is continued by a discussion of extant 
international relations literature which provides empirical evidence on the relationship 
between foreign policy decisionmakers' political ideology and state strategic behavior. In 
the next section, I will explore the differences between liberal and conservative 
ideologies in terms of their views on foreign policy. Following to this, I will advance a 
new foreign policy behavior model from which the study's main hypothesis will be 
drawn. Finally, this chapter will end with a section in which I will address the 
weaknesses present in the extant literature and how this study attempts to correct them. 
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Making sense of "ideology" 
"Ideas do not flow freely" (Risse-Kappen 1994). Ideology is one of the most ambiguous 
concepts found in the social sciences; not only because of the variety of connotations and 
functions associated to it, but also because it is linked with political nuances and 
extensively used in everyday life with most various meanings. The origins of the concept 
of ideology are in anthropology. Generally viewed as a set of aspirations and ideas that 
guide one's goals, expectations, and actions, ideology is more precisely defined as 
"complex, dogmatic belief systems by which individuals interpret, rationalize, and justify 
behavior and institutions" (Hinich and Munger 1994, 10).  
 Important to notice, ideologies are economizing devices because they, 
concomitantly, simplify and modify reality. According to McCartney (2006, 12), "an 
ideology is a grid - a rigid, doctrinaire, way of thinking that ignores inconvenient truths 
and bends reality to its requirements". By filtering social phenomena through ideology, 
reality becomes more categorical and thus, more accessible to understanding: 
"Ideologies perform an important psychological service because without them 
people cannot know, assess, and respond to much of the most world of social 
relations. Ideology simplifies a reality too huge and complicated to be 
comprehended, evaluated, and dealt with in any purely factual, scientific, or other 
disinterested way" (Higgs 1987, 37-38). 
 On the emergence and evolution of ideologies, some portray them as having their 
roots in abstract ideas which are created out of culture, history, and emotion (Hinich and 
Munger 1994, 14). According to Boulding (1964), an ideology is determined by the 
existence of someone's image of the world: 
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"An image of the world becomes an ideology if it creates in the mind of the 
person holding it a role for himself which he values highly... To create a role, 
however, an ideology must create a drama. The first essential characteristic of an 
ideology is then an interpretation of history sufficiently dramatic and convincing 
so that the individual feels that he can identify with it and which in turn can give 
the individual a role in the drama it portrays". (Boulding 1964, 39; quoted in 
Hinnich and Munger 1994, 14) 
Besides, ideologies must express, validate and give legitimacy to someone's actions. In 
this context, behavior becomes partly a reflection of an initial set of abstract ideas which 
are now embodied in ideology. Maybe the most difficult test that an ideology must pass is 
the test of consistency. In its evolution and growth, an ideology must be consistent in two 
ways. First, it must justify the same behavior in all similar situations. Second, during its 
evolution, an ideology becomes more and more sophisticated in order to provide answers 
to new social dilemmas. Throughout this process, an ideology must avoid contradictions. 
Otherwise, its moral force can fade away and finally lead to a loss of its legitimacy base 
(Hinich and Munger 1994, 15).   
 
Ideology in politics 
In politics, ideology is a debated notion. As I will use this concept throughout this study, 
political ideology "is a fairly coherent and comprehensive set of ideas that explains and 
evaluates social conditions, helps people understand their place in society, and provides a 
program for social and political action" (Ball and Dagger 2004, 4). The set of ideas and 
propositions which define or subscribe to a political ideology makes both proscriptive 
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and prescriptive demands on human behavior, in our case, political behavior. Based on 
the above considerations, all ideologies provide answers and then behavioral guidance 
related to (a) what is ethically good, and (therefore) what is bad; (b) how society's 
resources should be distributed; and (c) where power appropriately resides (Hinich and 
Munger 1994, 11).  
 Political ideologies perform four functions for their followers. They essentially 
cover the whole interaction between human beings and the social universe in which they 
live in (Ball and Dagger 2004, 4-6). First, the function of explanation, as its name 
suggests, ideologies explain why the social, political, and economic conditions are as 
they are. What causes unemployment? Why are there military conflicts? Why are some 
countries poor and others rich? These questions and many others receive different 
answers if approached through the lenses of various ideologies. For example, wars are 
viewed by Marxists as the result of competition for foreign markets, while fascists see 
military conflicts as tests of a nation's will against another's. Second, political ideologies 
provide standards for evaluating social conditions. This function goes further than just 
explaining social phenomena. More precisely, they create categories for those 
phenomena, if they are good or bad, desirable or undesirable. Are some wars just and 
others unjust? Is government intervention in people's lives desirable or undesirable? Are 
inequalities among people or nations acceptable or unacceptable? The ideology's function 
of evaluation offers standards that assist people to judge the social, political, and 
economic environment and also government's policies so that they to distinguish between 
good and bad policies.  
 Third, ideologies perform the function of orientation. Ideology serves as a 
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compass in the hands of the follower of a particular ideology and also provides a sense of 
identity. It helps people understand their social identity, the sense of belonging to a group 
- race, nation, ethnic group, and so on -  and how they relate to the rest of the world. A 
communist will most likely see himself as a member of a party committed to liberating 
workers from capitalist exploitation and oppression. A Nazi would probably think of 
himself as a person whose duty is to maintain racial purity and eliminate the "inferior" 
races. Finally, ideologies offer a political program. An ideology prescribes a general 
program of social and political action. When societies are in disarray, political ideologies 
provide remedies on how to fix the problems and improve the social conditions. 
Similarly, they show how to maintain health in healthy societies. Specifically, they have 
proposals about how to improve economic conditions, how to address domestic social 
tensions, and how to approach international threats which endanger national security. 
Communism would tell its followers to prepare for the overthrow of capitalism and the 
seizure of state power, while libertarianism would propose policies aimed at reducing or 
eliminating the government's involvement in people's lives.  
 In order to carry out these four functions, a political ideology has to subscribe to a 
set of basic beliefs about human nature and also, to offer a view of freedom. Explicitly or 
implicitly, any political ideology provides a picture about human nature, which, at a 
minimum, explains human motivations, limitations, and possibilities. At one extreme, 
human beings can be cooperative with one another and share what they have with others, 
and, at the other extreme, human beings compete with one another in their quest for 
resources. The way in which a political ideology perceives human nature is particularly 
important because it sets the limits on what it considers to be politically desirable or 
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possible (Ball and Dagger 2004, 9).  
 Further, every political ideology asserts its commitment toward protecting and 
expanding "freedom". However, political ideologies differ from one another on their 
definitions of freedom, how to act in order to gain more freedom, and implicitly, which 
are the possible obstacles on the path toward freedom. For example, conservatism, 
liberalism, and libertarianism support different degrees of freedom in the relationship 
between individual and government. Moreover, various ideologies identify different 
obstacles in their pursue of freedom. Among the most common obstacles, ideologies find 
that poverty, crime, oppression, the presence of some social, ethnic, or racial groups, or 
even the existence of other ideologies hinder freedom. For communists, it is the wealth 
and the power of the capitalists which obstruct attaining freedom, while for fascists, it is 
the "inferior" races which constitute the problem (Ball and Dagger 2004, 9-11).  
 
Political ideology and foreign state behavior 
In this section, I present different theoretical bases which explain the relationship, or the 
lack of, between political ideology and foreign policy decisionmaking. Two types of 
arguments are found in the international relations scholarship. First, some theorists argue 
that the nature of the determinants of state behavior is material (Robinson 1995, 
Morgenthau 1967, Kennan 1957). Therefore, because of its idealistic nature, ideology is a 
non-factor. The second argument challenges the first one and contends that ideology 
influences the making of foreign policy (Noel and Therien 2008, London, Palmer, and 
Regan 2004, Schultz 2001b, Klingeman et al 1994).  
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Political ideology as a non-factor 
A significant number of international politics scholars assert that domestic politics 
variables are not causal factors of foreign policy. Thus, foreign policy decisionmakers' 
political orientation is not a relevant feature in the big picture of global politics. In line 
with the realist theoretical tradition (Keohane and Nye 2000, Waltz 1979, Kennan 1957, 
Morgenthau 1967) states' foreign behavior is the result of their relative level of power. 
States are depicted as unitary, rational, power-seeking actors whose roles are determined 
by overall system structure, not by free will or by characteristics of particular states. 
More precisely, states' foreign policy is determined by their power, defined in military 
and economic terms (Waltz 1979).  
 As a leading proponent of the post war era realism, George Kennan (1957) claims 
that ideological dogma represents a barrier to clearly defining and successfully pursuing 
the national interest. Only by detaching themselves from ideological preconceptions, can 
decisionmakers comprehend the "realities" of international politics. In American 
Diplomacy (1957), Kennan writes about the legalistic-moralistic tendencies which had 
long damaged American diplomacy and asks policymakers to get rid of ideological lenses 
and adopt policies based upon calculations of interest. Analyzing the Soviet threat, he 
believes that it is the Soviet leadership, rather than its ideology, which makes the Soviet 
Union a security threat to the United States.  
"After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more 
truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for 
sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian 
rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found 
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justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without 
which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, 
for sacrifice they felt bound to demand" (Kennan 1967, 550).  
 In disagreement with Kennan's account of the Soviet threat, Lippmann (1987, 
874) contends that "it was the mighty power of the Red Army, not the ideology of Karl 
Marx, which enabled the Russian government to expand its frontiers". More precisely, "it 
is to the Red Army in Europe, therefore, and not to ideologies, elections, forms of 
government, to socialism, to communism, to free enterprise, that a correctly conceived 
and soundly planned policy should be directed" (Lippmann 1987, 874). Thus, Lippmann 
discards the role of ideology in foreign policy, and argues that U.S. foreign policy should 
be explicit and concrete, without "vague" ideas of an "ideological crusade", but built 
upon a solid balance of power. That is, interventions justified by balance of power, not 
arbitrary interventions in favor of distant and shaky client regimes, were right and 
mandatory.  
  Another realist who subscribes to this view, Hans Morgenthau claims that the 
role of ideology in the substance of foreign policy is little more than a justification and a 
cover - a more or less deliberate camouflage "for the true nature of policy: while foreign 
policy ... is necessarily pursuit of power, ideologies render involvement in that contest 
psychologically and morally acceptable to the actors and their audience" (1967, 87). In 
the particular case of alliances, it is the community of interests rather than ideological 
commitment which fortifies the bonds among the members. "If, however, a community of 
interests is absent, an alliance based on ideology alone will be stillborn" (Robinson 1967, 
147).  
 51 
 In addition to scholars who belong to the realist theoretical tradition, other authors 
offer different pictures in the non-relationship between ideology and foreign state 
behavior. In Capital (1967), Karl Marx considers that ideology has more to do with an 
ideal than with truth. After arguing that social reality is determined by material factors, 
more exactly economic structures, Marx says that ideologies offer a distorted view of 
reality and finally, they serve the interests of the ruling class, whether sovereigns or 
capitalists. Therefore, in Marxian tradition, political ideologies do not affect foreign 
policy, since all ideologies support the cause of the dominant classes in society.  
 On a similar note, but at a considerable distance from Marx's view, others point 
out that political parties, and implicitly the office holders, use political ideologies as a 
way to win elections, while political ideas are simply instruments for obtaining power 
(Downs 1957, Key 1961, Schultz 2001a). Politicians are primarily office-seekers and 
their main goal is to get elected or maintain power. If elected, ideas cease to be a guide 
anymore. Candidates thus position themselves so as to increase their prospect of election 
or reelection, based on their perception of voter preferences (Grofman 1995, 179). 
Succinctly stated by Anthony Downs (1957, 28), "parties formulate policies in order to 
win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies". According to the 
supporters of this thesis, this principle is true not only for incumbents but also for the 
parties in opposition which circumstantially may support a foreign policy with which 
they do not identify or believe in, but they do that just in order to score electoral points 
and take advantage of their rivals' shaky situation (Schultz 2001b, 65-66). The same 
opposition parties may express foreign policy positions which do not have much to do 
with their ideological prescriptions because of other reasons also. Most commonly, they 
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behave as "yes men" and support government positions in international crises. 
 Closely related to the above view, the diversionary use of force thesis comes to 
emphasize that, regardless of government's ideology, foreign policy decisions are shaped 
by the decisionmakers' electoral calculations. A deteriorating national economy and/or a 
low president's political health are instances when executives choose to use force in order 
to divert public attention from their domestic distress. In these situations, the 
decisionmakers believe that an international conflict will generate a "rally round the flag" 
effect (Mueller 1973), their popularity normally increases (Brody 1991; Ostrom and 
Simon 1985; Mueller 1973), and with that, their chances of remaining in power (Morgan 
and Bickers, 1992; James and Oneal, 1991; Ostrom and Job 1986). Even though the 
empirical evidence is mixed, it is generally accepted that both, Democratic and 
Republican presidents use diversionary tactics (Foster and Palmer 2006).  
 Moreover, two more lines of inquiry, the "convergence" thesis (Finnemore 1996, 
Meyer et al 1997, Kerr 1983) and world society approach, ignore the role of political 
ideology in foreign affairs. According to the "convergence" thesis, as countries 
industrialize, they assimilate ideologically the Western ways of involving in business 
(Kerr 1983). Thus, countries found in similar stages of economic development are likely 
to deal with the same kind of challenges and use the same kind of solutions. The 
supporters of world society approach (Finnemore 1996, Meyer et al 1997) claim that 
policy convergence is driven by the spread of models and ideas through global cultural 
and associational processes. On one side, the phenomenon of cultural globalization helps 
the diffusion of political behaviors which proved to be successful. On the other side, 
international government organizations (IGOs) accelerate the spread of common 
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practices among the member states. Thus, in the area of international politics, these two 
approaches indicate that the relevance of the ideological commitment of decisionmakers 
to a specific set of foreign policy practices is limited.  
 Further, some scholars question the relevance of political ideology by pointing out 
that positions on foreign policy are not easy to define as liberal or conservative. Several 
examples show that liberals can behave hawkishly. "Liberals and Democrats have led the 
country aggressively through two world wars, Vietnam and Korea, the Cold War, and 
other international conflicts and foreign policy initiatives with support from Republicans. 
And Democrats have supported not only the first Republican-led war in Iraq but also the 
second invasion, as well as the foreign policies of Republican presidents" (Shapiro and 
Bloch-Elkon 2005, 4). Since states both compete and cooperate, and war is a permanent 
risk, decisionmakers need to find the appropriate measures in order to protect their 
country's national interest. Therefore, based on circumstances, political leaders may have 
to embrace policy prescriptions belonging to more than one ideology in order to respond 
to world politics' challenges. "The successful mixture will vary over time and 
circumstance" (Russett 1990b, 516).  
 Finally, current analyses of world politics show that the end of the Cold War and 
the increasing pace of globalization are questioning the appropriateness of maintaining 
the old paradigms and orthodoxies in the study of world politics (Held and McGrew 
2002). In this new international politics environment, Anthony Giddens (1994, 251) 
argues, the terms "right" and "left" lost considerable meaning, this ideological approach 
being "in its own way exhausted". In the past, the international relations debate was 
constructed around dichotomies such as the North versus the South, East versus West, 
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and left versus right. Now, with these cleavages declining in relevance, social actors are 
in search of new identities and the international relations debate needs new paradigms 
(Laidi 1998). 
 This discussion above leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: Within developed democracies, the executive's political ideology does not play a 
significant role in determining state's foreign policy behavior.  
 
Political ideology determines foreign policy behavior: an analytical view 
Policies are an expression of ideologies. Due to the multitude of views, different political 
parties' ideologies define and defend the national interest in different ways (McCartney 
2006, 15) and, as "policy-seekers", the elected officials in the executive and legislative, 
aim at implementing agendas which reflect different ideological values (Rathbun 2004, 
2). As vehicles for ideology, parties via their policymakers, advance particular sets of 
policies, bring them before the electorate, and carry them out (Klingemann, Hofferbert, 
and Budge, 1994). Thus, policies are "packaged by ideology" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 
3).  
 The left-right dichotomy occupies not only the domain of domestic politics but 
also the area of international affairs. The debate between the left and the right is central to 
global politics. "This is so because the left-right cleavage expresses enduring and 
profound differences about equality, and equality is one of the most fundamental issues 
of controversy in any political community" (Noel and Therien 2008, 3). As complex as it 
is, the central debate in the discussion on ideological divisions is whether one agrees or is 
in opposition with social change in an egalitarian direction (Inglehart 1989, 292-293), 
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within and among societies. Even though it is generally accepted that not every conflict 
and event has a precise location on an ideological continuum and also that the ideological 
debate changes in time, most disagreements in domestic and foreign policy may be 
placed in a coherent and structured left-right cleavage (Kanbur 2001).  
 A large group of international relations scholars (Delaet et al. 2005; Haas 2003; 
Klingemann et al. 1994; Hinich and Munger 1994; Holsti and Rosenau 1990; Russett 
1990b; Eichenberg 1989; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987) argues that political ideology is an 
important determinant of foreign policymaking and sees foreign policy as subject to the 
same partisan and ideological clashes which take place in domestic policymaking. Thus, 
political ideology affects governments' view on the formation of alliances (Haas 2003), 
foreign aid policies (Therien and Noel 2000), cooperation and war (Schultz 2005, Prins 
2001), treaty-making (Delaet and Scott 2006), the way to approach terrorism (Noel and 
Therien 2008), and so on. According to Almond (1950), a foreign policy consensus is 
built upon a consensus of basic attitudes and ideology, shared by both the public and 
political elite. The patterns of foreign policymaking are affected by the ideology of 
political elites. Ideology is essential because it affects policymakers' priorities and how 
they do and should look at the world. Important to notice, ideology plays a more 
important role in closed societies than in open societies (Farrell 1966). 
 Political ideology shapes foreign policy decisions at various levels. It is maybe 
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington (1963, 56) who best capture the relationship 
between the two, claiming that:  
"Ideology and political beliefs play significant roles in the Soviet and American 
political systems. Ideology gives the Soviet leaders a framework for organizing 
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their vision of political development; it sets limits on the options open to them as 
policy makers; it defines immediate priorities and long-range goals; and it shapes 
the methods through which problems are handled". 
Similarly, Holsti (1974, 366) contends that "ideologies not only establish foreign policy 
goals, evaluative criteria, and justifications for actions, but have important effects on 
perceptual processes as well". On a similar note, Thompson and Macridis (1972, 12) 
write that ideology applies to both how goals are defined and shaped and then how 
particular goals will be pursued. 
 Hunt (1987, 16) stresses that foreign policy ideas are embedded during the course 
of nation building, in class and ethnic dissensions, and in domestic social arrangements 
broadly understood. Besides, those ideas are the product of a deep and comprehensive 
construction. Functioning as mediums for ideas, ideologies are essential because they 
establish the framework in which policymakers handle specific issues and in which the 
interested public understands those issues (Hunt 1987, 16). Ideology shapes the 
representations which elites create of reality and upon which they act, thereby 
constituting the primary pivot around which foreign policy decisions revolve (Brecher 
1973, 1974). "Indeed, elite images are not less real than the reality of their environment 
and are much more relevant to an analysis of the foreign policy flow" (Brecher et al 1969, 
87).  
 
Political ideology determines foreign policy behavior: empirical evidence 
To establish an empirical relationship between ideology and foreign policy has always 
been a difficult task and more importantly, it was never part of mainstream international 
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relations. However, there are a number of empirical studies which attempt to test the 
causal effect of partisanship and ideology, by employing various methods and techniques. 
First, certain studies estimate the relationship between ideology/partisanship and foreign 
policy by analyzing the legislative voting behavior of politicians (Delaet and Scott 2006; 
Delaet et al 2005; Bartels 2000, McCormick and Wittkopf 1990). Second, in order to 
study the connection between ideology and foreign policymaking, other studies do 
secondary analyses of elite surveys (Holsti 2004; Wittkopf 1990, 1986; Holsti and 
Rosenau 1988). Then, there is a third group of studies which do empirical analysis of 
political documents, such as political party manifestos (Schultz 2001a, Klingeman et al 
1994). Finally, there are studies that use statistical models in order to determine the 
impact of ideology on state external behavior (Arena and Palmer 2009, Schultz 2005, 
London et al 2004, Fordham 1998). The overwhelming majority of these studies show 
that the left and right, at least in established democracies, reveal systematic differences 
over foreign policy behavior. That is, right leaning governments support more hawkish 
foreign policy actions than their left wing counterparts.  
 Although the executive branch of the government has the main responsibility for 
conducting foreign policy, legislatures are influential on a wide range of foreign policy 
issues. In a study which examines Senate and House votes on several strategic weapons 
systems, Lindsay (1990) shows that members of Congress generally vote in accordance 
with their policy views and not their constituency's economic interests. Studying how 
U.S. legislators voted, from 1969 to 1987, on five major defense initiatives - the B-1 
bomber program, MX nuclear missile program, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, 
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) - Lindsay finds 
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that Republican senators were more inclined than their Democratic colleagues to support 
MX, B-1, and SDI. On ABM, partisanship did not have a significant influence on the 
vote. In both the House and Senate, party affiliation correlates highly with support for the 
five major defense initiatives, and partisan cleavages increased over time.  
 Two more empirical studies (Delaet et al 2005, Delaet and Scott 2006) offer 
support for the thesis that partisanship and ideology exert a growing impact on 
congressional behavior in foreign policy. The first study (Delaet et al 2005) looks at the 
Senate ratification votes on the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (1968), Chemical Weapons Convention (1997) and Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (1999) and concludes that that more liberal members were more likely to 
support the treaties while more conservative members were more likely to oppose the 
treaties. Significantly, partisanship increases substantially from the Cold War treaty votes 
to the post-Cold War votes. Extending the data set of votes that spans the 1960–2001 
period, the second study (Delaet and Scott 2006) find also that partisanship determines 
foreign policy stances. "The change in predicted probabilities is more pronounced in the 
post-Vietnam period: moving from liberal to conservative in this era continues to make a 
member less likely to vote for an arms control treaty, but by 18.15 percentage points (as 
compared to 4.79 points in the Cold War)" (Delaet and Scott 2006, 191).  
 Elite surveys provide another method for testing the relationship between 
ideology and foreign policy positions of decisionmakers. Drawing on data on mass and 
four elite opinion surveys undertaken by the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations 
(CCFR) from 1974 to 1986, Wittkopf (1990, 25-26) discusses the public and elites' 
attitudes toward internationalism and distinguishes between cooperative internationalism 
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and militant internationalism. Based on all four possible combinations of attitudes, 
Wittkopf identifies internationalists, as those who support both cooperative 
internationalism and militant internationalism, isolationists, or those who oppose both 
cooperative and militant internationalism and, hardliners, as those who support militant 
internationalism but oppose cooperative internationalism, and accomodationists, as those 
who oppose militant internationalism, but support cooperative internationalism. On issues 
such as expanding defense spending, assisting rebels with military aid, and using the CIA 
to assassinate terrorists and to intervene covertly in other countries, the study finds that 
Republicans embrace hardline policies while liberals embrace accomodationist policies. 
Correspondingly, conservatives lean toward hardline policies whereas Democrats toward 
internationalist or accomodationist policies (Wittkopf 1990, 132).  
 Similarly, in a later study which draws on six surveys conducted by the Foreign 
Policy Leadership Project (FPLP) during the period 1976-1996, Holsti (2004, 156) notes 
that the large majority of domestic liberals are accomodationists, as opposed to domestic 
conservatives, who are mostly either hardliners or internationalists. As an explanation for 
these positions, Holsti believes that economic liberals support cooperative 
internationalism because they prefer government spending for domestic rather than 
defense purposes, and thus less excited about militant internationalism. In a more recent 
study, analyzing the data taken from the CCFR mass public and leader surveys in 1998, 
2002, and 2004, Shapiro and Block-Elkon (2005, 27) find that Conservative or 
neoconservative positions emphasize the "need for a strong defense and support U.S.-
initiated and largely unilateral military action abroad, especially in circumstances in 
which multilateral, diplomatic, and economic options may not be fully exploited". 
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Moreover, Democrats are more supportive than Republicans on cutting back military aid 
to other countries.  
 Further, some studies focus on the relation between ideology and decisionmakers' 
foreign policy views by analyzing party policy documents or speeches of politicians. 
Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge (1994, 40, 274), via content analysis, conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of the party platforms in ten established democracies. The results 
offer support for the assertion that right-wing parties are “pro-military”, and express 
“need for a strong military presence overseas and for rearmament and self-defense” since 
the left-wing parties are considered “anti-military” and “pro-peace”, advocating “peaceful 
means of solving crises...and the desirability of the relevant country joining in 
negotiations with hostile countries”.  
 In a similar fashion, Schultz (2001a) uses party manifestos in order to determine 
where political parties are located on the hawk-dove ideological continuum. He also takes 
a deep look at data from the United States in order to determine whether the declared 
positions in the party manifestos, actually predict defense spending as a percentage of 
gross national product. He finds first, that there is a tendency of right parties to become 
more hawkish and left parties to become more dovish in times of high conflict and 
second, that there is a robust relationship between the U.S. governing party’s declared 
position and its preferred level of military spending.  
 Finally, there are more sophisticated empirical studies which discuss the 
conditions under which political ideology becomes a causal determinant of foreign 
policy. In a recent study, Arena and Palmer (2009) investigate if the political orientation 
of the government is a significant factor affecting the likelihood of international conflict 
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initiation. Analyzing 20 stable democracies for the period 1960-1996, they found that 
right governments, generally, have a higher probability of initiating international conflict 
than do left governments. That may be explained by the fact that "governments made up 
of right political parties are less likely than their left counterparts to be removed from 
office, should they use force" (London, Palmer, and Regan 2004, 5). The strength of the 
relationship between ideology and conflict initiation is influenced by domestic economic 
conditions, more precisely, the level of unemployment and inflation. Different results are 
obtained if studying the particular case of the United States. Exploring the association 
between US domestic conditions and whether the United States was an initiator or target 
of a MID, during the period 1870-1992, Prins (2001) finds that Democratic 
administrations are more likely to be challenged and then to reciprocate, than their 
Republican counterparts. 
 It is not only conflict initiation which is affected by government's ideology, but 
also conflict duration. Using a dataset of 20 democratic governments and militarized 
disputes between 1945 and 1992, Koch (2009) contends that governments of the left 
engage in shorter disputes than right wing governments. The relationship holds for 
parliamentary and presidential systems. Governments vary in dispute duration according 
to their removal costs. Thus, "high removal cost governments can allow disputes to 
persist. Conversely, low removal cost governments fight shorter disputes" (Koch 2009, 
813). Besides, in addition to its influence on conflict initiation and duration, ideology 
may have an effect on cooperation. Schultz (2005) develops a two-level game that 
examines a government's decision to risk cooperation, taking into account the strategic 
interdependence of the international and domestic levels. He synthesizes the results, 
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arguing (Schultz 2005, 22): 
"When trust is lacking and the costs of continued conflict are relatively tolerable, 
then it takes a pacifist to attempt peace. Under these conditions, a soft-line Dove 
is the only type willing to take the risky steps that are needed to learn whether 
mutual cooperation is possible. On the other hand, when trust is low but costs of 
mutual defection are high, efforts to initiate cooperation are most likely to come 
from moderate Hawks. Moreover, mutual cooperation initiated by such a 
government has a better chance of enduring over the long run than does 
cooperation initiated by a Dovish government. Moderate Hawks enjoy greater 
electoral security when risking cooperation, and foreign states respond to their 
cooperative gestures in a way that promotes robust cooperation over the long 
term". 
 
Dimensions of ideological conflict in foreign policy 
In this section I address the nature of the relationship between political ideology and 
foreign policy actions
1
. More precisely, I will examine how liberal or left wing ideologies 
differ from conservative, or right wing ideologies, in their views on foreign policy. As 
noted by Rathbun (2004, 18-21), there are three dimensions on which liberals and 
conservatives differ in terms of foreign policy behavior. All these three foreign policy 
dimensions revolve around the fundamental values of equality and liberty. They are the 
                                               
1
 In parliamentary systems, most of the time, it is a coalition of political parties which form the 
government, in which senior and junior partners share the power over the foreign policy decisionmaking. 
Even though conflicts over foreign policy often occur, it is the senior, larger coalition partner through the 
prime minister, which has the stronger say in these matters. The cabinet's prime minister, who is in most 
cases the leader of the larger party in the coalition, has a large autonomy on foreign policy issues. There are 
also exceptions, like in the case of Germany and Israel, where the junior parties have been able to 
significantly influence key foreign policy decisions (Kaarbo 1996, Hagan et al. 2001, Hermann 2001).  
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following: a) the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the national interest; b) the 
appropriateness of using forceful measures for pursuing the national interest; and c) 
unilateralism versus multilateralism, or the way in which countries coordinate their 
actions with other countries in pursuing their interests. Based on these three dimensions, 
testable propositions can be generated in order to examine the ideological cleavages 
among various political parties in terms of foreign policy making.  
 
Inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the national interest 
On this dimension, the basic question which needs to be answered is the following. "To 
what extent does an individual or a party believe its country should preoccupy itself with 
the internal processes of other countries when they have few tangible consequences for 
the country in question?" (Rathbun 2004, 19). An inclusive conception allows the 
promotion of the welfare of other countries to be part of the national interest while an 
exclusive conception focuses exclusively on a country's well being. Similar terms found 
in the literature which express this dimension are "multilateralism" (Chittick et al. 1995), 
"cooperative internationalism" (Wittkopf 1990), or "ethnocentrism" (Hurwitz and Peffley 
1987). On this scale, liberals are much more supportive of cooperative internationalism 
than conservatives (Holsti 2004, Wittkopf 1990).  
 On development assistance, it can be argued that its origins are in the left-wing 
ideology (Therien 2002). Three major developments, with a strong leftist ideological 
component, - the creation of the welfare state, the establishment of the U.N. system, and 
the launching of the Marshall plan - constitute the foundation of foreign aid, as a complex 
international institution. Further, in the period 1974-1986, liberals have been consistently 
 64 
more sympathetic of foreign economic aid for economic development and technical 
assistance, in comparison with conservatives (Wittkopf 1990, 73). A similar perspective 
is expressed in the works of Lumsdaine (1993) and Noel and Therien (1995) who state 
that the left is a much stronger promoter of human rights, democracy, and international 
aid, than the right. Most notably, Noel and Therien (1995) find that "the level of foreign 
aid provided by a country varies with social spending, but even more so with the degree 
to which its welfare state embodies socialist attributes, defined on the basis of social 
program universalism and benefit equality". This tendency is partly due to liberals' 
ideological stress on equality and embrace of a broader conception of political 
community, which are mirrored by a foreign policy which shows concern for others, 
advocates abolishing hierarchies in the world, and supports better living conditions for 
citizens in developing countries.  
 Internationally, it is also the left-leaning governments, rather than their right wing 
counterparts, which tend to adopt an agenda oriented toward politics of identity and 
human rights. In the aftermath of the Cold War, ideologues on both the left and right 
sides of the political spectrum disputed their views on the role of identity in a world 
dominated by cultural conflicts. Prevalent on the right, is the view that international 
politics are marked by anarchy, the revival of ancient hatreds, or "clash of civilizations", 
which would lead to ethnic instability and civil wars in the developing world and former 
communist countries. Having a different focus, the ideological left sees the new politics 
of identity in the post Cold War era as a distraction from more vital debates about 
equality, redistribution, and justice (Noel and Therien 2008, 200).  
 In support of this argument, scholars distinguish between the right-wing 
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irredentist nationalism promoted by Nazis in Germany and fascists in Italy in the 1930s 
and 1940s and the left-wing antifascist message which also supported nationalistic 
sentiment. Further, the decolonization movement is debated through ideological lenses. 
Even though political actors and thinkers on both the left and the right accepted 
colonialism, there are some nuances which are worth to be mentioned:  
"First, in the era of the American and the French Revolutions, a strong anti-
colonial current was already associated with the left's fight for democracy. 
Second, even when they supported colonialism, European socialists tended to do 
so for the sake of social progress more than in the name of an inherent inequality 
between races. Third, at the beginning of the twentieth century, it was the left that 
led the fight against colonialism" (Noel and Therien 2008, 101-102).  
Later, in the 1950s and 1960s, decolonization was identified as a favorite theme of the 
left, which perceived it as a movement of national liberation, part of the bigger struggle 
for basic human equality.  
 Finally, the ideological dimension of the politics of identity is important when it 
comes to multiculturalism. It is again the left which is more inclusive, calling for change 
in the status quo of women, indigenous people, ethnic, racial, and cultural minorities 
everywhere. Left wing governments, it seems, are more concerned than the right wing 
ones, with issues which affect equality, within and among societies. Conservatives, in 
contrast, are more concerned with preserving national traditions and culture and believe 
that immigrants should be satisfied with the status of being accepted to live in the country 
they inhabit (Noel and Therien 2008, 202-204).  
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The appropriateness of using force in international affairs 
The second dimension deals with attitudes toward the appropriateness of using forceful 
strategies for pursuing the national interest. Also, this scale may be called "militant 
internationalism" (Wittkopf 1990), "militarism" (Chittick et al. 1995), or "morality of 
warfare" (Horwitz and Peffley 1987). On this continuum, the decisionmakers on the left 
are more likely to pursue more dovish foreign and defense policies. That is, they are 
antimilitarist, advocate the peaceful methods of conflict resolution, such as diplomacy 
and sanctions, and tend to call for reduced military expenditures. They adopt this position 
because the use of force is dangerous and is neither a moral nor an effective tool of 
foreign policy. It only leads to tensions, arms races and escalations in violence. Besides, 
left wing government foreign policies are shaped by the belief that dialogue and 
negotiations are more effective tools of foreign policy (Beinart 2008; Noel and Therien 
2008; Rathbun 2004, 19-20; Schultz 2001a). This position is the result of an ideological 
conviction which stresses equality, popular rule, national sovereignty, cooperation among 
free peoples, and peace (Noel and Therien 2008, 89).  
 Among the founders of the liberal ideological tradition, Montesquieu wrote in 
1748 (25) that "peace and moderation are the spirit of a republic". For the ideological left, 
war is "rooted in the vested interests of the ruling class" (Howard 1978, 27) and that idea 
motivates Rousseau to assert that equality constitutes a precondition for peace. Here, 
equality among nations, no matter their power, is just an extension of the liberal principle 
than men are equal. Further, the importance of international law and institutions are also 
viewed by the left as helping to create peace and reduce the likelihood of war in world 
affairs. Militaries are not the ones which bring peace, but the free people have the power 
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to influence the destiny of their nations and the relations among them (Noel and Therien 
2008, 93).  
 On the other side, right-wing scholars and politicians are more likely to embrace 
more hawkish stances in international affairs. They see the use of force as an acceptable 
and necessary instrument of foreign policy and consider that military superiority and 
willingness to take military action contribute greatly in reaching foreign policy and 
national security goals. For right wing governments, appeasement is not the solution; 
adversaries have to be met with credible threats and actual punishment. Also, they are the 
defenders of the status-quo; they "prefer a stable international order governed by the most 
powerful states, by military strength, and, when necessary, by war" (Noel and Therien 
2008, 89).  
 The world, according to the conservatives, is not as ideal as liberals believe. The 
world is a dangerous place, marked by sharp inequalities among nations. As stated by 
Chancellor Metternich (quoted in Haslam 2002, 115),  
"In no epoch of modern history has society been presented with more dangers 
than in the present, because of the upheaval of France. The true... and last anchor 
left for the welfare of Europe lies in the understanding between the great powers, 
based on the conservative foundations of their happy and grand alliance". 
In line with the right's ideology, reason and morality are not useful in a world which is 
anarchical. Thus, balance of power, military strength, and alliance making, are the 
strategies that states have at hand if they want to survive. The biggest danger of all is war. 
In Clausewitz' words (1982), war is just the continuation of politics by other means. War 
is possible because states have diverging political interests which can not be resolved by 
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using less bloodier instruments of foreign policy.  
 The practice of international affairs shows consistent differences between left and 
right wing governments. Ronald Reagan rejected detente by launching a massive defense 
buildup, and aided anticommunist governments and rebels from Central America to 
Afghanistan. In contrast, for Democrats, Communism in third world countries could not 
have been contained militarily, because the use of force was ineffective and immoral. The 
1991 Gulf War shows a significant polarization between the two ideological camps. 
Republicans, both in the House and the Senate, supported the war almost with unanimity, 
while the Democrats opposed it with a large majority. Finally, although the 2003 Iraq war 
enjoyed significant bipartisan support at the beginning, a few years after the invasion, the 
partisan divisions between Democrats and Republicans were higher than ever (Beinart 
2008, 151-158). 
 Ideological cleavages are also present if the foreign policies of other developed 
countries. The Green parties in Europe, among which Germany, Britain, Switzerland, and 
Finland, traditionally on the left ideological spectrum, invariably demanded a decreasing 
role for the militaries  and adopted anti-nuclear positions. In France, starting with the end 
of 1970s, defense spending was, for a long time, a divisive issue among the main political 
parties. While the French Socialist Party (PSF) was advocating military budget cuts, the 
Gaullist Party (RPR), a right wing traditional party, was advocating the opposite. In 1987, 
in spite of the opposition of his conservative foreign and defense ministers, Francois 
Mitterrand, the first Socialist President of the Fifth Republic, endorsed the INF 
(Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty between the U.S. and Soviet Union, which 
required the elimination of all missiles with ranges between 625 and 3500 miles by June 
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1991 (Risse-Kappen 1991, 506).  
 On a smaller scale, the two main political parties or coalitions in Germany, the 
Social Democrats (SPD) and the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) had opposite stances 
on the issue of defense spending (Risse-Kappen 1991, 489). Another example of 
ideological divisions on security policy in German politics was the Christian Democrats' 
opposition to detente and the more pacifist positions of SPD, articulated by "disarmers" 
and the traditional arms control establishment. Traditionally, SPD was identified with 
antinuclearism in Germany. Premier Nakasone of Japan, the leader of LPD (Liberal 
Democratic Party), a long-time right wing party, took a courageous step in 1980s, 
proposing to make Japan an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" by adopting a more prodefence 
stance and initiating a major military buildup program (Risse-Kappen 1991, 505-508). 
More recently, the left wing prime minister Zapatero of Spain won the 2004 legislative 
elections by promising to pull out the country's military troops from Iraq, in a major 
foreign policy turn from its right wing predecessor, Jose Maria Aznar.  
 
Unilateralism versus multilateralism 
The third dimension looks at the way in which countries coordinate their actions with 
other countries in pursuing their interests (Rathbun 2004, 20). The extreme 
manifestations on this continuum are multilateralism and unilateralism. Multilateralism 
implies that states seek to form a coalition of support before they act and their actions are 
determined by some principles of conduct which go beyond the particular interest of the 
member parties. Ultimately, this approach to the international affairs has built confidence 
and understanding among the great powers. On the contrary, unilateralism entails that 
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states simply act alone, so that they preserve their freedom of action and avoid 
institutional binding commitments. Unilateral action may undermine international peace, 
welcome outside intervention in the domestic affairs of the smaller states and finally, can 
increase tensions among the great powers.  
 Quite predictably, the left-right cleavage has ramifications for how different 
decisionmakers view the way in which their countries direct their actions with other 
countries in following their interests. On this dimension, left governments tend to offer 
more support to multilateralist foreign policies than their right wing counterparts 
(Ikenberry 2004; Holsti 2004; Daalder and Lindsay 2001; Russett 1990). Left leaning 
governments are more supportive of multilateralism because of their ideological 
emphasis on equality. Russett (1990, 516) considers that "modern-day conservatives laud 
the possibilities of individual action by persons and, internationally, by nations acting 
alone. Political liberals decry unfettered individualism as destroying natural bonds of 
community and mutual aid". 
 Concern for others, at both domestic and international level, is mirrored by 
identification with a broader community. In line with this approach, states take into 
consideration the interests of other states and that consequently limits the adventurous 
unilateral foreign interventions and the discretionary use of forceful tools in global 
politics, regardless of the international community (Rathbun 2004). Conservatives have a 
different approach on this issue. Being less likely than liberals to recognize that foreign 
governments have legitimate security interests, conservatives tend to "see the demands of 
their states as more important and more justified than those of others" (Rathbun 2004, 
22). Conservatives are skeptical of multilateralism as it restricts freedom of action in the 
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international arena and weakens state sovereignty.  
 The reactions of the Bush administration to recent international developments 
support the thesis that there are ideological divisions over the necessity of coordinating 
actions with other states in pursuing U.S. national interests. Referring to the first years of 
the Bush's administration Daalder and Lindsay (2001) argue that unilateralists who 
occupied top positions in the administration and in the US Congress supported self-
reliance, discarding multilateralism and international treaties as unnecessary constraints 
on America's freedom to act. Specifically, before September 11th, President Bush 
showed hostility to existing multilateral policy instruments by not signing the Kyoto 
Protocol, refusing to ratify the treaty for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and 
treating harshly countries that did not sign immunity agreements
2
 with the United States, 
and finally, withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM).  
 The case of France also shows ideological divisions on the unilateralism - 
multilateralism dimension. Charles de Gaulle, conservative president of France during 
1959-1969, with the support of the government, directed the development of France's 
nuclear weapons program, seeking independence from U.S. and British influence, and 
twice vetoed Britain's admission to the European Community. He withdrew from 
NATO's military command, although he opted to remain a member of the organization. 
In contrast, the Socialist President Francois Mitterrand largely embraced multilateralism, 
demonstrated by his consent to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. More recently, 
                                               
2 Known as the Nethercutt Amendment, President Bush signed into law, on December 2004, legislation 
which authorizes the loss of Economic Support Funds (ESF) to countries, including many key U.S. allies, 
that have not signed a BIA (bilateral immunity agreements). Threatened under the Nethercutt Amendment 
are: funds for international security and counterterrorism efforts, peace process programs, antidrug-
trafficking initiatives, wheelchair distribution, human rights programs, economic and democratic 
development, and HIV/Aids education, among others (see http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=nethercutt) 
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the left leaning government of France harshly criticized U.S. unilateralism preceding the 
2003 invasion of Iraq.  
 Furthermore, Germany and Britain illustrate similar ideological cleavages on this 
dimension. The foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, a representative of the Free 
Democratic Party (FDP), a classical liberal party in Germany, with the support of a ruling 
coalition with the Social Democrats, was the architect of the country's multilateral 
diplomatic approach during the 1970s and the 1980s (Krause 2004). The foreign policy 
response of Margaret Thatcher's conservative government to the 1982 Falkland crisis, 
arguably the most significant challenge during her prime ministership, was unilateral 
action via the use of military force. In Thatcher's own words, "I was presented with the 
dangers of a backlash against the British expatriates in Argentina, problems about getting 
support in the UN Security Council, the lack of reliance we could place on the European 
Community or the United States, the risk of the Soviets becoming involved, the 
disadvantage of being looked at as a colonial power" (1993, 181). Before exhausting the 
more multilateral and accomodationist tools of resolving the conflict with Argentina, 
Britain resorted to unilateral action.  
 
Advancing a new foreign policy behavior model 
In order to explain the relationship between the executive's ideology and foreign policy 
behavior, I advance the following theoretical argument. According to their ideological 
preferences, conservative leaders have a more exclusive conception of the national 
interest than liberal leaders. An exclusive conception focuses on a country's well being 
rather than adopting the welfare of other countries as a part of a country's national 
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interest. Therefore, conservative leaders believe that their country should not preoccupy 
itself with the internal processes of other countries when they have few tangible 
consequences for the country in question. In the practice of foreign affairs, this belief of 
conservatives will be mirrored by a disregard of how their foreign policy actions affect 
the stability and internal processes of other countries, and moreover, the human rights 
and the living conditions of people living in those countries. In contrast, liberal leaders, 
due to their ideological predisposition to care about other countries' internal processes, 
will act more peacefully toward other countries. Consequently, in response to 
international crises, conservative governments, less worried about the repercussions of 
their actions, will be inclined to behave more aggressively than liberal governments.  
 The propensity toward more aggressive foreign policy actions of conservative 
governments can be explained also, by using the second ideological dimension discussed 
earlier in the chapter. Ideologically, conservatives believe in the appropriateness of using 
forceful strategies for pursuing the national interest. According to their views, the use of 
force is an acceptable tool of foreign policy because the world is a dangerous place and 
enemies have to be met with credible threats and actual punishment. In contrast, liberal 
leaders believe in peace and have antimilitarist ideological convictions. They advocate 
the peaceful methods of conflict resolution, such as diplomacy and sanctions. The use of 
force only leads to tensions, arms races and escalations in violence. In consequence, in 
response to crises, due to their ideological belief in the appropriateness of the use of 
force, conservative governments will be more likely than liberal governments to act 
aggressively in international arena.  
 Thirdly, the left-right ideological cleavage on the way in which countries 
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coordinate their actions with other countries in pursuing their interests impacts the type of 
actions governments engage in international affairs. Liberals view that multilateralist 
foreign policies are more appropriate than unilateral ones, because, when intervening, 
states have to consider the interests of other states. Besides, according to the liberal view, 
unilateral action may undermine international peace, welcome outside intervention in the 
domestic affairs of the smaller states and finally, can increase tensions among the great 
powers. Alternatively, conservatives consider that unilateral actions are appropriate 
because they preserve countries' freedom of action and avoid institutional binding 
commitments. Thus, when responding to crises, due to their ideological preference for 
unilateral action and dislike of binding commitments, conservative governments will be 
more likely than liberal governments to act aggressively.  
 This discussion leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: Within developed democracies, the further right a government is, the more likely it is 
to behave more aggressively. Oppositely, the further left a government is, the more likely 
it is to behave more peacefully. 
  
 The second hypothesis reflects the possibility that governments will act in a 
manner consistent with the ideological principles presented in their political platforms, 
party manifestos, and their voters' expectations. Specifically, when responding to 
international crises, right leaning governments, due to their ideological predisposition 
toward an exclusive conception of the national interest and belief in the appropriateness 
of using force and acting unilaterally, will be expected to act more aggressively than left 
wing governments. This expectation is also due to left wing governments' ideological 
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predilection toward multilateralism, an inclusive conception of the national interest, and 
reluctance of using force in international affairs. 
 
Conclusion 
The extant international relations literature which focuses on explaining state behavior 
has two important weaknesses. First, foreign policy behavior is most of the time reduced 
to the use of military force (Fordham 1998, Meernik 2004, Morgan and Bickers 1992, 
James and Oneal 1991, Ostrom and Job 1986). Second, the large majority of studies 
which examine state external behavior concentrate only on the U.S. case. Although an 
interesting case study, drawing general propositions from the U.S. case would be 
inaccurate.  
 Regarding the first weakness, the use of force, however, is just one area of foreign 
policymaking. Therefore, the present scholarship ignores most actions that governments 
take in the international arena. Among them, mediation, condemnation of other countries' 
behavior, use of sanctions, participation in peacekeeping missions, are examples of state 
behavior which are not taken into consideration. In my study, I advance a more 
comprehensive measure of state behavior which takes into account fourteen types of 
foreign policy actions, where the use of force is just one of them. This new proxy for 
state behavior incorporates two of the three dimensions of ideological conflict in foreign 
policy - the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the national interest and the appropriateness 
of using force in international relations. In this way, my study helps to better understand 
the complex environment of foreign policymaking, where state behavior is described 
more precisely.  
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 Second, most scholarship which studies the impact of the executive's ideological 
orientation on foreign policy decisions draws empirical generalizations from only the 
U.S. case (Schultz 2005, Fordham 1998, London, Palmer, and Reagan 2004). However, 
the United States is unique, due in part to being the superpower and thus, the most active 
actor in international affairs. Also true, is the fact that, the stakes that other major powers 
have in foreign affairs are much less than those of the United States. For instance, 
someone could argue that there are no very distinct demarcation ideological lines in terms 
of foreign policy among political parties within Western European countries and that the 
foreign policy interests of those countries do not go much further than the European 
integration. However, that does not mean that there is no need of more testable 
generalizations on a large pool of countries. The response of my study to this weakness in 
the present literature is to empirically test the relationship between ideology and state 
behavior on all twenty two OECD countries.  
 This study, then, attempts to fill these gaps in the literature by doing two things: 
develop a better measure of foreign policy behavior and test the relationship between the 
executive's ideology and foreign policy behavior by using a large-N cross national model.   
With the theoretical model presented in this chapter, my study attempts to test the 
consistency between the ideological believes of foreign policymakers and the state's 
actions in international arena. My study expands on the thesis regarding the right leaning 
governments' propensity of using force in international relations and tests if right wing 
governments are more likely to behave aggressively than left wing governments. I will 
test this hypothesis on the OECD countries and by using a broader measure of foreign 
policy behavior which takes into account multiple instances of external actions, not only 
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the traditional use or non use of force. This is particularly interesting in the context 
where, in average, in less than one percent of the situations, the OECD countries' 
response to international crises is the use of military force. 
In the next chapter, I further discuss operational measures of the important 
variables and present preliminary descriptive statistics. That will be followed by a chapter 
where I will empirically test the hypotheses and then analyze the statistical results. These 
two chapters will create the premises to analyze if there is empirical support to the thesis 
that conservative governments are more likely to act aggressively than liberal 
governments.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the research design for empirically assessing the impact of 
executive political ideology on the foreign policy responses of governments in 
international crises. Here, my goal is to explain the manner in which I did the case 
selection, data collection, and variable operationalization and measurement. Various 
studies focused on foreign policy behavior produce conflicting results, partly due to the 
employment of different research designs. In consequence, I will compare my research 
design with other designs used to estimate states' foreign policy actions.  
 This chapter continues as follows. First, I will discuss the case selection method. 
Second, I will describe the dependent variable, which is an ordinal measure of foreign 
policy actions. Then, I present basic descriptive statistics for the dependent variable. 
Third, I will discuss the main independent variable, the executive's political ideology, and 
the key independent variables, power and economic interdependence, as used in the 
statistical analyses. Here, I will provide measurable proxies for these variables. Fourth, I 
will present a number of control variables which provide causal explanations for changes 
in foreign policy decisions. Finally, I will conclude by comparing the present research 
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designs with previous designs used to evaluate foreign policy behavior.  
 
Data and unit of analysis 
I analyze all international crises during the timeframe 1977-2001 using the International 
Crisis Behavior Project (ICB) (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). There are 158 crises which 
started and ended during this period (see Appendix A). According to Brecher and 
Wilkenfeld (2000, 3), a crisis is a “a threat to one or more basic values, along with an 
awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of 
involvement in military hostilities”. I chose ICB dataset because it includes not only 
militarized disputes but also crises short of war, which finally allows for a more nuanced 
analysis of states foreign policy decisions. 
 I will test my hypotheses on twenty two states, which are all OECD countries. 
They are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, 
Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. The 
reason for focusing on this group of countries is twofold. First, they are consolidated, 
well-established democracies, which make them more likely to have developed firm 
ideological cleavages among various political parties. Second, the most comprehensive 
source which provides measurable proxies (Klingeman et al. 2006) for the study's main 
independent variable, the executive's ideology, includes only the OECD countries.  
 The unit of analysis of this study is the dyad year. The first member of the dyad is 
an OECD country and the second member is a country involved in the ICB crisis. During 
my study's timeframe, there are twenty two crises in which one of the adversaries is an 
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OECD country. My study contains an initial number of 6,856 observations. In the present 
study, each observation aims at estimating the foreign policy action taken by every 
OECD country toward each state involved in the international crises or incident. For 
example, if there are three parties involved in an international crisis, none of them an 
OECD country, the resulting number of cases is sixty six (all 22 OECD countries paired 
against each country in the crisis). Every OECD country will be coded as having just one 
response per crisis, no matter the duration of the crisis. In the case when a country has 
more than a single response to the crisis, the response that I code is the most aggressive 
one. In this context, foreign policy action can be viewed as both third-party intervention 
and non intervention. For the purpose of this study, I will define a third-party intervention 
as “any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to 
reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and, 
therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself” (Young 1967, 34).  
 This study analyzes three empirical models. While the independent and control 
variables remain constant, the dependent variable is measured uniquely in each separate 
model.  
 
Dependent variable: foreign policy behavior 
In order to evaluate the theoretical argument and test the hypotheses, I develop a new 
ordinal variable called foreign policy behavior, which represents the individual response 
of a country to an international crisis. This action can take one of fourteen possible 
outcomes. The two sources I have used in order to assess a country's foreign policy 
behavior are Keesing's Record of World Events, a monthly digest of worldwide political, 
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diplomatic and economic affairs, and the ICB crises summary, which present the 
evolution of the crisis and describe the response of third parties and regional and 
international organizations to a given crisis.  
 Most previous studies operationalized state behavior dichotomously by modeling 
only the use or non-use of force (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991; Meernik 
1994; Gowa 1998; Fordham 1998). These studies either investigated states' annual or 
quarterly use of military force, or modeled the level of force used. Few studies, however, 
operationalize state foreign behavior as different degrees of aggressiveness or magnitude 
of engagement in world affairs (Rummell 1966, East 1973, Davis and Moore 1997; Clark 
2001). In some cases state behavior may take into consideration trade disputes (Clark 
2001) and in others foreign policy behavior may be much broader, including events 
ranging from meeting of officials and military and economic agreements to the 
imposition of economic and political sanctions, military clashes and war.  
 As a response to an international crisis, it may be the case that a country may 
choose to intervene in more than one way. For example, it may condemn one or both 
countries involved in the crisis, then it may impose sanctions, and finally, if sanctions do 
not have the intended effect, the third party may decide to engage its military forces. In 
those kinds of situations I will consider the most belligerent action taken by that state.  
 As mentioned above, I measure foreign policy behavior ordinally, from 
accommodation to aggression. I identify fourteen types of responses which will be 
grouped in five different categories of behavior. The underlying analytical concept that 
distinguish between these five categories of behavior is aggressiveness. Thus, the five 
categories of behavior are ordered on an aggressiveness scale. The first category, 
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accommodationist behavior, consists of actions or statements made by governments 
which aim at a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Three types of individual responses fall 
into this category: non military aid, adjudication/mediation/arbitration, and call for a 
cease-fire and a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The second category, neutral 
behavior, consists of just one instance of state behavior, non intervention. I include just 
non intervention in this category, because the motives and circumstances of this type of 
response to the crisis are not made entirely clear by the third party. The third category, 
semi-accomodationist behavior, encompasses individual positions of states which consist 
of verbal statements, made in relation to the whole crisis or a particular actor directly 
involved in the crisis. These verbal statements do not include direct threats. The 
individual type of responses which fall into this category are express concern, call for 
withdrawal of troops, and condemnation.  
 The fourth category, semi-aggressive behavior, consists of actions taken by third 
parties aimed at putting an end to the crisis The intervention tools are more 
comprehensive and vigorous than those in the previous categories of behavior. Important 
to note, the various manners of intervention are short of the direct use of military force or 
threat of the use of force against one of the crisis actors. Participating in 
peacekeeping/peacemaking missions, sanctions, and military aid are the types of 
individual behaviors which comprise this category. Finally, the fifth category, aggressive 
behavior, contains those types of foreign policy behavior which directly involve the 
military forces of the OECD country or refer to the potential use of direct military force. 
Thus, the kinds of responses which fall into this category of state behavior are  
threat of force, mobilization of troops, peace enforcement, and use of force.  
 83 
 Below, in table 4.1, I present the five categories of state behavior, from the most 
accommodationist to the most aggressive, and the correspondent values for each of them, 
resulted from collapsing the fourteen individual categories of foreign policy behavior.  
 
 
 
Table 4.1. Instances of foreign policy behavior of OECD countries, as responses to crises 
 
Type of foreign policy behavior 
 
Correspondent 
value for state 
behavior  
Categories of behavior 
(accommodationist vs. 
aggressive) 
Correspondent 
value for categories 
of state behavior 
Non military aid 
 
1 Accommodationist 1 
Adjudication, mediation, 
arbitration 
2 Accommodationist 1 
Call for a cease-fire and a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict 
3 Accommodationist 1 
Non-intervention 
 
4 Neutral 2 
Express concern 
 
5 Semi-accommodationist 3 
Call for withdrawal of troops 
 
6 Semi-accommodationist 3 
Condemnation 
 
7 Semi-accommodationist 3 
Peacekeeping, peacemaking 
 
8 Semi-aggressive 4 
Sanctions 
 
9 Semi-aggressive 4 
Military aid 
 
10 Semi-aggressive 4 
Threat of force 
 
11 Aggressive 5 
Mobilization of troops 
 
12 Aggressive 5 
Peace enforcement 
 
13 Aggressive 5 
Use of force 
 
14 Aggressive 5 
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Description of types of foreign policy behavior 
For a better understanding of each category of behavior on the foreign policy continuum, 
below, I describe each instance of foreign policy behavior I have identified in studying 
the responses of OECD countries to international crises during 1977-2001. Again, the 
dependent variable's fourteen point scale consists of non military aid, adjudication/ 
mediation, call for a cease-fire and a peaceful resolution of the conflict, no involvement, 
express concern, call for withdrawal of troops, condemnation, peacekeeping/ 
peacemaking, sanctions, military aid, threat of force, mobilization of troops, peace 
enforcement, and use of force.  
a. Financial, economic, humanitarian, medical aid 
The dependent variable is coded as providing aid when the OECD country offers non-
military assistance to one or more parties directly involved in the crisis. The aid may be 
given either on an international or an intergovernmental level and aims at reducing the 
population suffering affected by the crisis. For example, Norway announced on May 22 
2007, its donation of 100 million dollars to boost the development and peace process in 
Sudan. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 1. 
b. Mediation, arbitration, adjudication, negotiation 
I code a foreign policy behavior as mediation, arbitration, adjudication, or negotiation 
when a third party gets involved in the dispute settlement, aiming at reducing the 
differences or seeking a solution. Jimmy Carter’s mediation of the Israeli-Egyptian 
conflict in 1979 at Camp David (Kleiboer 1998, 89-90) illustrates this kind of outcome. I 
code this type of foreign policy behavior as 2. 
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c. Call for a cease-fire and a peaceful resolution of the conflict 
Individually, or along with other countries, members of various regional or international 
organizations, such as the European Union or United Nations, a country can call for a 
cease-fire among the warring parties and a peaceful resolution to the conflict. As an 
example, on January 8 2009, the United Nations Security Council via UN Security 
Council Resolution 1860 (www.un.org), called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza 
leading to a full Israeli withdrawal, the unimpeded provision throughout Gaza of food, 
fuel and medical treatment, and intensified international arrangements to prevent arms 
and ammunition smuggling. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 3.  
d. No involvement 
For various reasons, a third party may choose not to respond in any way to an 
international crisis. A significant number of European countries, for instance, chose not 
to get involved in the 2003 American led invasion of Iraq. Similarly, the involvement of 
an OECD country in crises geographically situated in Africa is a rare occurrence. I code 
this type of foreign policy behavior as 4.  
e. Express concern 
As a result of unfolding human tragedies or situations which have the potential of leading 
to major regional conflicts, a country can show its anxiety by "expressing concern" 
toward a crisis. Throughout the crisis between India and Pakistan in July 1999, the 
international community (including the US, Russia, China, and France) expressed grave 
concerns about the escalating violence in Kashmir. I code this type of foreign policy 
behavior as 5.  
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f. Call for withdrawal of troops 
When a crisis leads to the dispatch of military forces across the border or military 
occupation, a third party may call for the withdrawal of troops. On 28 July 1993, as a 
result of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
852 (www.un.org), critical of Israel and called for its withdrawal from all Lebanese 
territory. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 6. 
g. Condemnation 
Via the practice of condemnation, a country shows its strong disapproval with an event or 
a foreign government's policy, practice, or action. France, Ireland, and Norway 
condemned the 2006 Qana airstrike by the Israel Air Force on a building in the small 
community of al-Khuraybah near the South Lebanese village of Qana on July 30, 2006, 
during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 7.  
h. Peacekeeping, peacemaking, observers 
The dependent variable is coded as peacekeeping, peacemaking, or observers when a 
country sends military troops overseas with the purpose of monitoring and observing 
peace processes, and more generally, in non-combat missions. Typically, soldiers sent on 
these missions are unarmed or only lightly armed. States such as Austria, Australia, 
Canada, and Denmark contributed military personnel to UNIIMOG (United Nations Iran-
Iraq Military Observer Group) which was established in August 1988 to verify, confirm 
and supervise the ceasefire and the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally 
recognized boundaries, pending a comprehensive settlement (www.un.org). I code this 
type of foreign policy behavior as 8.  
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i. Sanctions 
I code a sanctions when a country, directly involved in the crisis or as a third party, 
individually or within a regional or international organization, imposes economic, 
political, financial, or military sanctions against one or more parties involved directly in 
the crisis. As an example, during 1998 and 1999 the European Union decided to take a 
range of measures against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia because of its role in 
Kosovo (De Neuilly, 2001). Those sanctions included an arms embargo, travel 
restrictions, an oil embargo, and financial sanctions. I code this type of foreign policy 
behavior as 9.  
j. Military aid 
The dependent variable is coded as military aid when a third party offers military aid to 
one or more parties directly involved in the crisis. By supporting militarily one side, I 
view this behavior as indirect military involvement in the crisis. As an example which 
illustrates this behavior, the United States government delivered precision-guided bombs 
to Israel, which were requested after beginning its air campaign against Hezbollah targets 
in Lebanon (The New York Times, July 21, 2006). I code this type of foreign policy 
behavior as 10.  
k. Threat of force 
I code the threat of force when a country, directly involved in a crisis or a third party, 
makes an express or implied promise that it will resort to force if certain demands of that 
government are not met. In January 1998, the United States and Britain threatened Iraq 
with the use of "substantial" force if this country would not comply with its obligations of 
cooperating with a delegation of UN inspectors. I code this type of foreign policy 
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behavior as 11.  
l. Mobilization of troops 
A mobilization of troops occurs when a government assembles, prepares, and places its 
military troops into readiness for war. As an example, on December 13, 2001, the Indian 
Parliament was attacked by a group of militants allegedly belonging to Pakistan. The 
Indian Government responded with a massive troop mobilization along the India-Pakistan 
border
3
. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 12.  
m. Peace enforcement 
The dependent variable is coded as peace enforcement when a country involves its 
military troops in a mission which may require the application of military force, or the 
threat of its use, to ensure compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain 
or restore peace and order. Peace enforcement operations, where there is limited or no 
consent of the parties, are very close to actual combat. For example, since 2003, NATO 
countries, through the International Security Assistance Force, assist Afghan authorities 
in providing security and stability, in order to create the conditions for reconstruction and 
development (http://www.isaf.nato.int/). I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 13.  
n. Use of force 
The use of force, refers to a country's use of land, naval, or aerial military forces against 
another country in order to settle a dispute or abate a crisis. Far example, the intervention 
in Afghanistan initiated by the United States in response to the 9/11 attacks, falls into this 
category. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 14.  
 
                                               
3 See the International Crisis Behavior Project, Indian Parliament Attack, crisis number 435. 
Http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/ 
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Discussion of data 
 By the criteria enunciated above, out of 6,856 cases, 6098 of them resulted in non 
intervention on the part of the OECD countries (89%); there are 14 instances when 
OECD countries responded by providing non-military aid to one or more states involved 
directly in the crisis (0.2%); in 73 cases, they were involved in mediation (1%); in 77 
cases, OECD countries called for a cease-fire and a peaceful resolution of the conflict 
(1%); in 46 instances, OECD countries expressed concern about the crisis (0.7%); in 12 
cases, troops were asked to withdrawal (0.2%); in 212 cases, the actions of one or more 
of the direct participants in the crisis were condemned (3%); in 39 instances, OECD 
states participated in peacekeeping or peacemaking missions (0.6%); in 166 cases, they 
imposed economic, financial, political, or military sanctions (2.5%); in 24 instances they 
responded by offering military aid (0.4%); in 6 cases, OECD countries responded by 
threatening the use of force (0.1%); in 37 cases, OECD executives ordered the 
mobilization of troops (0.5%); in 11 instances, they engaged their troops in peace 
enforcement operations (0.2%); and finally, in 41 cases, leaders of certain OECD 
countries employed the use of military force (0.6%).  
 In figure 4.1, I present the frequency of each category of foreign policy behavior. 
Noticed that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, OECD leaders do not intervene in 
international crises. 
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 Figure 4.1. Frequency distribution of foreign policy behavior, International Crisis 
Behavior Data 
 
 Regarding the duration of crises, out of the total number of 158 crises which 
started and ended during 1977 to 2001, 52 of them (32.9%) lasted less than a month. For 
example, Israel and Lebanon experienced a violent crisis on both sides of their border 
from 9 to 27 April 1996 (see ICB Project, summary of crisis # 344). Then, 49 crises 
(31%), lasted between a month and three months, such as a long-standing border dispute 
which generated the first of several crises between Nigeria and Cameroon from 15 May 
to 24 July 1981 (see ICB Project, summary of crisis # 328). 26 crises in my study's 
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timeframe (16.5%) lasted between three and six months. For instance, from 30 October 
1978 to 10 April 1979, Tanzania, Uganda, and Libya were the actors in a crisis leading to 
the fall of Uganda's President Idi Amin (see ICB Project, summary of crisis # 296). 
Further, 21 crises (13.3%) during 1977 to 2001, lasted between six and twelve months, 
such as the rebellion in eastern Zaire which led to another international crisis for Zaire 
and Rwanda, that escalated into an eight-month civil war in Zaire, from 8 October 1996 
to 16 May 1997. Finally, 10 crises (6.3%) lasted more than a year. As an example, from 
25 September 1992 to 8 October 1993, the newly independent state of Georgia 
experienced a crisis with Russia during its prolonged civil war against a separatist 
movement in Abkhazia (see ICB Project, summary of crisis # 407).  
 In terms of the initial number of countries directly involved in a crisis, in 11 crises 
out of 158 (7%) the crisis took place within the territory of just one country. For example, 
the Polisario Front, a nationalist organization located in Morocco and supported by 
Algeria, whose main goal is the independence of Western Sahara, conducted an attack on 
the Moroccan town of Tan Tan triggered a crisis for Morocco on 28 January 1979 (see 
ICB Project, summary of crisis # 299). The crisis was confined only within Morocco. 
However, in the vast majority of crises, 135 (85.4%), there are two adversaries. Finally, 
in 12 crises (7.6%), there were three or more countries directly involved in the crisis. As 
an example, the U.S. embassy bombings in August 1998 led to a crisis, pitting the US 
against both Afghanistan and Sudan (see ICB Project, summary of crisis # 427).  
 The average annual number of crises for the whole timeframe of the study (1977-
2001) is 6.32. Important to note, during the Cold War years (1977-1991), the annual 
average number of crises was 8.3 per year, while the annual average in the post Cold War 
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(1992-2001) was 3.3 crises per year.  
 
Key independent variable: executive's political ideology 
I identify as the key independent variable the one which is explicitly discussed in the 
theoretical chapter. Thus, my study's key independent variable is executive political 
ideology. To account for political ideology, I use Klingemann et al.'s Manifesto dataset 
(2006) on policy preference estimates for parties, electors, and governments, which 
covers the period 1945-2003. This is the most comprehensive dataset on policy 
preferences available. The dataset estimates political parties and governments' policy 
preferences by doing a content analysis of the political parties manifestos/election 
programmes or their nearest equivalents. The Manifesto Data consist of at least 57 policy 
variables, with several leading indicators based on combinations of these. These policy 
variables are grouped into seven major policy areas: external relations, freedom and 
democracy, political system, economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society, and 
social groups. The data set further contains information on the ideological position of 
parties on a left-right scale, on their support or refusal for state intervention in the 
economy, on their acceptance of a market economy, on welfare state expansion, on 
European Integration and on international peace. 
 I will use two proxies for executive ideology. Both estimates are interval-level 
data. First, the Left-Right dimension (RILE), takes into consideration all 57 policy 
variables and covers all seven major policy areas. The Left-Right scale is made up by 
adding percentage references to the categories grouped as Left and Right, and subtracting 
the sum of the Left percentages from the sum of the Right percentages. Negative scores 
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represent Left positions and positive scores represent Right positions. At the extreme a 
political party devoting its entire programme on Left-wing issues would score -100; 
similarly a totally Right-wing programme would score +100 (Budge et al. 2001, 21). For 
the particular timeframe of my study (1977-2001) and the pool of countries (OECD 
countries) on which I will test my hypotheses, the range of the Left-Right ideological 
dimension is -39.2 to 48.46. Among the Right emphases, we find issues such as positive 
references about the use of military force, freedom, human rights, social services 
limitation, law and order, effective authority, and free enterprise. On the Left side, the 
emphasis is on issues such as negative references about the use of force, decolonization, 
peace, economic planning, regulate capitalism, labor groups, and expansion of social 
services and education.  
 The second proxy for executive ideology, international peace (INTPEACE), 
represents the scores concerning the policy preferences of government on foreign policy. 
Higher values on the international peace scale represent a more liberal ideological 
orientation expressed in the party manifesto. For the particular case of my study, the 
range of the international peace ideological dimension is 0 to 8.8. The international peace 
score is a composite score which takes into account references on three categories. The 
first category, foreign special relationships, looks for negative mentions of particular 
relationships between the manifesto country and other countries. For example, in the 
British case, this category seeks to identify if Britain still looks to control its former 
colonies. The second category, military, codes the favorable mentions of decreasing 
military expenditures, disarmament, “evils of war”, and promises to reduce conscription. 
Finally, the third dimension, peace, codes the positive mentions of peace as a general 
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goal, declarations of belief in peace and peaceful means of solving crises, and desirability 
of countries joining in negotiations with hostile countries.  
 The choice of including two dimensions instead of one originates from the 
probable diminishing significance of the left-right cleavage (Giddens 1994). For instance, 
in practice, left wing political parties around the world increasingly have embraced new 
social and economic policies which traditionally belonged to right-wing parties, such as 
market liberalism and welfare reduction measures. However, at the theoretical level, the 
left-right position is still the central determinant factor for policy preferences 
(Klingemann et al., 2006).  
 For any given government, the government ideology is defined as: 
G.I. = Σ{Ideologyi * (#Postsi/Total Posts)} 
where:  Ideologyi = the ideology of party i 
  Postsi = the total number of cabinet posts controlled by party i 
  Total Posts = the total number of posts in the cabinet 
In the case when there is just one political party which formed the government, Postsi = 
Total Posts, and thus government ideology is equal with the ideology of the party which 
formed the government, G.I = Ideologyi. When there is a coalition of parties which 
formed the government, then, the overall ideology of the government is assessed by 
looking at the political relevance of each party in the government
4
. The relevance of a 
party in the coalition government is given by the number of posts filled by that party as a 
                                               
4
 In parliamentary systems, most of the time, it is a coalition of political parties which form the 
government, in which senior and junior partners share the power over the foreign policy decisionmaking. 
Even though conflicts over foreign policy often occur, it is the senior, larger coalition partner through the 
prime minister, which has the stronger say in these matters. The cabinet's prime minister, who is in most 
cases the leader of the larger party in the coalition, has a large autonomy on foreign policy issues. There are 
also exceptions, like in the case of Germany and Israel, where the junior parties have been able to 
significantly influence key foreign policy decisions (Kaarbo 1996, Hagan et al. 2001, Hermann 2001).  
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percentage of the total number of posts in the government. Therefore, the equivalent 
ideology of a coalition government is calculated with the formula presented above, which 
takes into account the relative importance of each party which formed the executive. In 
order to estimate a party's ideology, I use successively both measures of ideology. First, 
Ideologyi is estimated with the overall measure of ideology (RILE), which contains all 57 
policy variables. Second, Ideologyi is estimated with the measure which takes into 
account only the policy preferences of government on foreign policy (INTPEACE).  
 There are other methods for estimating the ideological positions of political 
actors. However, alternate indicators of party ideology are not as rich and differentiated 
as the ones I use in this study. For example, Huber and Inglehart (1995) and Castles and 
Mair (1984) estimate party policy positions and ideologies by conducting surveys of 
political experts. In this case, the ideological party position is measured by the mean 
value of party activists or likely supporters. The main disadvantages of this method are 
first, that the correspondent indicators are formed by one or a limited number of static 
variables, generally a Left-Right scale, and second, the time period on which policy 
positions are based on is unclear (Budge 2000).  
 Another approach for estimating political actors' ideological location is based on 
an analysis of roll-call voting (Poole and Rosenthal 1985, 1997; Hix, Noury, and Roland 
2006). This is perhaps the most straightforward method, but, there are certain limitations 
associated with this approach. The most important limitation is that it is difficult to 
estimate a coalition government's ideology because political parties can vote in 
Parliament in such a way to keep the coalition together rather than voting according to 
their ideological principles (Debus 2009, 286). 
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Control variables 
Besides executive ideology a number of other variables account for foreign policy 
behavior. Power parity, economic interdependence, contiguity and distance, similarity of 
foreign policy views, and regime type, all influence leader foreign policy decisions and 
will be included in the empirical models presented in the next chapter. 
Power parity 
Power parity is operationalized by accounting for the military, economic, and 
technological capabilities of states (Gilpin 1981, 33). In this study, the proxy for power 
parity is relative capabilities, operationalized as the OECD country's share of capabilities 
within the dyad. That is, I calculate relative capabilities, RELCAP1, as the ratio between 
the capabilities of country 1 and the sum of capabilities of country 1 and country 2, where 
country 1 is the OECD country and country 2 is a country directly involved in the crisis. 
Thus, 
RELCAP1 = CAP1/(CAP1+CAP2) 
An alternate proxy for power parity is the relative capability of the stronger state to the 
sum of capabilities in thy dyad. However, I use the first measure because I look for it to  
capture the increasing strength of the OECD country relative to the total power of the 
countries in the dyad.  
 I use the CINC score in order to estimate the national material capabilities, as 
found in the COW dataset (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). This is a 
multidimensional indicator which takes into consideration six factors: energy 
consumption, iron and steel consumption, military expenditures, military personnel, total 
and urban population.  
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 The use of relative capabilities as a measure for military power parity between the 
two countries in the dyad has some limitations. Among those limitations, this measure 
does not take into account, for instance, the determination showed by the less powerful 
country during a military conflict or the resilience of a population, able to overcome the 
difficulties associated with the sanctions imposed by the international community. 
Similarly, as a proxy for military power parity, relative capabilities does not capture 
difficulty of terrain and tactics employed by the less powerful country, which finally may 
diminish the military superiority of the more dominant country. However, taking into 
account that concepts such as determination or population's resilience are difficult to be 
quantified, the use or relative capabilities remains the most appropriate measure for 
military power parity.  
 I expect that the larger the relative capability, in other words the stronger the 
OECD country and the weaker the crisis country, the more aggressive the OECD country 
will behave. 
Economic interdependence 
Multiple measures have appeared in the literature to operationalize economic 
interdependence (Barbieri 1995, 1996; Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999a). Two different 
variable constructions are commonly used to express the same concept. The basis of 
Barbieri's composite variable is trade share which is calculated as the proportion of 
bilateral trade to each state's total trade. In addition to trade share, among Barbieri's 
measures, we find: a) trade salience, which equals the square root of the product of trade 
share measures for both states in a dyad; b) trade symmetry which assesses the "balance" 
of the two trade share measures, and c) trade interdependence, which summarizes the 
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interaction of salience and symmetry (Gartzke and Li 2003, 555).  
 In contrast, Oneal and Russett's (1997, 1999a) core measure is trade dependence, 
measured as the ratio of bilateral trade to a state's gross domestic product (GDP). Trade 
dependence focuses on interdependence expressed as economic importance of a given 
bilateral trade relationship as a portion of the national economy, dismissing the role of the 
trade relationships with third parties. Further, two additional measures, derived from 
trade dependence, are operationalized as follows: a) trade interdependence, which equals 
the lower of the two dependence measures; and b) trade asymmetry, the higher economic 
dependence measure of the two.  
 In this study, as a proxy for trade interdependence, I will use Barbieri's trade share 
(TRADESHARE) measured as follows:  
TRADESHAREi = (importsij + exportsij)/(importsi + exportsi) = tradeij/tradei 
I use this measure because it better captures the significance of a given trading 
relationship, in relation to trade with a state's other partners. 
 The trade between two countries is defined as the annual levels of exports and 
imports of goods and services. In order to estimate countries' annual trade levels and the 
individual level of trade with particular countries, I use the Correlates of War Project’s 
Trade Data. The data set covers the period 1870-2006 and uses data provided by multiple 
sources, including the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations’ Yearbook of 
International Trade Statistics, and the World Bank.  
 I expect that, with the increase of trade share between the OECD and the crisis 
country, the propensity toward a more accommodationist behavior on the part of the 
OECD country increases.  
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Contiguity and distance 
Contiguity and distance affect the relationships among states on various levels. 
According to Starr and Most (1978, 444), territory and borders "do not cause wars, they 
at least create structure of risks and opportunities in which conflictual behavior is 
apparently more likely to occur". Associated with Diehl's (1991) "facilitating condition 
for conflict", geography is important from two different perspectives. First, in line with 
the proximity perspective, closeness influences foreign policy behavior because it 
facilitates the ease with which states are able to reach to each other politically, militarily, 
or from a trade standpoint. Second, according to the interaction perspective the frequency 
with which states interact is influenced by their location.  
 When relating contiguity and distance with foreign policy behavior, the most 
common argument is that proximity increases the propensity toward more aggressive 
behavior. If two neighboring states have a history of disputes, proximity exacerbates the 
tensions between them, which may lead to more aggressive behavior toward each other 
(Hensel 1994; Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi 1991). Political instability or revolutions should 
also concern policymakers if they take place in a neighboring country. Thus, threat 
perception is heightened and policymakers may overreact by responding more 
aggressively than necessary (Diehl 1985, 1991). On a similar note, Starr and Most (1978) 
believe that relations between neighboring states are marked by higher uncertainty than 
the relations between countries situated farther apart. This higher uncertainty can also 
lead to more confrontational behavior.  
 In order to capture the effects of these two influences, I include two proxies which 
operationalize distance and contiguity. First, DISTANCE is expressed as the distance in 
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miles between the capitals of the two states. Second, CONTIG is expressed as a 
dichotomous variable which equals 1 if the two countries share a land border or are 
separated by less than 150 miles of water, or 0 if they are not directly contiguous. The 
effect of distance in hindering aggressive behavior is less obvious for the powerful 
countries, which have the capacity to mobilize, deploy their troops worldwide, and use 
them if necessary. In this study, I expect that proximity will lead to more aggressive 
behavior.  
Similarity of foreign policy views 
Many researchers of international politics believe that the similarity of two states' foreign 
policy positions may impact the relations between them (Bueno de Mesquita 1975, 1981, 
Gartzke and Simon 1996, Oneal and Russett 1997b). That is, the more common their 
foreign policy views, the less room for disagreements and thus, a reduced likelihood for 
aggressive behavior toward one another. The pattern of alliances among states is 
generally considered to express the extent to which states have similar or diverging 
foreign policies or security interests (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979). More 
precisely, as Bueno de Mesquita (1975) suggests, states with similar alliance portfolios 
are likely to have similar foreign policy goals and vice versa.  
 In order to take into account the similarity of foreign policy views, I use a spatial 
measure, similarity of alliance portfolio (S), which evaluates the rank order correlation 
for two states' alliance portfolios. S considers both the presence and the absence of 
alliances in the correlation calculation (Bennett and Stam 2004, 237). The values for S 
are on the interval (-1, 1), where -1 represents totally opposite alliance agreement patterns 
between the two countries , and 1 indicates identical alliance agreement patterns 
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(Signorino and Ritter 1999). The Correlates of War COW Alliances Data Set provides the 
estimates for the policy portfolio.  
 An alternative measure for similarity of foreign policy views is Kendall tau-b. 
Like S, Kendall tau-b estimates the rank order correlation for two states' alliance 
portfolios. However, rather than considering both the presence and the absence of 
alliances, the latter takes into account only the existence of alliances in the correlation 
calculation (Bennett and Stam 2004, 237).  
 In this study, I expect that the more similar are the alliance portfolios of the two 
states in the dyad, the more likely the OECD country will act more cooperatively toward 
the crisis country.  
Regime type 
Regime type is an important attribute of states, which influences the relations with other 
actors in the international system. According to democratic peace theory, democracies 
rarely, if ever, fight each other, but they are just as bellicose as non-democracies (Maoz 
and Russett 1993, Russett 1993, Oneal et al. 1996). Thus, it is expected that an OECD 
country will act more aggressively toward countries with increasing levels of 
authoritarianism and oppositely, more peacefully toward more liberal countries.  
 The measure I use to take into account for regime type (POLITY) is the difference 
between the polity score of country 2 and the polity score of country 1, where country 1 
is the OECD country and country 2 is a country directly involved in the crisis. The polity 
score is calculated as the democracy score minus the autocracy score. Thus, 
POLITY = POLITY2 - POLITY1 
POLITYi = DEMOCi - AUTOCi 
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The intervals for democracy and autocracy scores are (0, 10). Therefore, the polity score 
captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary 
monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity IV Project contains coded annual 
information on regime and authority characteristics for all independent states.  
 
Models 
This study addresses empirically the two hypotheses presented in the theory chapter, by 
using three different models. The difference between the three models is the manner in 
which the dependent variable is operationalized. The independent and control variables 
and their measures are the same in each of the three models. As I mentioned before, I 
started with 6,856 observations on Y. Missing data on the measures of power, trade 
interdependence, similarity of foreign policy views, distance and contiguity, and regime 
type, leaves me with 5,612 cases. That is, a number of 1,244 observations are missing. 
479 observations were lost because of missing data correspondent to the flow of imports 
and exports between the two countries in the dyad and also the total trade of each of those 
two countries. Also, 444 observations were lost because of missing data on democracy 
and autocracy scores in the two countries. Thus, I excluded the observations which were 
coded in Polity IV as -66 (cases of foreign "interruption"), -77 (cases of “interregnum,” 
or anarchy), and -88 (cases of "transition"). Finally, another 321 observations were 
dropped because of missing values associated with the polity scores of the two states in 
the dyad.  
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Model 1 
In this model, foreign policy behavior is a two category variable. The two types of 
behavior are no intervention and intervention. I code 0 the instances of foreign policy 
behavior which consist of no intervention. All other instances are coded as 1. 
Noteworthy, the second category does not take into account the character of the behavior 
- aggressiveness/accomodationism. By these criteria, out of 5,612 observations, 5,023 of 
them are coded as no intervention (89.5%), while in 589 cases (10.5%), OECD countries 
intervened in one form or another. Figure 4.2 displays the frequency distribution of the 
two category dependent variable of model 1. 
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Figure 4.2. Frequency distribution of foreign policy behavior: two category dependent 
variable (Model 1) 
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Model 2 
In this model, foreign policy behavior is a four category variable. The first category, 
which is more accomodationist than the following categories, is coded as 1, and is 
comprised of non-military aid, mediation, and call for a cease fire. There are 121 
observations in this category (2.2%). The second category is coded as 2 and contains only 
the no intervention instances of foreign policy behavior. There are 5,023 observations in 
this category (89.5%). The third category of foreign policy behaviors, which is semi-
accommodationist, is coded as 3, and is comprised of the categories express concern, call 
for troops withdrawal, and condemnation. 239 cases are found in this category (4.3%).  
The fourth category, which is semi aggressive, is coded as 4, and is comprised of 
peacekeeping, sanctions, and military aid. This category contains 157 instances of 
behavior (2.8%). Finally, the fifth category includes the more aggressive instances of 
foreign policy behavior, among which, threat of force, mobilization of troops, peace 
enforcement, and use of force. There are 72 observations in this category (1.3%). Figure 
4.3 displays the frequency distribution of the five category dependent variable of model 
2.  
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Figure 4.3. Frequency distribution of foreign policy behavior: five category dependent 
variable (Model 2) 
 
Model 3 
In this model, foreign policy behavior is a four category variable, which excludes the 
instances of no intervention. I develop this model in order to explore the impact of 
government's political ideology on foreign policy decisionmaking in instances of 
intervention. The justification for including such a model is that no intervention, which 
accounts for more than ninety percent of the observations in my study, is not always the 
result of lack of power, economic sufficiency, or a location which hinders intervention in 
world affairs. For example, there are countries such as New Zealand and Switzerland 
which, in over 95 percent of the crises, do not intervene at all.  
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 Various reasons are invoked when explaining no intervention. Generally, a 
country's security interests and behavior are defined by actors who respond to cultural 
factors (Katzenstein 1996). Expanding on this broad argument, Kal Holsti (1970) refers 
to what he calls "national role conception", a notion which sought to express how a 
nation views itself and its role in world affairs, when explaining differences in national 
behavior. In this context, no intervention does not imply lack of capabilities but it reflects 
the deep cultural beliefs of a nation and its leaders. On a similar note, Ball (1992) 
observes that Asian culture predisposes toward longer term approaches than other 
cultures. He quotes the first president of Indonesia, Sukarno, as saying "We, the 
Indonesian people, have learned not to think in centimeters or meters, not in hours or 
days. We have learned to think in continents and decades" (Ball 1992, 5). Thus, a 
country's foreign policymaking that is influenced by this cultural approach would very 
likely be non interventionist rather than interventionist. Finally, through the concept of 
strategic culture
5
, non-intervention receives a new meaning. Elaborating on the 
relationship between Chinese strategic culture and its use of military force, Johnston 
points out that “China has exhibited a tendency for the controlled, politically driven 
defensive and minimalist use of force that is deeply rooted in the statecraft of ancient 
strategists and a worldview of relatively complacent superiority” (1995, 1). 
 In practice, neutrality or "isolationism" refers to a government’s deliberate policy 
of refraining from interfering in the affairs of other nations. It was not until December 7, 
                                               
5
 Born at the intersection between history, geography, values, beliefs, and politics, strategic culture is 
labeled as “the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of 
mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particularly geographically 
based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience” (Gray 1999, 53). 
Therefore, as opposed to culture, which describes the society as a whole, strategic culture is an attribute of 
the security community elite.  
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1941, when Japanese naval forces attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, 
when the United States decided to change its approach toward intervening in world 
affairs on a larger scale. West German governments, during the Cold War, pursued a 
foreign policy consisting of a strong commitment to multilateral institutions and a innate 
skepticism of military power. Preferring a low international profile, they sought to create 
a reputation as an “honest broker”. During the post World War II period, until the first 
Gulf War, Japan, forced by circumstances, became a pacifist and noninterventionist 
nation, with no military of its own, which allowed this country to focus entirely on 
economic development. From a different perspective, there are situations when countries 
are willing and ready to act but they chose not to. For example, in the aftermath of 9/11 it 
was just the US and Britain that attacked Afghanistan. Germany and France committed 
their countries to providing military support to the US-led war on terrorism if required. 
 This model includes 589 observations. The first category, which accounts for the 
more accomodationist foreign policy behaviors, is coded as 1, and is comprised of non-
military aid, mediation, and call for a cease fire. This category includes 121 observations 
(20.5%). The second category includes 239 observations (40.6%) and consists of semi 
accomodationist behaviors, such as express concern, call for troops withdrawal and 
condemnation. I code this new category as 2. The third category is coded as 3 and 
includes 157 observations (26.7%). It is a semi aggressive type of foreign policy behavior 
and is made up by peacekeeping, sanctions and military aid. Finally, the forth category is 
the most aggressive one and is comprised of threat of force, mobilization of troops, peace 
enforcement, and use of force. I code it as 4 and includes 72 observations (12.2%).  
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Figure 4.4. Frequency distribution of foreign policy behavior: four category dependent 
variable (Model 3) 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented the operationalization of the concepts in my model, in order to 
be able to test, in the next chapter, the influence of government's political ideology on 
foreign policy behavior. I discussed the measurement of these variables and then 
compared those measures with other measures of the same concepts, found in the 
literature. Further, I presented basic descriptive statistics related to the dependent 
variable. Finally, I examined the three empirical models which will be used to test the 
study's hypotheses.  
 There has been little empirical research directed toward understanding the role of 
executives' political ideology in foreign policymaking. Although there is scholarship 
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which analyzes both qualitatively and quantitatively the use of force in international 
politics, limited research examines the broader range of foreign policy behavior. Thus, 
this study aims at addressing an ignored area of foreign policy decisionmaking.  
 In the next chapter, I use ordinary least square regression to evaluate the role 
played by government's political ideology in influencing foreign policy behavior.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
In the third chapter I reviewed extant research on the impact of political ideology on state 
foreign policy behavior. This literature suggests political ideology may or may not affect 
foreign policy decisionmaking. For example, realists insist that ideology does not 
influence the foreign policy decisions of governments. It is power relations which 
determine relations among states. In contrast, liberals, among others, maintain ideology 
directly influences the actions governments take in the international arena. Left wing 
governments are likely to act dovishly, while right wing governments are expected to 
behave more hawkishly. However, there is no significant empirical evidence which 
supports the thesis that left wing executives behave more dovishly, while right wing 
executives act more hawkishly. The sample of countries used in my analyses include all 
OECD states from 1977 to 2001.  
 This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the estimation technique utilized 
to assess the influence of the executive ideology on foreign policy decisions of the 
government. In the second part, I discuss the empirical findings characteristic to each of 
the three empirical models. Lastly, I conclude that executive ideology's role in 
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influencing foreign policy behavior is mixed, depending on the way ideology is 
estimated.  
 
Model 1: binary dependent variable 
Estimation technique 
The dependent variable in all three models is discrete or categorical, rather than 
continuous. In the first model, the dependent variable is binary, where no intervention is 
coded as 0, while intervention is coded as 1. Because the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, I use a logistic regression in order to estimate the relationship between 
executive ideology and foreign policy behavior, while controlling for power parity, 
economic interdependence, policy portfolio, regime type, distance, and contiguity. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is inappropriate because, in my case, the 
dependent variable is not continuous and thus, I cannot assume a linear relationship 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable (Long 1997). 
 The most common form of the logistic regression equation is  
 Yi (x)= 
)](exp[1
1
bixia
, or alternatively,  
logit[Yi(x)] = log {Yi(x)/[1- Yi(x)]} = a + b1x1 + b2X2 + ... + bixi 
where a = the constant of the equation, and bi = the coefficient of the predictor variables. 
Employing Agresti's formalization (2002), if the probability of a country to intervene 
(take on the value of 1) is P(Yi=1) = πi, then the probability of not to intervene is P(Yi=0) 
= 1 - πi., where 0 ≤ πi ≤ 1.  
The probability mass function for the possible outcomes y for Y is  
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E(Yi) = p(y) = πy(1- π)n-y 
)!(!
!
yny
n
 
where y = 0 or 1, and n = number of binary observations (Agresti 2002, 5-6) 
 The general equation which describes this model and includes all independent 
variables assumed to influence foreign policy behavior is presented below. 
Ln (Foreign policy behavior) = a + b1ideology + b2relcapab + b3ecinterdep +   
       b4regimetype + b5policyviews + b6distance + b7contiguity 
 
The basic descriptive statistics for the variables in Model 1 is shown in Table B.1. (see 
Appendix B). 
 
Empirical results 
The results from model 1 provide solid support to the argument that executive ideology 
influences government's decision of intervening or not intervening in international crises. 
In table 5.1., I present the results of a Logit analysis, where executive ideology is 
expressed as both the overall ideology of the party or coalition of parties which form the 
government (the Left-Right dimension), and the ideology which refers to the specific area 
of foreign policy. I opt for using both measures of executive ideology because they 
express different ideological domains and besides, they are not highly correlated (-0.059). 
The dependent variable is dichotomous. The two categories are no intervention and 
intervention, where intervention refers to all possible instances of involvement, 
accomodationist or aggressive.  
 Both Logit models confirm that executive ideology influences the likelihood of a 
government to intervene in crises. However, depending on how executive ideology is  
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Table 5.1. Logit Estimates of Executive Ideology and International Influences on Foreign 
Policy Behavior, 1977-2001; two level dependent variable 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable    Overall  International Peace 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
EXECUTIVE IDEOLOGY  0.01
***
   0.048
**
   
 t    (0.0025)  (0.023)    
      
RELCAP1    0.817
***
  0.845
***
 
  
 
 (t - 1)    (0.164)  (0.164) 
 
TRADESHARE1   -11.48
***
  -11.56
***
  
 (t - 1)    (2.92)   (2.93) 
 
POLITY    0.065
***
  0.066
***
  
     (0.007)  (0.0066) 
 
ALLIANCE PORTFOLIOS (S) -1.238
***
  -1.23
***
 
 (t - 1)    (0.25)   (0.255) 
 
DISTANCE    -8.6e
-05***
  -8.42e
-05***
  
     (2e
-05
)   (2.03e
-05
) 
 
CONTIGUITY   0.57   0.573 
     (0.337)  (0.337) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Log likelihood   -1792.98  -1799.07 
 
Chi-square    183.43   171.26 
 
N     5,612   5,612 
________________________________________________________________________ 
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed 
test. 
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estimated, the two models show contrasting results. First, if I use the Overall Ideology 
estimate, the results show that the more conservative the ideological orientation of the 
government, the higher the likelihood of intervention. The relationship between the 
two is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. Further, as shown in the second Logit 
model, if I estimate ideology with the international peace proxy, the relationship between 
executive ideology and foreign policy behavior is also positive and significant, but at the 
0.05 level. However, the meaning of the relationship is different. The presence of a 
liberal government increases the likelihood of intervention. Important to emphasize, these 
results do not say anything about the type of intervention a state opted for. The 
coefficients in both cases are slightly positive. The effects I document are robust across 
the two measures of executive ideology. Thus, the empirical results strongly support the 
argument that the decisions of governments to respond or not to respond to international 
crises is highly influenced by their ideological views.  
 When using the overall right-left estimate of ideology, the results support the 
common view, according to which liberals are more isolationists and conservatives are 
more interventionist. Discussing bipartisanship in U.S. foreign policy, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter, notes that "the 
Democratic Party, the party of internationalism, became increasingly prone to the appeal 
of neo-isolationism. And the Republican Party, the party of isolationism, became 
increasingly prone to the appeal of militant interventionism" (Brzezinski 1984, 15-16). At 
its core, a Republican foreign policy involves a strong commitment to a strong national 
defense, where force remains the first and last line of defense of U.S. freedom and 
security (Hagel 2004, 65). This reliance on force breathes a more proactive approach in 
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dealing with security challenges and thus more interventionism. Oppositely, the 
reluctance of the Left to invest in the military reduces the capacity to intervene abroad. 
That is the case because, frequently, the ability to intervene in international affairs, either 
peacefully or aggressively, requires military capabilities.  
 The use of the second proxy for executive ideology, international peace, leads to 
results which contradict the expected direction of the relationship. A possible explanation 
for the inverse relationship is that liberal governments, due to their inclusive conception 
of the national interest, will be more likely to respond to crises than conservative 
governments, so that equality prevails, human rights abuses and ethnic rivalries are 
stopped, dictators are removed from office, and people living in other countries enjoy 
better living conditions. Another possible reason is that liberal governments, as in the 
case of the United States, are challenged to a greater extent than conservative 
administrations (Prins 2001) and thus, liberal executives end up being more 
interventionist.   
 Few examples from the case of the United States are illustrative. Throughout the 
study's timeframe, the most tested U.S. President was Jimmy Carter (Democrat). During 
his four years in office, 45 international crises took place, and he responded to 23 of them 
(51.11%). The least tested one term U.S. President was George H. W. Bush (Republican), 
who responded to 10 of the 21 international crises (47.62%) which took place during his 
presidency. The most interventionist American President was Bill Clinton (Democrat), 
who responded to 20 of the 25 international crises (80%) taking place during his eight 
years in office. Lastly, as a two term president, Ronal Reagan (Republican) responded to 
32 international crises out of the total number of 65 (49.23%).  
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 With regard to the impact of relative capabilities and economic interdependence 
on foreign policy behavior, both relationships are robust and statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. That is true for both models, no matters how executive ideology is measured. 
In the case of relative capabilities, the relationship coefficients are positive and relatively 
high. These estimates show that the OECD country's probability of intervention increases 
with increases in power. This outcome is in line with the realist argument that assumes 
that it is the more powerful countries that are more likely to intervene because they have 
the primary interest in maintaining or changing the status quo. Besides, they have the 
financial, political, diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities which allow them to 
intervene in international affairs (Waltz 1979, Morgenthau 1967, Kennan 1957).  
 The relationship between economic interdependence and state behavior is 
strongly negative, as shown by the coefficients presented in Table 5.1. These estimates 
strongly support the claim that the higher the trading relationship between an OECD 
country and another country, the lower the likelihood of engagement of the first toward 
the latter. The results come to expand on the liberals' argument, according to which open 
international markets and heightened economic exchange promote communication 
between governments and thus, inhibit political-military discord and hinder interstate 
hostilities (Doyle 1997, Rosecrance 1986). Besides, OECD countries are reluctant to 
intervene even cooperatively. The justification for such an argument is that crises take 
place mainly in developing areas, between countries which do not have large level of 
trades with the OECD countries. It may be the case that these crises do not disrupt in a 
major way the normal economic exchanges with the OECD countries and thus, there is 
no reason for them to intervene, even cooperatively. Therefore, OECD countries do not 
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have the incentives to intervene either belligerently or cooperatively. 
 The other control variables also have a significant effect on foreign policy 
behavior. As anticipated, the impact of the regime type of the state directly involved in a 
crisis influences the propensity of engagement of the OECD country. The relationship 
between the two is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. That is to say, the more 
democratic the target country, the more likely the OECD country will engage with it. 
These results come somehow to expand on the democratic peace thesis, which states that 
democratic countries do not fight one another (Maoz and Russett 1993, Gledistch 1992). 
However, the results go further than democratic peace theory, and show that OECD 
countries have more interactions with the more democratic countries than with less 
democratic ones.  
 Further, as with the impact of the pattern of alliances between states on foreign 
policy behavior, the coefficient on the relationship term is negative, fairly high, and 
significant at the 0.01 level. The significance of these estimates is that OECD countries 
are more likely to engage with or intervene against countries whose foreign policy 
positions are different than theirs. The possible explanation for such a behavior is that 
OECD countries form alliances mostly with other OECD countries, and since in 
approximately 85% of the total number of international crises the initial participants are 
non OECD states, the OECD countries can not respond to crises by engaging with their 
alliance partners. Thus, because OECD countries and crisis countries do not have similar 
pattern of alliances, it is improbable that the OECD country's response to crises will 
consist of engagement with another OECD country. 
 As one would expect, the distance between two countries influences the behavior 
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toward one another. Either they are far from each other and do not have the necessary 
capabilities to reach distant countries, or they are neighbors and have a history of 
previous disputes, my model estimates show that the probability of intervention decreases 
with distance. The coefficient on the Distance variable is slightly negative and significant 
at the 0.01 level. Finally, contiguity does not affect the OECD countries response to a 
crisis, if Distance is also present, as a variable. Most likely, the effect of contiguity is not 
significant because of the overwhelming majority of dyads whose members are not 
contiguous. At the same time the effect of contiguity may be insignificant due to the 
relatively high correlation between contiguity and distance (-0.21). However, if I take 
distance out and keep only contiguity as a measure of proximity, the effect of contiguity 
is statistically significant at the 0.05 level (almost at the 0.01 level). The relationship 
between contiguity and state behavior is positive, which means that contiguity increases 
the likelihood of OECD country's intervention.  
 
Model 2:  five level categorical dependent variable 
The dependent variable in Model 1 is a dichotomous variable, where the two categories 
are intervention and non intervention. The first model's results indicate that the more 
conservative governments show a greater propensity toward intervention than the more 
liberal governments, if ideology is estimated with Overall Ideology. Oppositely, the more 
liberal executives are more likely to respond to crises than conservative executives, if the 
estimate for ideology is International Peace Ideology. However, this model is limited 
because it lacks information about the manner in which OECD countries respond to 
international crises. Intervention, in the previous model, meant both accommodationist 
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and belligerent behavior. Model 2 refines the dependent variable by expressing it on five 
categories of behavior, based on various levels of aggressiveness. The advantage of this 
model is that it offers a better picture of state strategic behavior and how executive 
ideology and other factors influence foreign policymaking. 
 
Estimation technique 
The dependent variable in the second model is a five level categorical variable. The first 
category is the most accomodationist of the five and includes 
financial/economic/humanitarian aid, mediation, and call for a cease fire. The second 
category is non intervention. The third category of foreign policy behavior is more 
aggressive than the previous two and consists of express concern, call for withdrawal of 
troops, and condemnation. The fourth category is comprised of peacekeeping, sanctions, 
and military aid. Finally, the fifth category, which is the most aggressive, is comprised of 
threat of force, mobilization of troops, peace enforcement, and use of force. From the 
description of the five categories, it can be concluded that this is an ordinal variable, 
because the values can be ranked but the real distance between categories is unknown.  
 In this case, I evaluate the impact of the independent variables on foreign policy 
behavior using the ordered logistic regression (Long 1997). Ordered logit model has the 
form (see Menard 2001, Borooah 2001):  
Y
*
i = 
K
k 1
βkXki + εi = Zi + εi, 
where Y
*
i is a continuous or discrete latent variable, whose values determine what the 
observed ordinal variable Y equals. More generally, Y is the collapsed version of Y
*
. In 
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the case of my study Y
*
 can take on a range of 14 values which have been collapsed into 
5 categories of Y. Specifically, 
Yi = 1 (accomodationist behavior) if  Y
*
i ≤ 3  
Yi = 2 (no intervention) if  Y
*
i = 4 
Yi = 3 (semi-accomodationist behavior) if 4 < Y
*
i ≤ 7  
Yi = 4 (semi-aggressive behavior) if 7 < Y
*
i ≤ 10  
Yi = 5 (aggressive behavior) if  Y
*
i > 10 
 The estimated probability that Y will take on a particular value is as follows: 
P(Yi=1) = 
k1) - Ziexp(1
1
 
P(Yi=2) = 
k2) - Ziexp(1
1
 - 
k1) - Ziexp(1
1
 
P(Yi=3) = 
k3) - Ziexp(1
1
- (
k2) - Ziexp(1
1
- 
k1) - Ziexp(1
1
) 
P(Yi=4) = 
k4) - Ziexp(1
1
- [
k3) - Ziexp(1
1
- (
k2) - Ziexp(1
1
-
k1) - Ziexp(1
1
)] 
P(Yi=5) = 1 - 
k4) - Ziexp(1
1
, 
where k1, k2, k3, and k4, are the threshold values.  
The basic descriptive statistics for the variables in Model are shown in Table B.2. (see 
Appendix B). 
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Empirical results  
Model 2 provides partial support for the theoretical expectations model presented in the 
theory chapter. These results are explained by the different ways in which government 
political ideology is measured. The proxies for the independent and control variables are  
the same as the ones in Model 1. The estimated coefficients are summarized in Table 5.2. 
Further, I explain the statistical analysis and discuss the results in greater detail.  
 The impact of executive ideology on foreign policy behavior varies, depending on 
the way the ideology is measured. If it is coded as right-left on a general ideological 
scale, the relationship factor with state behavior is negative, but not significant. In other 
words, if the measure of ideology takes into account, in addition to the domain of 
external relations, the other six dimensions - freedom and democracy, political system, 
economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society, and social groups - both, left and 
right governments do not differ in terms of how aggressive they act in foreign affairs. 
Therefore, in this case, the results offer empirical support for Hypothesis1. If I use the 
foreign relations measure of ideology, the relationship between executive ideology and 
foreign policy behavior however, is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
The significance of these estimates is that left wing governments are more likely to act 
peacefully than right wing governments. In this case, the results support Hypothesis 2.  
 These results partially support my theoretical argument and are not unanticipated. 
They show support for the realist school of thought. According to the realist argument, 
the political orientation of the government is a non factor; it is only the power-related 
attributes of states which are the sole predictors of state behavior (Waltz 1979, Schuman 
1969, Deutsch and Singer 1964). Alternatively, ideology is not relevant because both 
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Table 5.2. Ordered Logit Estimates of Executive Ideology and International Influences on 
Foreign Policy Behavior, 1977-2001; five level dependent variable 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable    Overall  International Peace 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
EXECUTIVE IDEOLOGY  -0.017   -0.062
**
   
 t    (0.0026)  (0.026)    
      
RELCAP1    0.242
*
   0.281
*  
 
 (t - 1)    (0.146)  (0.146) 
 
TRADESHARE1   -3.92
***
  -3.9
***
  
 (t - 1)    (1.16)   (1.17) 
 
POLITY    0.036
***
  0.036
***
  
     (0.0065)  (0.0064) 
 
ALLIANCE PORTFOLIOS (S) -0.41   -0.51
*
 
 (t - 1)    (0.254)  (0.26) 
 
DISTANCE    -1.73e
-05
  -1.93e
-05
  
     (1.87e
-05
)  (1.86e
-05
) 
 
CONTIGUITY   0.582
*
   0.588
*
 
     (0.341)  (0.34) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
τ1     -4.2   -4.37 
τ2     2.08   1.92 
τ3     2.84   2.68 
τ4     4.03   3.87 
 
Log likelihood   -2631.68  -2628.95 
 
Chi-square    37.99   43.43 
 
N     5,612   5,612 
________________________________________________________________________ 
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed 
test. 
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liberal and conservative governments do and should act in such a way to preserve and 
promote the national interest, regardless of their ideological convictions (Bliss and 
Johnson 1975, 83). Finally, as noted by Gowa (1998, 307), in foreign policymaking, it is 
a "partisan truce" between government and opposition, where the opposition parties defy 
ideology and support government foreign policies because they expect to get the same 
treatment when holding executive power in the future.  
 The second set of results confirm the theoretical argument described in Chapter 3.  
More explicitly, my study finds evidence that left leaning governments act less 
belligerent than conservative governments. That means that, when responding to crises, 
there is consistency between executive ideological orientation and foreign policy actions. 
Essentially, these results broaden the general claim in the extant literature, that 
conservative governments are more likely to use force than liberal governments (Arena 
and Palmer 2009, Schultz 2005, London, Palmer, and Reagan 2004, Fordham 1998, 
Wittkopf 1990).  
 As in the previous model, the relationship between relative capabilities and 
foreign policy behavior is positive and significant. Regardless the measure used for 
executive ideology, the results show that the relationship is both significant at the 0.10 
level.  According to these estimates, the more powerful the OECD country, the more 
likely it will behave aggressively. The results are in line with the realist thesis, that only 
powerful countries can afford to behave aggressively, because it takes financial, 
economic, and military capabilities in order to act belligerently.  
 The effect of economic interdependence on foreign policy behavior is also robust 
and significant. The relationship coefficients, regardless the measure for executive 
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ideology, are negative and significant at the 0.01 level. These estimates strongly indicate 
that the response of OECD countries to international crises is in strict correlation with the 
degree of economic interdependence with the countries directly involved in the crisis. 
The larger the amount of economic exchanges the more likely the OECD country will 
behave peacefully. These results refine the liberal argument, in the sense that they go 
beyond the assumption that increasing trade between two countries reduces the likelihood 
of war between them, and demonstrates that increases in trade reduces the likelihood of 
aggressive behavior.  
 Regime type of the crisis state influences the manner in which the OECD country 
gets involved in a crisis. As in the previous model, the relationship between the two 
variables is positive and significant at the 0.01 level, regardless the measure for executive 
ideology. The results suggest that, in response to international crises, the more liberal the 
crisis country, the more likely the OECD country will act hawkishly toward it. The same 
results are obtained if using alternate measures of regime type. For example, if the 
measure of regime type is a dichotomous variable (coded as 1 if crisis country's 
democracy score is equal or higher than 7 and 0 if democracy score is less than 7) the 
strength of the relationship increases and becomes significant at the 0.001 level. However 
different results are found if I express regime type with a three category polity score for 
the crisis country, coded as follows: polity2 = 2 if polity2 is equal to or greater than 4; 
polity2 = 1 if polity2 is equal to or greater than -3 but less than 4; polity2 = 0 if polity2 is 
less than -3. In this case, the coefficient on the regime type variable remains positive but 
fails short of achieving statistical significance at 0.1 level. 
 Surprisingly, the results partially challenge the democratic peace thesis, which 
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states that democratic countries do not fight one another (Maoz and Russett 1993, 
Gledistch 1992). However, these results may be influenced by the high number of non 
democracies and reduced number of full democracies, as the pairs of the OECD country 
in the dyad. It may be the case that, until the crisis state does not attain a certain threshold 
of liberalism, the OECD country's response is aggressive.  
 This relationship is explained mostly by the quasi cooperative response (no 
intervention) of the OECD countries to crises in which both actors are non democracies. 
Besides, there are instances when OECD countries acted aggressively against democratic 
countries involved in crises. Of the total number of 5,612 cases, in 31% of them, the 
target countries are democracies (polity score higher or equal to 4, on a scale from -10 to 
+10), while in 63.2% of the cases, the target countries are non-democracies (polity score 
equal to or lower than -4). The rest, 5.8%, are countries in transition, with the polity 
scores ranging from -3 to +3. For example, very often, OECD countries condemned and 
then imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan as a result of the increasing tensions 
between the two countries. Similarly, various crises between Greece and Turkey, and 
Cypress and Turkey, led to the same aggressive response from the OECD countries. This 
aggressive reaction was justified by the danger of a possible confrontation between the 
two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, and also by the possible destabilization of the 
NATO space as a result of a potential conflict between Turkey and Greece.  
 Regarding the role of similarity of alliance portfolios between the two countries in 
the dyad in influencing the foreign policy behavior of the OECD country, as table 5.2. 
shows, when executive ideology is estimated with the overall measure of ideology, the 
relationship coefficient is negative and falls short of conventional threshold of statistical 
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significance. In the second case, when political ideology of the government is expressed 
by the international peace measure, then the relationship is significant at the 0.1 level. 
The significance of this second empirical result is that OECD countries are more likely to 
behave aggressively against countries with different policy positions. This comes to 
broaden the thesis that countries with similar policy views are less likely to confront each 
other (Gartzke and Simon 1996, Oneal and Russett 1997b). 
 Finally, in this model, the distance between the two countries in the dyad is not a 
factor which influences foreign policy behavior of states. The coefficient on the distance 
variable is slightly negative but, in contrast with the previous model, is not statistically 
significant. Thus, no matter how far the crisis state, distance does not play any role in 
shaping OECD countries response to the crisis. Further, contiguity with the crisis actors 
represents a significant factor in OECD countries foreign policy decisionmaking. Based 
upon the measure of executive ideology, in both cases, the coefficients are positive and 
significant at the 0.1 level. More specifically, contiguity with the crisis country increases 
the propensity toward more aggressive behavior. If I take out distance and maintain 
contiguity as the only measure of proximity, the strength of the relationship increases and 
becomes significant very close to the 0.05 level.  
 
Model 3: four level categorical dependent variable 
The results of Model 2 provide empirical support to both hypotheses. If estimated with 
Overall Ideology, the role of executive ideological orientation in shaping the response to 
international crises of OECD countries is not significant. Oppositely, if executive 
ideology is estimated with International Peace Ideology, government ideology influences 
 127 
strategic behavior. Specifically, more conservative executives are prone toward 
increasing aggressive behavior at a larger extent than the more liberal executives. The 
main limitation of Model 2 is that the foreign policy behavior variable is very skewed: 
non intervention accounts for 89.5% of all instances of behavior. Importantly, non-
intervention is not always the result of lack of power, economic sufficiency, or a location 
which hinders intervention in world affairs, variables which are accounted for in my three 
models. For example, there are countries such as New Zealand and Switzerland which, in 
over 95 percent of the crises, do not intervene at all. Thus, I introduce Model 3 which 
excludes the instances of no intervention. The main advantage of this model is that it 
explores the impact of government political ideology on foreign policy decisionmaking 
only in instances of intervention.  
 The basic descriptive statistics for the variables in Model 3 are shown in Table 
B.3. (see Appendix B). 
Estimation technique 
The dependent variable in the third model is a four level categorical variable. As 
explained in Chapter 4, this model excludes the instances of non intervention, as a type of 
response to international crises, on the part of the OECD countries. Thus, the number of 
cases in this model drops to 589. After collapsing the thirteen remaining types of foreign 
policy behavior, the dependent variable becomes a four category ordinal variable. The 
first category (AC), which is the most accomodationist, is comprised of financial, 
economic, and humanitarian aid, mediation, and call for a cease fire. Then, the second 
category of foreign policy behavior, semi-accommodationist (SAC), is more aggressive 
than the first and is comprised of express concern, call for withdrawal of troops, and 
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condemnation. The third category, semi aggressive behavior (SAG), is more belligerent 
than the previous two categories, and is comprised of peacekeeping, sanctions, and 
military aid. The fourth category (AG), is the most aggressive of the four and is 
comprised of threat of force, mobilization of troops, peace enforcement, and use of force. 
Because the dependent variable of this model is also categorical and ordinal, as in the 
previous model, I evaluate the impact of the independent variables on foreign policy 
behavior by using the ordered logistic regression.  
 
Empirical results  
As in the previous model, Model 3 provides partial empirical support for the theoretical 
expectations derived in the theory chapter. That is due again to the way in which 
executive ideology is measured. The estimated coefficients are summarized in Table 5.3. 
Further, I explain the statistical analysis and discuss the results in greater detail.   
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Table 5.3. Ordered Logit Estimates of Executive Ideology and International Influences on 
Foreign Policy Behavior, 1977-2001; four level dependent variable 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable    Overall  International Peace 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
EXECUTIVE IDEOLOGY  -0.0071
*
  -0.18
***
   
 t    (0.0041)  (0.05)     
      
RELCAP1    -0.69
**
   -0.56
**
 
  
 
 (t - 1)    (0.273)  (0.276) 
 
TRADESHARE1   -3.25   -2.42  
 (t - 1)    (2.59)   (2.68) 
 
POLITY    -0.084
***
  -0.083
***
  
     (0.012)  (0.012) 
 
ALLIANCE PORTFOLIOS (S) -0.95
**
   -1.66
***
 
 (t - 1)    (0.42)   (0.47) 
 
DISTANCE    -6e
-05*
   -5.5e
-05
 
     (3.41e
-05
)  (3.42e
-05
) 
 
CONTIGUITY   0.623   0.637 
     (0.546)  (0.54) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
τ1     -2.93   -3.67 
τ2     -0.95   -1.67 
τ3     0.78   0.078 
 
Log likelihood   -726.16  -720.63 
 
Chi-square    79.63   90.70 
 
N     589   589 
________________________________________________________________________ 
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed 
test
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 When excluding the instances of non intervention in international crises, the role 
of government ideology in shaping foreign policy behavior is mixed. In the case when 
political ideology is estimated with overall ideological measure, the relationship between 
ideology and state behavior is statistically significant at the 0.1 level. The relationship 
coefficient is negative, which means that, when responding to crises, conservative 
governments act more peacefully than liberal governments. Unexpectedly, these results  
basically contradict Hypothesis 2. The main explanation is that, out of the 5,023 
observations of non intervention which were dropped, approximately two thirds of 
governments (66.57%) were liberal and very liberal. Therefore, in the new data set, a 
large number of governments which score very high on Overall Ideology in the first two 
categories of behavior (accommodationist and semi accommodationist) and scored 
relatively low in the third and forth categories of behavior (semi aggressive and 
aggressive). For example, approximately 50% of governments in the accommodationist 
behavior category are very conservative (they score 16 and higher on the overall 
ideological continuum of -31.6 to 33.6).  
 If using the international peace estimate of ideology, the coefficient on the 
ideology variable is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. As in the 
previous model, the results reveal that, when responding to crises, left wing governments 
are more likely to behave more cooperatively than right wing governments. This analysis 
provide full evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2. The difference from the previous model is 
that in Model 3, the relationship between government ideology and foreign policy 
behavior is statistically stronger. 
 These empirical results entirely contradict the realist argument that government 
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ideology does not influence state external behavior. In the first case, with the use of the 
overall ideological estimate, the results show that liberal executives act more 
belligerently than conservative ones. If I use the international peace estimate of executive 
ideology, this empirical model provides evidence not only that liberal governments are 
less inclined to use military force in foreign affairs than conservative governments, but 
also they are more prone to act cooperatively than their conservative counterparts.  
 With regard to the impact of relative capabilities on foreign policy behavior, no 
matter the proxy used for executive ideology, the relationship between the two variables 
is robust and significant. As shown in Table 3, the coefficients on the power parity 
variable are both negative and significant at the 0.05 level. As opposed to the results in 
the previous two models, these estimates show that, when responding to international 
crises, the more powerful the OECD country the more likely it will behave peacefully. 
These results challenge the realist assumption, according to which the more powerful 
countries are more prone to belligerent actions (Waltz 1979, Morgenthau 1967, Kennan 
1957). This happens because the observations which were dropped (the non intervention 
cases) consisted mostly of dyads with relatively powerful OECD countries (high relative 
capabilities scores) which acted more peacefully (non-intervention). Thus, Model 3 
contains a higher number of weaker governments which act more aggressively, relative to 
Model 2.  
 On the influence of economic interdependence on state external behavior, 
regardless of the measure used for government ideology, the former does not predict the 
changes in the latter. The coefficients on the economic interdependence variable are 
negative but fall short of the conventional threshold of statistical significance. The results 
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are in opposition with the results obtained in the previous model, when an increasing 
trade led to a less belligerent response to the crisis on the part of the OECD country. 
Again, this happens because the elimination of non intervention cases leads to dropping 
relatively high trading dyads where OECD country behaved cooperatively. Thus, the 
strength of the negative relationship between trade and behavior from Model 2 decreases 
and the relationship between the two in Model 3 becomes not statistically significant.  
Specifically, this model's empirical results show that, when determined to intervene in 
international crises, the economic relations between the OECD and the crisis countries do 
not affect the manner in which the first intervenes in the crisis.  
 Regarding the role played by the target state's regime type in shaping the response 
of the OECD country to the crisis, the effect of the first is robust and significant, no 
matter the ideological measure for executive political orientation. In both cases, the 
relationship between regime type and state behavior is strongly negative and statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. In other words, when responding to international crises, the 
OECD countries are more inclined to act peacefully toward countries which increasingly 
embrace liberalism as a type of governance. These empirical results come to support and 
broaden the democratic peace argument that states that democratic countries do not fight 
each other (Maoz and Russett 1993, Owen 1994).  
 The similarity of alliance portfolios between the two states in the dyad also shapes 
the response of the OECD country to the crisis. The relationships between the two 
variables are robust and statistically significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively, 
depending on the executive ideology estimate. As shown in Table 5.3, the coefficients on 
similarity of alliance portfolios variables are both negative. That is to say, similar with 
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the results in the previous model, when dealing with or responding to international crises, 
OECD countries are more likely to behave aggressively against countries with different 
foreign policy positions, manifested as dissimilar alliance portfolios. These findings come 
also to expand the thesis that countries with similar policy views are less likely to 
confront each other (Gartzke and Simon 1996, Oneal and Russett 1997b).  
 Finally, regarding the influence of distance between the two countries in the dyad 
on the foreign policy behavior of the OECD country, the relationship between the two 
variables is negative and statistically significant (at the 0.1 level), when using the overall 
measure of executive ideology. In this particular instance, OECD executives tend to 
behave less aggressively when crises actors are distant. If ideology is expressed with the 
international peace measure, the impact of distance on behavior in negligible. Contiguity 
is also a factor which does not have an influence on the response choice. OECD 
executives, when responding to crises, act in the same manner against both contiguous 
and non contiguous countries. This change in the impact of contiguity on state behavior, 
from positive and significant relationship at the 0.1 level (Model 2) to non significance 
(Model 3) is due to the elimination of non intervention as a category of state behavior. 
More precisely, the elimination of an accommodationist type of behavior weakens the 
relationship between contiguity and behavior, which becomes statistically insignificant. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I tested the relationship between executive political ideology and foreign 
policy behavior. The relationship between the two variables is analyzed by using three 
empirical models. While the independent and control variables remain constant, the 
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dependent variable is measured uniquely in each separate model. In each model I use two 
different measures for assessing the independent variable: overall ideology, which takes 
into account 57 policy variables, and international peace ideology, which considers only 
the policy preferences of government on foreign policy. 
 The empirical results outlined in this chapter partially support the analytical 
framework presented in the theory chapter. In the first model, the results suggest that, in 
OECD countries, conservative governments are more likely to respond to international 
crises than liberal governments, if ideology is estimated with the overall ideological 
measure. Oppositely, if executive ideology is estimated with the international peace 
proxy, it is the liberal governments which are more interventionist. Besides, the 
propensity toward intervention increases with the increase in relative capabilities between 
the OECD country and the target country, and also with the degree of liberalism in the 
latter. Further, the OECD country's likelihood of intervention decreases with the increase 
in trade with the target country, the distance to the target country, and with the increase in 
similarity of alliance portfolio between the two countries. Most of these relationships are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  
 In the second model, when foreign policy behavior is a five category variable 
which includes no intervention, partial support was found for the argument that executive 
ideology influences state behavior. Indeed, when ideology is estimated with Overall 
Ideology there is little evidence which indicates that executive ideology impacts foreign 
policymaking. The variable is not statistically significant and its substantive strength is 
negligible. Alternatively, when estimated with International Peace Ideology, the role of 
executive ideology is statistically significant (at the 0.05 level) in the sense that liberal 
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governments are more likely to act more cooperatively than conservative governments. In 
terms of relative capabilities, the results show that increasing levels in relative 
capabilities between the OECD country and the target country increase the likelihood of 
more aggressive response of the first against the latter (0.1 confidence level). Further, 
economic interdependence and regime type were found to be influential (at the 0.01 
level) in the foreign policy decisionmaking. Specifically, high levels of trade with and 
decreasing levels of democracy in the countries directly involved in the crisis tend to 
dissuade OECD executives from acting aggressively. Similarity of alliance portfolios 
with the target country is influential only when executive ideology is estimated with 
International Peace Ideology. That is, the more similar the policy views between the dyad 
countries, the more likely OECD country will act peacefully. Finally, in this model,  
contiguity is responsible for increasing the propensity toward more aggressive responses 
to crises. Also, taken separately from contiguity, distance increases the propensity toward 
more accomodationist behavior. 
 In the third model, when I exclude the instances of non intervention, there is 
consistent empirical support to the argument that executive ideology systematically 
influences OECD executives' crisis response choices. In the case when executive 
ideology is measured with Overall Ideology, the results prove that right leaning 
governments act more peacefully than the left wing ones. The use of International Peace 
Ideology estimate for ideology leads to a more significant impact of this variable on state 
behavior. Specifically, conservative governments act more aggressively than liberal ones. 
In this case, not only was the substantive strength of ideology relatively high, but the 
variable was also highly significant. Regarding the roles played by relative capabilities 
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and regime type, their effects are both negative and significant. In other words, OECD 
executives are more likely to act peacefully when their relative capabilities are higher and 
when target countries experience increasing levels of democracy. Further, contiguity and 
the level of trade between the OECD and the crisis country do not have any impact on the 
foreign policy behavior of the former. The influence of similarity of alliance portfolios  
is negative and significant at both 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. OECD executives 
appear to reject the use of the more belligerent tools of foreign policy against countries 
with which they have an increasing similarity of foreign policy views. Lastly, distance to 
the crisis country is a significant factor of foreign policy behavior when executive 
ideology is estimated with the overall measure of ideology. If ideology is estimated with 
the international peace proxy, distance ceases to be a determining factor of behavior.  
 In the next chapter I will conclude by reviewing the theoretical argument and 
discussing the findings in quantitative analysis. Also, I will discuss the implications and 
contributions of this study.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Are Liberals and Conservative different species when it comes to international politics?
6
 
One can argue that we ask the wrong question. The proper question which needs to be 
answered first is if ideas and beliefs make a difference in foreign policymaking. In other 
words, do ideational factors coexist with material ones and both determine the strategic 
behavior of states? Ruggie's straightforward answer is yes (1998, 879), since “the 
building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material”. Wendt (1992) 
also concurs to this view by asserting that interests and preferences are constructed by 
ideas and therefore, material world may have different designs and meanings for different 
people. For example, in the practice of foreign affairs, it is the ideas which tells Western 
foreign policy makers that North Korea's nuclear weapons are dangerous while Great 
Britain's ones are not.  
The post World War II era shows that similarly powerful states or states found in 
comparable phases of economic and political development behave differently by 
employing different tools of foreign policy in order to advance their interests. Some 
                                               
6 In part, this question has been asked by David Sloan Wilson in the article Are Liberals and Conservatives 
Different Species? The Answer is Yes published in The Huffington Post, on July 1, 2010. 
Http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-sloan-wilson/are-liberals-and-conserva_b_72044.html 
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countries may not hesitate to use military engagement as a means of conflict resolution, 
not necessary as the last resort, since others prefer to involve progressively more 
moderate means of foreign policy, such as aid, diplomacy, and economic sanctions before 
going to war. The wars in the former Yugoslavia, conflicts between Israel and Palestine, 
the second Gulf War, defiant North Korea and Iran, are just a few instances which point 
to the different strategic behaviors and approaches among the developed states on how to 
handle the international issues and crises.  
What determines the response by OECD executives to international crises? Why 
did countries such as the United States, alongside the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
Poland, agree to use force against Iraq in 2003, while others, such as France, Belgium, 
and Germany, advocated the continuation of sanctions in parallel with aggressive 
diplomacy? The primary concern of this study is to analyze the influence of executive 
political ideology on foreign policy behavior of OECD states. More specifically, my 
dissertation examines if liberal governments differ from conservative governments in 
terms of how they respond to international crises. 
Despite the comprehensive differences between left and right leaning political 
parties in terms of their foreign policy views and preferences, little attention has been 
devoted to understand how ideological preferences affect foreign policy choices. While 
right wing executives appear to be more prone to the use force than left wing executives, 
little is known about the impact of executive ideology in influencing strategic behavior, 
especially when behavior is viewed more comprehensively than the simple use of force. 
There is a need for a better understanding of the role played by ideology on the more 
general behavior of states, since wars are very rare events in international politics and 
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there are other tools of foreign policy that states make use of, among which,  condemning 
behavior of other states, mediating crises, imposing sanctions, and providing aid.  
 
Executive Political Ideology as an Ideational Cause of Behavior 
This dissertation develops an analytical model which explains the role of executive 
political ideology in foreign policymaking. I assert that within developed democracies, 
the further right a government is, the more likely it is to behave more aggressively. 
Oppositely, the further left a government is, the more likely it is to behave more 
peacefully. For instance, in response to international crises, the more conservative 
executives are inclined to use the more belligerent foreign policy tools, such as imposing 
sanctions, providing military aid, mobilization of troops, and the use of military force. 
Oppositely, the more liberal executives are more prone to employ the more 
accomodationist foreign policy tools such as providing economic and financial aid, 
pursuing diplomatic efforts, calling for withdrawing of troops, condemning one or more 
actors involved in the crisis, or not intervening at all.  
 This claim is explained by the assumption that governments will act in a manner 
consistent with the ideological principles presented in their political platforms, party 
manifestos, and their voters' expectations. Specifically, when responding to international 
crises, right leaning governments, due to their ideological predisposition toward an 
exclusive conception of the national interest and belief in the appropriateness of using 
force and acting unilaterally, will be expected to act more aggressively than left wing 
governments. This expectation is also due to left wing governments' ideological 
predilection toward multilateralism, an inclusive conception of the national interest, and 
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reluctance of using force in international affairs.  
 The empirical evidence I find provides mixed support for the study's analytical 
argument, according to which executive ideology is an important determinant of foreign 
policy behavior. These empirical results both confirm and disprove my theoretical model 
and that is due to the different measures used to express the ideological orientation of the 
government. First, when using International Peace Ideology as a proxy for executive 
ideology, a measure which takes into account only the foreign policy variables present in 
the political parties' manifestos, the results show that more conservative governments act 
aggressively and more liberal governments act cooperatively. These results are true for 
both, Model 2 (foreign policy behavior is a five level ordinal variable, which includes no 
intervention as one of the five categories) and Model 3 (foreign policy behavior is a four 
level ordinal variable, which excludes no intervention).  
 Second, when executive ideology is estimated with Overall Ideology, a measure 
which takes into consideration 57 policy variables grouped in seven major policy areas 
(foreign policy, freedom and democracy, political system, economy, welfare and quality 
of life, fabric of society, and social groups), the empirical evidence is mixed. That is, if 
state behavior is expressed with the five level ordinal measure which includes non 
intervention as one of the five categories of behavior (Model 2), executive ideology does 
not influence state behavior. Alternatively, if state behavior is expressed with the four 
level ordinal measure which excludes non intervention (Model 3), the relationship is 
negative and significant (at the 0.1 level).  
 In Chapter Two, I discuss the major debate in the present international relations 
literature about the clash between two groups of scholars who dispute the origins of state 
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strategic behavior: materialist and idealists. Mainstream scholars in the field of 
international relations, the materialists, view factors, such as power and economic 
relationships, are the primary determinants of state strategic behavior. Alternatively, 
idealists suggest that the state behavior is primarily influenced by ideational factors, such 
as belief systems, perceptions, identity, ideology, discourse, and culture.  
 I argued, contrary to materialists, such as realists and neoliberal institutionalists, 
that the security landscapes in which states interact are in significant part social, rather 
than just material. Thus, material explanations of state behavior, centered either at the 
individual, state, or the international system level, are insufficient to explain foreign 
policy decisionmaking. Specifically, there is a need in international politics scholarship 
for a better understanding of the role of ideational factors as determinants of state 
behavior. It is through ideas that decisionmakers make sense of social reality and also, 
ideas help define policymakers goals. Furthermore, it is ideas which serve as a foundation 
for establishing alternative strategies in order to attain those goals. Therefore, only a 
model of international behavior which includes both idealist and material factors will 
adequately explain foreign policy decisionmaking.  
 In Chapter Three, I develop an analytical model of foreign policy behavior which 
underlines the importance of political ideology as an ideational causal factor of foreign 
policymaking. I dispute the realist view (Waltz 1979, Morgenthau 1967) that states' 
foreign behavior is entirely explained by shifts in the balance of relative capabilities 
and that ideational factors have no independent explanatory power. Realists contend that 
policymakers adopt policies based upon calculations of interest (Kennan 1957) and that 
ideology in the substance of foreign policy is little more than a justification and a cover 
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for the true nature of policy which is the pursuit of power (Morgenthau 1967). Also, I 
reject other arguments which overlook the role of ideology, such as the premise that 
political ideologies are simply instruments for obtaining power (Downs 1957) or the 
thesis which asserts industrialized countries are likely to deal with the same kind of 
challenges and use the same kind of solutions (Kerr 1983).  
 I assert that, indeed, foreign policies are an expression of ideologies. Ideologies 
have an important role in policymaking because they explain and evaluate social 
conditions and provide a program for social and political action (Ball and Dagger 2004). I 
contend that more right leaning executives are inclined to behave more aggressively than 
more left wing executives. These differences in behavior between conservative and 
liberal governments are explained by the fact that they subscribe to fundamentally 
different values of equality and liberty, which revolve around three basic ideological 
dimensions: a) the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the national interest; b) the 
appropriateness of using forceful measures for pursuing the national interest; and c) 
unilateralism versus multilateralism, or the way in which countries coordinate their 
actions with other countries in pursuing their interests. 
 My dissertation builds on the works of Arena and Palmer (2009), Koch (2009), 
London, Palmer, and Regan (2004), Schultz (2005), who find that, generally, political 
ideology is a causal factor of the use of force. More precisely, conservative 
administrations are more prone toward the use of force than liberal administrations.  
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Findings 
In Chapter Five, I employed statistical analyses to examine foreign policy behavior of all 
twenty two OECD countries as a response to the ICB crises during the period 1977-2001. 
I tested my hypotheses on three empirical models where the dependent variable is 
measured uniquely in each separate model while the independent and control variables 
remain constant. In Model 1, the dependent variable is dichotomous: intervention versus 
non intervention. The dependent variable in the Model 2 is a five level categorical 
variable, which includes non intervention as one of the five categories. The dependent 
variable in the Model 3 is a four level categorical variable, which excludes non 
intervention.  
 In each of the three models I use two distinct proxies of executive ideology: a) 
Overall Ideology, a measure which takes into consideration 57 policy variables grouped 
in seven major policy areas (foreign policy, freedom and democracy, political system, 
economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society, and social groups); and b) 
International Peace Ideology, a measure which takes into account only the foreign policy 
variables.  
 The empirical results indicate that the ideological orientation of the government is 
associated with OECD executives' responses to international crises, when executive 
ideology is estimated with International Peace Ideology. Thus, more liberal governments 
show a greater propensity toward responding to international crises than more 
conservative governments, and, at the same time, they tend to use more cooperative tools 
of foreign policy. If executive ideology is assessed with Overall Ideology, the results are 
relatively mixed. First, it is the more conservative governments which are more 
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responsive to crises (Model 1) and also, when excluding non intervention as a response to 
international crises, they are more likely to respond more cooperatively (Model 3). In the 
case when all possible responses to a crisis are included in the model (Model 2), 
government ideology does not influence foreign policy behavior.  
 Of the two measures of ideology, International Peace Ideology seems to be more 
relevant to my study because it captures specifically the ideological views of an executive 
in the area of foreign policy. The other measure, Overall Ideology, takes into account a 
large number of policy measures, among which, technology and infrastructure, political 
corruption, education, and farmers, whose relevance for foreign policy actions is limited. 
Therefore, I consider that the results obtained with the use of International Peace 
Ideology measure are more meaningful to my study.  
 According to the results in Model 1, no matter the estimate for executive 
ideology, OECD country's aggressiveness toward the crisis country increases with 
increases in power, decreases in trade and distance between the two countries, decreases 
in liberalism in the crisis country, and a decrease in similarity of alliance portfolios. 
Contiguity with the crisis country does not affect the response of the OECD country.  
 Similarly, Model 2 shows that OECD country's aggressiveness increases with 
increase in power (although the margin of error is larger than in the first model), 
decreases in trade between the two countries, increase in liberalism in the crisis country, 
and contiguity. Distance between countries and similarity in alliance portfolios do not 
affect an OECD country's response to international crises. Finally, empirical results in 
Model 3 show that OECD country's belligerence increases with decreases in power, 
decreases in crisis country's degree of liberalism, and lowering similarity of alliance 
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portfolios. Distance and the amount of trade between the two countries, and also, 
contiguity, do not have a significant effect on foreign policy behavior.  
 
Contributions 
This dissertation has sought to contribute furthering our understanding about the role of 
ideational factors in foreign policymaking by examining the role of ideological 
orientation of governments in influencing the course of executives' responses to 
international crises. Towards this end, this study's contributions are threefold. First, I 
developed a new ordinal dependent variable, foreign policy behavior, which takes into 
account all possible instances of state behavior. This new operationalization better 
mirrors the complex range of actions that governments take in the international arena. 
This is a step further from the extant literature where state behavior is mostly 
operationalized dichotomously as use of force/no use of force.  
 Second, this dissertation analyzes the relationship between executive ideology and 
foreign policy behavior by using a large-N cross national model. Most empirical studies 
which test the possible impact of government ideological orientation on its foreign policy 
decisions focus on the particular case of the United States. Even though interesting and 
meaningful, such studies remain limited. By focusing on a larger pool of 22 countries, all 
OECD states, this study generalizes the posited relationships to a broad range of 
countries.  
 Third, by examining the influence of executive ideology in international crises 
response choice, this dissertation has the theoretical merit of revitalizing the general 
theoretical discussion about the role of ideational determinants in foreign policy decision 
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processes. Being marginalized in the mainstream international relations literature, which 
focuses mostly on the material factors, the ideational factors still have a lot to bring to the 
scholarship. This study shows that the accumulation of scientific knowledge on the state 
strategic behavior requires a better understanding of the role of both the material and 
ideational factors. 
 
Implications 
This dissertation presents a number of implications for the field of international relations. 
The analytical model advanced in this study primarily claims that decisionmakers' 
ideological views impact foreign policy decisions in the sense that the executives act 
consistent with their ideological preferences. Depending on the measure of political 
ideology and the way foreign policy behavior is operationalized, the findings illustrate 
that executive ideology influences foreign policymaking. These results refute other 
theoretical perspectives which assert that political ideology does not affect executive 
foreign policy decisions (Lippmann 1987, Morgenthau 1961, Downs 1957, Kennan 
1957). The practical implication of these findings is that the domestic public and foreign 
governments and audiences know what to expect from the OECD governments in terms 
of how they behave in world affairs. From a financial standpoint, when ideology matters 
in foreign policymaking, the domestic public will know how the taxpayers money will be 
spent, on domestic or international projects, if certain political parties form or control the 
government.  
 The findings of this dissertation approach two other major debates in the 
scholarship of international relations. First, it addresses the core argument of democratic 
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peace thesis which states that democratic countries will not go to war against other 
democratic countries but they are prone to war as the non democratic countries (Maoz 
and Russett 1993, Russett 1993b, Oneal et al. 1996). However, according to my study, if 
state strategic behavior is assessed more comprehensively than the use of force/non use 
of force, the response of democratic leaders to international crises is more aggressive 
toward the more liberal countries than toward the more nonliberal ones. Thus, the OECD 
countries do not appear to behave friendly with countries whose regimes are increasingly 
liberal. Obviously, additional research is required to find out how these findings can 
enrich the democratic peace thesis.  
 The second major international relations debate that my dissertation speaks to is 
the relationship between economic interdependence and international conflict. Two major 
perspectives are present in the literature. The central argument is the liberals' claim that 
increasing economic exchange hinders interstate hostilities (Doyle 1997, Rosecrance 
1986). Oppositely, others argue that the disproportionate distribution of gains from trade 
(Hirschman 1980), the shifting power as a result of trade (Levy 1989), and the incentives 
that states have to reduce their economic vulnerability by taking military actions (Gilpin 
1981), are reasons which may encourage one of the trading partners to initiate hostilities. 
The results of my study, however, mostly support the liberal view. More specifically, my 
dissertation finds that at worst, economic relations do not affect OECD countries' 
strategic behavior, and at best, increasing economic relations lead to more 
accommodationist behavior. Thus, states involved in international crises which enjoy 
heightened economic exchanges with the OECD countries, should not expect an 
aggressive treatment from them.  
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 In general, as the results of my dissertation suggest, the ideological label of 
decisionmakers represents an important factor in foreign policy decision process. 
Specifically, most of the time, political elites act in accordance with their ideological 
principles.  
 
Limitations and Further Research 
The role of executive political ideology in foreign policymaking is insufficiently explored 
by scholars of international relations. This dissertation has offered partial support to the 
thesis that decisionmakers' ideological views has a significant role in influencing the 
foreign policy decisions of states. For a better clarification of this relationship, a few 
research avenues can be further explored.  
 First, the two measures of political ideology in my dissertation capture only the 
ideology of the executive. However, in many OECD countries which have parliamentary 
systems, a relatively large responsibility for foreign affairs is in the hands of the 
legislatives. Therefore, a new composite measure of political ideology which takes into 
account the ideological orientation of both, the executive and legislative, would be a 
more appropriate estimation for ideology.  
 Besides, in this dissertation I emphasized the need for examining at a larger extent 
the influence of ideational factors in foreign policymaking. However, the only ideational 
variable I include in my study is executive ideology. Therefore, future studies may 
examine the role of other ideational variables, such as political culture, strategic culture, 
and national identity. Besides, the incorporation of other ideational variables can lead to 
better account for the high number of cases of non intervention.  
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 Finally, my dissertation's timeframe ranges from 1977 through 2001. More 
meaningful inferences can be drawn if, further studies expand the timeframe to the entire 
Post-War period or longer. Besides, my study does not take into account any variables 
which describe the characteristics and nature of the international crisis that the OECD 
countries respond to. Future studies may incorporate variables such as crisis salience, 
ethnicity, gravity of value threat, or overall violence. 
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APPENDIX A 
ICB CRISES EXAMINED DURING 1977-2001 
Table A.1. International Crises 
________________________________________________________________________ 
    Crisis Number Crisis Name   Start Year Primary Adversaries 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 277   Shaba I    1977   D.R. Congo, Angola 
 278   Mapai Seizure   1977   Zimbabwe, Mozamb. 
 279   Belize II    1977   Guatemala, UK 
 280  Nouakchott II   1977  Mauritania 
 281   Egypt-Libya Clashes   1977   Libya, Egypt 
 282   Ogaden II    1977   Ethiopia, Somalia 
 283   Rhodesia Raid   1977   Zimbabwe, Zambia 
 284  Vietnam Invasion of Cambod 1977  Cambodia, Vietnam 
 285  French Hostages Mauritania 1977  Algeria, France 
 286   Chimoio-Tembue Raids  1977   Zimbabwe, Mozamb. 
 287   Beagle Channel I   1977   Argentina, Chile 
 288  Chad-Libya II   1978  Libya, Chad 
 289   Litani Operation   1978   Israel, Lebanon 
 290  Chad-Libya III  1978  Chad, Libya 
 291   Cassinga Incident   1978   South Africa, Angola 
 292   Shaba II    1978   Angola, D.R. Congo 
 293   Air Rhodesia Incident  1978   Zimbabwe, Zambia 
 294   Nicaragua Civil War II  1978   Nicaragua, Costa Rica 
 295   Beagle Channel II   1978   Argentina, Chile 
 296   Fall of Amin    1978   Libya, Tanza., Ugand 
 297  Angola Invasion Scare 1978  South Africa, Angola 
 298   Sino-Vietnam War   1978   Vietnam, China 
 299  Tan Tan   1979  Morocco 
 300  Raids on Zipra  1979  Angola, Zamb, Zimb 
 301   North-South Yemen II  1979   Yemen Rep D.R Yem 
 302  Raids on Swapo  1979  South Africa, Angola 
 303   Afghanistan Invasion   1979   Soviet Union, Afghan 
 304  Chad-Libya IV  1979  Chad, Libya   
 305  Goulimime-Tarfaya Raid 1979  Morocco 
 306   Soviet Threat/Pak.   1979   Afghanistan, Pakistan 
 307   Rhodesian Settlement  1979   Zimb, Bots, Moz, Zim 
 308  Raid on Angola  1979  S. Africa, Angola 
 309   US Hostages in Iran   1979   Iran, US 
 310   Colombia-Nicaragua   1979   Nicaragua, Colombia 
 311   Raid on Gafsa   1980   Libya, Tunisia 
 312  Operation Iman  1980  Morocco 
 313  Operation Smokeshell 1980  Angola, S. Africa 
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Table A.1. (continued) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
    Crisis Number Crisis Name   Start Year Primary Adversaries 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 314  Libya Threat-Sadat  1980  Egypt, Libya 
 315   Solidarity    1980   Poland, Soviet Union 
 316  Libya Malta Oil Dispute 1980  Malta, Libya 
 317   Onset Iran/Iraq War   1980   Iran, Iraq 
 318  Libya Interv. in the Gambia 1980  Gambia, Libya 
 319   Jordan-Syria Confrontation  1980   Syria, Jordan 
 320  East Africa Confrontation 1980  Somalia, Ethi, Kenya 
 321   Chad-Libya V   1981   Libya, France 
 322   Ecuador/Peru Border II  1981   Peru, Ecuador 
 323  Mozambique Raid  1981  Mozamb, S. Africa 
 324   Iraq Nuclear Reactor   1981   Israel, Iraq 
 325  Essequibo II   1981  Guyana, Venezuela 
 326  Contras I   1981  Honduras, Nicaragua 
 327   Al-Biqa Missiles I   1981   Syria, Israel 
 328  Cameroon-Nigeria I  1981  Cameroon, Nigeria 
 329   Coup Attempt Gambia  1981   Gambia 
 330   Gulf of Syrte I   1981   Libya, US 
 331   Operation Protea   1981   Angola, S. Africa 
 332   Galtat Zemmour I   1981   Mauritania, Morocco 
 333  U-137 Incident  1981  Sweden, Soviet Union 
 334  Coup Attempt in Bahrain 1981  Bahrain, Saudi Arabia 
 335   Khorram Shahr   1982   Iran, Iraq 
 336   Falklands/Malvinas   1982   Argentina, UK 
 337   War in Lebanon   1982   Syria, Lebanon, Israel 
 338   Ogaden III    1982   Ethiopia, Somalia 
 339  Lesotho Raid   1982  South Africa, Lesotho 
 340   Libya Threat/Sudan   1983   Libya, Sudan 
 341  Chad-Nigeria Clashes  1983  Chad, Nigeria 
 342   Chad-Libya VI   1983   Libya, Chad 
 343   Invasion of Grenada   1983   US, Grenada 
 344   Able Archer 83   1983   Soviet Union, US 
 345  Maitengwe Clashes  1983  Botswana, Zimbabwe 
 346  Ethiopia-Sudan Tension 1983  Sudan, Ethiopia 
 347   Operation Askari   1983   South Africa, Angola 
 348   Basra-Kharg Island   1984   Iran, Iraq, Kuw, S. Ar 
 349  Aegean Sea II   1984  Greece, Turkey 
 350   Omdurman Bombing   1984   Libya, Sudan 
 351   Vietnam-Thailand   1984   Vietnam, Thailand 
 352   Sino-Vietnam Clashes  1984   Vietnam, China 
 353  Three Village Border I 1984  Thailand, Laos 
 354   Nicaragua MiG-21   1984   Nicaragua, US 
 355   Botswana Raid   1985   South Africa, Botsw 
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Table A.1. (continued) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
    Crisis Number Crisis Name   Start Year Primary Adversaries 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 356   Expulsion-Tunisians   1985   Libya, Tunisia 
 357   Al-Biqa Missiles II   1985   Syria, Israel 
 358   Egypt Air Hijacking   1985   Libya, Egypt 
 359  Burkina Faso-Mali Border 1985  Burkina Faso, Mali 
 360   Lesotho Raid II   1985   South Africa, Lesotho 
 361   Capture of Al-Faw   1986   Iran, Iraq 
 362   Chad/Libya VII   1986   Libya, Chad 
 363   Gulf of Syrte II   1986   Libya, US 
 364  Al Dibal Incident  1986  Bahrain, Qatar 
 365   South African Raid   1986   S. Africa, Bots, Zamb 
 366  Rebel Attack on Uganda 1986  Uganda, Sudan  
 367  Mozambique Ultimatum 1986  Malawi, Mozamb 
 368  Attempted Coup in Togo 1986  Togo, Ghana 
 369   Contras II    1986   Nicaragua, Honduras 
 370   Chad/Libya VIII   1986   Libya, Chad 
 371  Sino-Vietnam Border  1987  Vietnam, China 
 372  Punjab War Scare II  1987  India, Pakistan 
 373  Todghere Incident  1987  Somalia, Ethiopia 
 374  Syria Interv. in Lebanon 1987  Syria, Lebanon 
 375  Sand Wall   1987  Morocco, Maur, Alge 
 376   Aegean Sea III   1987   Turkey, Greece 
 377  Cameroon-Nigeria II  1987  Cameroon, Nigeria 
 378  India Interv. in Sri Lanka 1987  India, Sri Lanka 
 379  Mecca Pilgrimage  1987  Saudi Arabia, Iran 
 380   S. African Interv.-Angola  1987   Angola, S. Africa 
 381  Three Village Border II 1987  Laos, Thailand 
 382  Kenya-Uganda Border 1987  Kenya, Uganda 
 383   Contras III    1988   Nicaragua, Honduras 
 384  Spratly Islands  1988  Vietnam, China 
 385   Iraq Recapture-Al-Faw  1988   Iran, Iraq 
 386   Libyan Jets    1988   Libya, US 
 387  Mauritania-Senegal  1989  Mauritania, Senegal 
 388   Cambodia Peace Conf.  1989   Cambodia, Vietnam 
 389  Contras IV   1989  Nicaragua, Honduras 
 390  Galtat Zemmour II  1989  Morocco 
 391   Invasion of Panama   1989   Panama, US 
 392   Kashmir III-Nuclear   1990   India, Pakistan 
 393   Gulf War    1990   Iraq, Kuwait 
 394  Rwanda-Uganda  1990  Rwanda, Uganda 
 395   Liberia-Sierra Leone   1991   Sierra Leone, Liberia 
 396  Ghana-Togo Border II 1991  Ghana, Togo 
 397   Yugoslavia I-Croat./Sloven  1991   Serbia, Slovenia, Croa 
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 Table A.1. (continued) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
    Crisis Number Crisis Name   Start Year Primary Adversaries 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 398   Bubiyan    1991   Iraq, Kuwait 
 399   Foreign Intervention Zaire  1991   Zaire, Belgium, Fran 
 400   Ecuador-Peru Border IV  1991   Ecuador, Peru 
 401   Nagornyy Karabakh   1991   Azerbaijan, Armenia 
 402  Egypt-Sudan Border II 1992  Egypt, Sudan 
 403   Yugoslavia II-Bosnia   1992   Serbia, Bosnia, Croa 
 404  Papua New Guinea-Solomon 1992  Pap New Gui, Solom 
 405  Sleeping Dog Hill  1992  Thailand, Myanmar 
 406   Iraq No-Fly Zone   1992   Iraq 
 407  Georgia-Abkhazia  1992  Georgia, Russia 
 408   N. Korea Nuclear I   1993   North Korea 
 409   Operation Accountability  1993   Lebanon, Israel 
 410  Cameroon-Nigeria III  1993  Cameroon, Nigeria 
 411   Haiti Military Regime  1994   Haiti, US 
 412   Iraq Deploy-Kuwait   1994   Iraq, US 
 413   Ecuador-Peru Border V  1995   Ecuador, Peru 
 414  Spratly Islands  1995  China, Philippines 
 415   Taiwan Strait IV   1995   China, Taiwan 
 416   Red Sea Islands   1995   Eritrea, Yemen 
 417   Aegean Sea IV   1996   Turkey, Greece 
 418   Operation Grapes of Wrath  1996   Lebanon, Israel 
 419   Desert Strike    1996   Iraq, US 
 420   N. Korea Submarine   1996   N. Korea, S. Korea 
 421   Zaire Civil War   1996   Zaire, Rwanda 
 422   UNSCOM I    1997   Iraq, US 
 423   Cyprus-Turkey Missiles  1998   Turkey, Cyprus 
 424   Eritrea-Ethiopia   1998   Eritrea, Ethiopia 
 425   Ind-Pak Nuclear Test   1998   India, Pakistan 
 427   US Embassy Bombings  1998   Afgh, Sudan, US 
 428   Syria-Turkey    1998   Syria, Turkey 
 429   Unscom II    1999   Iraq 
 430   Kosovo   1999   Yugoslavia 
 431   Kasmir IV Kargil  1999   India, Pakistan 
 432   East Timor II    1999   Indonesia, Australia 
 433   Caspian Sea    2001   Azerbaijan, Iran 
 434   Afghanistan-USA   2001   US, Afghanistan 
 435   Indian Parliament Attack 2001  India, Pakistan 
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APPENDIX B 
BASIC DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STUDY'S VARIABLES 
 
Table B.1. Basic statistics for the variables included in Model 1 
 Minim Maxim Mean Std. Deviation 
Variable     
Foreign Policy Behavior 0 1 0.105 0.31 
Overall Ideology -39.2 48.46 -0.597 17.22 
International Peace Ideology 0 8.8 1.683 1.82 
Relative Capabilities 0.003 0.999 0.572 0.33 
Trade Share 0 0.74 0.01 0.043 
Polity -20 2 -12.25 7.04 
Alliance Portfolios 0.097 1 0.72 0.182 
Distance 0 11939 4442.01 2443.16 
Contiguity 0 1 0.017 0.13 
 
 
Table B.2. Basic statistics for the variables included in Model 2 
 Minim Maxim Mean Std. Deviation 
Variable     
Foreign Policy Behavior 1 5 2.115 0.527 
Overall Ideology -39.2 48.46 -0.597 17.22 
International Peace Ideology 0 8.8 1.683 1.82 
Relative Capabilities 0.003 0.999 0.572 0.33 
Trade Share 0 0.74 0.01 0.043 
Polity -20 2 -12.25 7.04 
Alliance Portfolios 0.097 1 0.72 0.182 
Distance 0 11939 4442.01 2443.16 
Contiguity 0 1 0.017 0.13 
 
Table B.3. Basic statistics for the variables included in Model 3 
 Minim Maxim Mean Std. Deviation 
Variable     
Foreign Policy Behavior 1 4 2.305 0.932 
Overall Ideology -36.35 48.46 3.12 19.16 
International Peace Ideology 0 8.7 1.98 1.897 
Relative Capabilities 0.009 0.998 0.657 0.306 
Trade Share 0 0.669 0.006 0.03 
Polity -20 2 -10.48 7.25 
Alliance Portfolios 0.101 1 0.686 0.23 
Distance 0 11406 4262.1 2370.17 
Contiguity 0 1 0.02 0.14 
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APPENDIX C 
OVERALL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE IDEOLOGY, BY COUNTRY 
 
Figure C.1. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Australia 
 
 
Figure C.2. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Australia 
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Figure C.3. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Austria 
 
 
Figure C.4. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Austria 
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Figure C.5. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Belgium 
 
 
 
Figure C.6. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Belgium 
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Figure C.7. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Canada 
 
 
Figure C.8. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Canada 
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Figure C.9. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Denmark 
 
 
Figure C.10. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Denmark 
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Figure C.11. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Finland 
 
 
Figure C.12. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Finland 
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Figure C.13. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: France 
 
 
Figure C.14. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: France 
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Figure C.15. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Germany 
 
 
Figure C.16. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Germany 
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Figure C.17. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Great Britain 
 
 
Figure C.18. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Great Britain 
 
 
 184 
 
Figure C.19. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Greece 
 
 
Figure C.20. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Greece 
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Figure C.21. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Ireland 
 
 
Figure C.22. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Ireland 
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Figure C.23. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Italy 
 
 
Figure C.24. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Italy 
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Figure C.25. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Japan 
 
 
Figure C.26. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Japan 
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Figure C.27. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Netherlands 
 
 
Figure C.28. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Netherlands 
 
 
 189 
 
Figure C.29. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: New Zealand 
 
 
Figure C.30. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: New Zealand 
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Figure C.31. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Norway 
 
 
Figure C.32. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Norway 
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Figure C.33. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Portugal 
 
 
Figure C.34. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Portugal 
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Figure C.35. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Spain 
 
 
Figure C.36. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Spain 
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Figure C.37. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Sweden 
 
 
Figure C.38. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Sweden 
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Figure C.39. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Switzerland 
 
 
Figure C.40. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Switzerland 
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Figure C.41. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: United States 
 
 
Figure C.42. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: United States 
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